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ABSTRACT 
The question is posed, what does it mean to be oneself? 
It is argued that to look for an answer in the psycho-physical 
characteristics of the individual himself does not take account of 
man's restless refusal to be content with what he is. The starting 
point of the inquiry is that an understanding of what makes man himself 
must take account of the 'beyond' in terms of which he seeks to define 
himself. It is this preliminary assumption which explains how Heidegger 
and Buber come to be considered together, for both philosophers share 
the view that man is an ec-static being, one who 'stands out' from 
himself in some way. However, it is precisely when Heidegger and 
Buber are juxtaposed that the problem of the thesis is set, for their 
views seem mutually exclusive. In Heidegger's understanding a--man is 
only himself when he steps forth towards his own possibility of non- 
existence. In contrast for Buber it is the relation of love which 
enables a person to be himself. The purpose of the comparison is to 
attempt to face the reality of death for each person with its effect 
on identity, and also the reality of the love of another person freeing 
ona to be oneself. 
The argument is presented that man's relation with man as 
Buber presents it requires a radical reconstruction of Heidegger's 
analysis of existence. It is suggested that through the reality of love 
which resists the world 'as it is', including the power of death, the 
boundaries of existence need to be redefined. If love is accepted as 
an ontological phenomenon, then its appearance does not seem to be 
explicable within Heidegger's ontology of Being-towards-death. It is 
ii 
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noted, on the other hand, that if it is possible to build an alternative 
ontology on love, the final possibility of death cannot be sidestepped. 
It is here that Heidegger can be used to strengthen Buber's notion of 
relation, for Buber seems to ignore the finitude of man, and the threat 
it poses to the 'I-Thou' relation as an ontological category. 
In the final section of the thesis, it is argued that the 
phenomenon of love cannot have its roots in this dying world. It is 
suggested that an explanation of the reality of love and its power to 
create personal Being requires an eschatological perspective. Only 
from such a perspective, with its refusal to accept death as a condition 
of man being himself, can an alternative ontology to Heidegger's be 
found. 
The conclusion reached is that the concept of God is 
implicit in the view of selfhood developed in the thesis. In accordance 
with that conclusion, in the final chapter some theological implications 
of a relational view of the self are outlined. In particular, the 
question is asked whether Persons-in-Trinity can be viewed as the 
ultimate resource for personhood. Finally, requirements for a 
Christological anthropology consistent with a relational selfhood, are 
considered. 
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... For how can we reject 
The long last look on the ever-dying face 
Turned backward from the other side of time? 
And how offend the dead and shame the living 
By these despairs? And how refrain from love? 
This is a difficult country, and our home. 
Edwin Muir 
"The Difficult Land" in 
Collected Poems (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 238. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Thirty spokes unite in one nave, 
And because of the part where nothing exists we have 
the use of a carriage wheel. 
Clay is moulded into vessels, 
And because of the space where nothing exists we are able 
to use them as vessels. 
Doors and windows are cut in the walls of a house, 
And because they are empty spaces, we are able 
to use them. 
Therefore on the one hand we have the benefit of existence, 
and on the other of non-existence. 1 
In Antoine de Saint-Exupery's, The Little Prince, the story 
is told of a space-traveller, who is overcome with sadness on encountering 
an earthly garden full of roses. On his home planet, the Little Prince 
had cared for one rose which he believed to be unique in the whole 
universe, and here were five thousand of them all alike in a single garden. 
As he was concluding that all he had loved was a common rose, a wise fox 
appeared, and taught him that his rose was unique, not through any intrinsic 
properties it possessed, but because he had loved it. To the other roses 
he said, 
You are beautiful, but you are empty. One could not 
die for you. To be sure, an ordinary passer-by would 
think that my rose looked just like you--the rose that 
belongs to me. But in herself alone she is more important 
than all the hundreds of you other roses .... because 
she is my rose. 2 
1The 
thoughts of Lao-Tse, quoted in a discussion on Heidegger 
in William Barrett's Irrational Man, A Study in Existential Philosophy 
(New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962), p. 234. 
2Antoine 
de Saint-Exupery, The Little Prince, translated by 
Katherine Woods (Puffin Books, 1962), p. 83. 
1 
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The purpose of this inquiry may be stated as an examination 
in depth of one approach to the question of how one is identified uniquely 
as oneself. The quotations chosen above have something in common, and 
enable that approach to be made clear, for both quotations, in 
significantly different ways, direct attention away from characteristics 
of personality. In doing that, they introduce the first assumption to 
be made; that to look for the centre of personal identity somewhere 
other than in observable characteristics of personality is at least a 
conceivable enterprise. 
It is this preliminary assumption which explains how 
Heidegger and Buber come to be considered together, for both philosophers 
share the view that one is uniquely oneself when one 'stands out' from 
oneself in some way. It is this capacity to be ec-static which, for 
them, distinguishes man from other beings who can be identified as 
themselves only by their particular characteristics. For both Heidegger 
and Buber, one is uniquely oneself in relation to that which lies beyond 
one's bodily boundaries. 
However, it is precisely when Heidegger and Buber are 
juxtaposed that the problem of this thesis is set, a problem which is 
expressed in placing together the initial quotations (on page 1). In 
the first, it is the emptiness of non-existence which is exalted as that 
which complements existence and integrates it into a functioning whole. 
In opposition to this is - an©tý-ier-. view in_which_one's identity is created 
by the love of another. The problem is that each view seems to exclude 
the other. In Heidegger's understanding, a man is only himself when he 
steps forth towards his own possibility of non-existence. Death, as 
that possibility which, of all possibilities is his alone, has an 
integrating function in bringing him to be himself. The fact that each 
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individual must die is constitutive of authentic selfhood. It is man's 
relation to time which enables him to be himself. In contrast, Buber 
talks of the meeting in which there is the encounter of 'I' and 'Thou' 
which enables a person to be himself. 
Death and love; are they mutually exclusive, or is a synthesis 
possible? The question will be posed to Heidegger: Is his existential 
analysis adequate? Does he take sufficient account of the realm of the 
interhuman (Zwischenmenschlichen) which Buber makes the foundation of 
his anthropology and ontology? If it is shown that his analysis is 
partial, can we simply add an analysis of interpersonal relations to 
give a whole view of man's existence, or are the two ways of viewing 
man incompatible? 
It seems to me that these questions are tested by one fact 
in particular, the fact that I will die. As will be made clear, 
Heidegger's definition of existence as "towards death" makes it 
impossible for him to give the existence of his fellow men any 
ontological status. He may recognise the everyday reality of man in 
relation to others, but he cannot agree that authentic existence is 
ultimately interpersonal. Buber, on the other hand, does not seem to 
face up to the reality of death, and the threat which it poses to any 
talk of love as the ultimate category for man's existence. 
The purpose of this comparison of Buber and Heidegger is to 
attempt to face both the reality of death for each one of us with its 
effect on who we are, and also the reality of the other person who in 
the act of love can free one to be oneself. The argument will be that 
man's relation with man as Buber presents it requires a radical 
reconstruction of Heidegger's analysis of man's existence. 
As the discussion progresses it will be shown that far more 
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is at stake here than alternative views of selfhood. We are not embarking 
on a study of selfhood as an isolated phenomenon, in abstraction from 
the world. Indeed it is assumed from the beginning that such an isolation 
cannot lead to a full understanding of personal identity. The significance 
of the difference between Heidegger and Buber on the question of personal 
identity lies in the alternative views of reality which are linked 
inseparably with their views of selfhood. Both philosophers see man in 
a world that is bound up with him. The world does not exist for them 
as a detached reality over against a worldless subject; the world and 
man are caught up in each other, so that any conclusions concerning 
personal identity have implications for man's world, and vice versa. 
To anticipate something of the argument, it will be suggested 
that through the reality of love, which resists the world, as it is, and 
resists even the power of death, the boundaries of existence need to be 
redefined. If love is accepted as an ontological phenomenon, then its 
appearance must be explained, and this seems impossible to do in 
Heidegger's ontology of Being-towards-death. We are forced to look 
beyond the world in some sense for an explanation, and once we do that, 
Being-towards-death must be redefined. This does not mean that Heidegger's 
analysis will simply be discarded, for he accurately portrays an ontology 
of this world. If death is the final possibility, to live authentically 
is to face resolutely that non-relational, individualising possibility. 
If it is possible to build an alternative ontology on love, that final 
possibility of death must not be sidestepped. It is here that Heidegger 
can be used to strengthen Buber's notion of relation, for Buber seems 
to ignore the finitude of man, and the threat it poses to the I-Thou 
relation as an ontological category. 
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In the final section of the thesis, it will be argued that 
the phenomenon of love cannot have its roots in this dying world. It 
will be suggested that an explanation of the reality of love and its 
power to create personal Being requires an eschatological perspective. 
Only from such a perspective, with its refusal to accept death as a 
condition of man being himself, can an alternative ontology to 
Heidegger's be found. 
The conclusion reached is that the concept of God is 
implicit in the view of selfhood developed in this thesis, though by no 
means in all concepts of the self. In accordance with that conclusion, 
in Chapter V some theological implications of a relational view of the 
self are outlined. The purpose of these comments is not to provide a 
prescriptive solution to the problems of existence explored, but rather 
to show that if the concept of God is relevant to a relational selfhood, 
it is relevant only as its ontological ground and not as an appendix to 
it. 
Before beginning the task of analysing Heidegger's and 
Buber's concepts of personal identity, an objection to the whole 
venture must be considered. It is suggested that Buber and Heidegger 
cannot be compared since their intentions are so radically opposed. 
Thus Maurice Friedman: 
The basic issue between Heidegger and Buber is whether 
the reality of the self, and of ontology, is found in 
the ground of the self and of its own "mature resolute 
existence" or whether it is found "between man and man". 
If the former, one can make use of existential categories 
of analysis since they tell us something of a self that 
may be regarded in itself; if the latter, the self must 
be understood in the dialogue with other selves, in the 
between, and never as an ontological entity understandable 
prior to its interhuman relations. The issue between the 
two philosophers, therefore, is a much more radical one 
than the question of whether one may add the 'I-Thou' 
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relationship as one further existential category tol 
those with which Heidegger has already provided us. 
The point is made by Friedman in a discussion on psychotherapy, and raises 
the question whether in that context there can be any synthesis of the 
two views, since from Buber's standpoint an ontological analysis of 
dialogue is no substitute for dialogue itself. 
2 However true it may be 
that therapy can only happen as a result of the direct encounter of 
therapist and patient, this criticism need not affect the task of this 
inquiry. Buber himself, in his writings on the I-Thou relation, 
necessarily steps back from dialogue in order to reflect on it. It is 
perfectly legitimate to compare the alternative views of what enables 
man to be himself. 
A more serious ground for criticising the direct comparison 
of the two philosophers is that Heidegger is engaged in a study of the 
meaning of Being as such, whereas Buber is concerned with philosophical 
anthropology. 
3 
In fact, as will be made clear in the following pages, 
the two pursuits are not mutually exclusive. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger finds the way to his goal through an analysis of man's 
existence. Buber, although his interest is in the relation of one man 
to another, develops an ontology in the process. The difference between 
the two is one of emphasis rather than of subject matter. 
1Maurice 
Friedman, The Worlds of Existentialism, A Critical 
Reader (University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 515. 
2The 
criticism is directed specifically towards the work of 
Ludwig Binswanger who in his theory of psychiatry known as Dasein 
analysis, has attempted to add to Heidegger's analysis of existence 
"for the sake of myself", the dimension of love. See Being-in-the-world. 
Selected papers of Ludwig Binswanger, edited by Jacob Needman (New York: 
Basic Books, 1963), also Friedman, op. cit. pp. 414ff; p. 514. 
3This 
judgement is made by William Barrett, Irrational Man, 
p. 236. 
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This study is brought into focus by two books, Being and Time, 
and I and Thou. I make no apology for limiting the analysis of Heidegger's 
work in this way. Some commentators make much of Heidegger's so-called 
Reversal, and the suggested impossibility of considering Being and Time 
except in the light of his later writings. However, the purpose of this 
study is not to comment on the philosophy of Heidegger as a whole, but 
specifically on how he understands selfhood in relation to death. This 
question is dealt with almost exclusively in Being and Time. 
CHAPTER I 
HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF 
PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Introductory Remarks on Method 
In a study which attempts to find the focus of personal 
identity beyond the boundaries of the individual, the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger cannot be ignored. The analysis of man's existence in 
his major work, Being and Time, 
1 
rests on the assumption that man is 
a being with the capacity to stand ahead of himself. Indeed, in his 
view, it is only because man is characterised as an ec-static being that 
he is enabled to be a self at all. For that reason alone Heidegger's 
work could not be ignored in this thesis. However, there is a more 
profound reason than simply that Heidegger's thought is an important 
contribution to the problem under consideration. His analysis of the 
Being of man is claimed to be exhaustive, and seems to preclude other 
interpretations of man as an ec-static being, in particular the view 
represented here by Martin Buber, that it is only when man stands out 
from himself to other persons that he can be himself. By incorporating 
the dimension of the future into his definition of personal identity, 
Heidegger forestalls any talk of an identity which is timeless. In the 
light of his work, one cannot say, "Death will mean the end of me, but 
that does not affect my identity now". As will be made clear in the 
following pages, because the "end", or the future, is a constitutive 
1Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and 
Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973). Henceforth referred to 
as BT. The original German annotation is given after the English. 
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feature of identity "now", the character of the future is all important 
to the question of who I am. 
It is this emphasis on the future which provides a critical 
tool to be applied to Buber's concept of personal identity; for as will 
be shown later, the interhuman nature of selfhood which he proposes 
grants little significance to man's character as a being who exists in 
time and is limited by it. However, before Buber can even be considered 
in the same context as Heidegger, it must be shown that there is reason 
to go beyond Heidegger's analysis of man's existence. The way through 
to considering Buber's work as more than a description of the ways people 
relate to each other, depends on showing that Heidegger's analysis is 
inadequate. It is not sufficient simply to show that it is incomplete 
as an ontological analysis, and that the addition of Buber's relational 
concept could fill the gaps. It must be shown to be inadequate in its 
very foundation, i. e. that man is not himself as "Being-towards-death", 
to use Heidegger's phrase. The task of chapters one and two is to 
consider Heidegger's arguments in Being and Time, questioning whether 
he does succeed in presenting an exhaustive analysis of man's Being. 
If it were to be concluded that his project is successful, this study 
would end at that point, for the ground of comparison between Heidegger 
and Buber would be removed. Buber's relational concept of "I and Thou" 
could then be no more than a piece of philosophical anthropology, for 
the analysis of what man is in his Being would be completed by Heidegger. 
The tension which creates the argument of this thesis is only maintained 
if each philosopher can show that his concept of personal identity is 
related to the nature of Reality itself. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse Heidegger's under- 
standing of the "ground" of personal identity. In using the word "ground" 
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it is implied that the primary concern is not with the ways in which 
individual human beings have in fact seen themselves as "selves" or 
how they have marked themselves off as distinct from others. The 
question being asked is rather, what is it about being human which 
enables us to see ourselves as 'selves' at all? Only then can 
consideration be given to the problem of what enables that selfhood 
to be manifested. 
Before examining these questions, their relation to Heidegger's 
concern in Being and Time must be shown, for the connection is not 
immediately obvious. The purpose of Being and Time as stated in the 
preface, and frequently throughout the book, is "to raise anew the 
question of the meaning of Being", or more in the spirit if not the 
letter of Being and Time, "the question of what it means to be". 
l 
This concern, according to Heidegger, has been lost in the pre-occupation 
with 'beings' (Seindesl So much attention has been given to the inter- 
relationships of 'beings' in the midst of other 'beings', that the 
question of what it is to be at all, has been overlooked. In that case, 
it might seem inappropriate to turn to Being and Time with questions 
about the meaning of selfhood. What other activity could be more 
inclined to turn the inquirer away from the meaning of Being as a whole 
towards an introspective examination of particular 'beings'? 
In fact, for Heidegger, there is a close connection between 
the analysis of one particular being, man, and the question of the 
meaning of Being itself. The connection lies in the fact that the 
1BT, 
p. 19/1. Macquarrie's translation of "die Frage nach 
dem Sinn vom Sein", is given first. Although Sein in this context is 
a substantive, it is suggested by one commentator that it should be 
understood as the infinitive 'to be'. This interpretation certainly 
carries an existential as opposed to substantial meaning, which is 
Heidegger's intention throughout Being and Time. See Michael Gelven, 
A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time (New York: Harper, 1970), p. 18. 
11 
question of the meaning of Being cannot be asked in isolation from 
particular beings, but must be approached through them. The inquiry 
is about 'Being', "that which determines entities as entities ... and 
'is' not itself an entity", but the investigation can proceed only via 
'entities'. ' Heidegger goes on to argue that one particular being has 
priority over all others when it is a question of the meaning of Being, 
and that is the inquirer himself. As a preliminary step towards an 
understanding of the meaning of Being the inquirer must examine the 
meaning of himself. Far from being an introspective inquiry, this 
examination is intended to lead beyond the questioner to Being as the 
ground of his identity. 
2 Heidegger's reason for claiming priority for 
the inquirer is that, in each case the very question of the meaning of 
Being belongs to his Being. 3 The capacity to ask about the meaning of 
Being is not something external to the inquirer, or an ability which 
the inquirer has as a possession, but is that which makes man the being 
that he is. For such a being whose way of Being is constituted by his 





purpose of Being and Time is clarified by a footnote 
in Heidegger's The Essence of Reasons, transl. by Terence Malick (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 97. This text, published only 
one year after BT, is in some ways a commentary on some concepts of the 
earlier work. Here Heidegger explains that BT has "as its task nothing 
more than a concrete, revealing sketch (Entwurf) of transcendence". 
In order to counter the suggestion that such an emphasis means that BT 
works from an "anthropocentric standpoint", he explains that "by elaborating 
the structure of transcendence of Dasein, 'man' comes into the 'centre' 
of the picture, so that his nothingness within the totality of Being 
can and must become a problem of first priority". Thus the analysis of 
transcendence is not an end in itself but is to lead to the horizon of 
man's Being. 
3BT, p. 27/7. 
4Ibid. 
The term will be left untranslated as it has become a 
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Dasein denotes a being which stands apart from other beings in that 
what it is, is defined only in relation to Being. This means that, to 
discover how Dasein is in each case itself, the inquiry must also be 
directed towards Being in relation to which Dasein is itself. 
As Heidegger himself admits, a circularity pervades this 
project. An analysis of Dasein with its close relation to Being requires 
some pre-understanding of the meaning of Being, but it is precisely that 
understanding which the project is designed to attain. 
1 Heidegger does 
not wish to deny the circularity, but encourages us to "leap into the 
circle primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis 
of Dasein we make sure we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being". 
2 
In his later writings Heidegger enters the circle grasping the question 
of the meaning of Being directly, but in Being and Time his approach is 
by way of Dasein, which is itself in relating to Being. The preliminary 
task in the question of the meaning of Being is therefore to make Dasein 
"transparent in his own being". 
3 
It will be made clear that in this 
existential approach the concept of personal identity is crucial. The 
thread of Jemeinigkeit (Mineness) runs through the entire work, being 
the condition for the possibility of authentic and inauthentic existence. 
Heidegger's argument is that if Dasein were not characterised by 'mineness' 
or selfhood, there would be no possibility of existing authentically or 
inauthentically. It is a major task of Being and Time to explore the 
technical term as it stands. It should be emphasised that Heidegger uses 
the term not as a pseudonym for "individual" or "man" but solely as an 
ontological term. By using 'Dasein' he avoids any suggestion of a subject 
who is 'there'. 'Dasein' is simply 'Being-there'. 
1See 




p. 27/7. This indeed is the whole project of BT, and 
Heidegger never succeeded in moving to the next stage. 
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ground of selfhood, which can then give access to the question of the 
meaning of Being. 
Before considering Heidegger's way of analysing man 
existentially, an indication will be given of the approaches he is 
rejecting. He sets his analysis in opposition to a 'substantialist' 
ontology which, whether intentionally or not, identifies the individual 
by his location as an object in space and time. Since everyday language 
identifying the individual tends to support this position, Heidegger is 
careful to avoid the use of terms such as"the ego cogito of Descartes, 
the subject, the 'I', reason, spirit, person", which have been used to 
denote the selfhood of the inquirer, but have disguised the fact that 
the Being of the inquirer remains unquestioned. 
1 
Names such as 'subject' 
suggest some 'thing' which is there, and Heidegger's intention is to 
question the substantial nature of the self so that there can be an 
openness to what underlies the existing 'self'. He argues that unless 
the notion of 'subject' is explicitly challenged, there is a tendency 
to slip into a 'substantialist' ontology so that the Being of the 
subject is conceived by analogy with the Being of a 'thing'. 
2 
Descartes 
in particular is seen as guilty since with the cogito sun he claimed to 
put philosophy on a new firm footing but totally neglected to ask 
concerning "the meaning of the Being of the sum"? Heidegger discusses 
Descartes in some detail, and it will help prepare the ground for the 




pp. 44/22; 72/46. 
2 
Ibid., pp. 72/46f. 
3Ibid., 
p. 46/24. 
4See in particular BT, pp. 43/22ff.; 123/90ff. The unpublished 
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1) According to Heidegger, Descartes understands man as 
an object within a world of objects, and his Being is defined in relation 
to other objects. No question is asked concerning the 'ground' of that 
world of objects. In Heidegger's terminology, the woridhood of the world 
remains unquestioned. For Descartes, 'world' is equivalent to "all 
that is", i. e. a whole which embraces but no further defines the entire 
sum of what is. 
1 By contrast, Heidegger argues that the position of man 
as an object in a world of objects is irrelevant to the question of his 
Being. He does not deny that man can be viewed as an object, but by 
using the term Dasein, which is not applicable to man as an object, he 
concentrates solely on his character as a being who stands out from 
objects in the world. Heidegger certainly wishes to consider man in 
relation to the world, but not as a part is related to a whole. World 
is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself, in a way which will be 
made clear later in the chapter. 
2 
2) In Descartes' ontology, the Being of man is taken "in 
the same sense as the Being of the res extensa, viz. as substance". 
3 
When the meaning of 'substance' is taken further it becomes clear why 
Heidegger objects so strongly to the view that the self is a res cogitans. 
He quotes Descartes' definition of substance: 
By substance we can understand nothing else than an 
Part II of BT was to have included a section analysing the ontological 
foundation of the cogito sum. It should be noted that there is no 
intention here to discuss the validity of Heidegger's criticism of 
Descartes, but simply to present his interpretation. 
1See 
BT, pp. 128/95; 130/98. The point is expanded in an 
extended treatment of the concept of world in Essence of Reasons, p. 43. 
2BT, 




entity which is in such a way that it needs no other 
entity in order to be. 1 
Descartes equates substantiality and self subsistence. That which 
makes each substance be itself is found within itself. Applied to the 
Being of man, such an ontology implies that nothing beyond what is 
substantially present can affect his Being. The result is to encapsulate 
man's Being, to confine him within the boundaries of the 'given', and 
to deny the ontological significance of his capacity to relate to what 
is beyond him. It is this self-contained character of 'substance' which 
Heidegger finds so inappropriate for the Being of man. However this 
does not mean that he rejects the concept of self-subsistence altogether. 
The point is simply that Dasein's self-subsistence rests on a different 
basis from any other being: 
Its 'subsistence' is not based on the substantiality of 
a substance but on the 'Self-subsistence'of týe existing 
self, whose Being has been conceived as care. 
It is the existing Dasein, Dasein which 'stands-out' from itself which 
is self-subsistent. In other words, Heidegger selects the capacity to 
stand-out or ex-sist, the very capacity that was denied by a substantialist 
ontology, as the condition of self-subsistence. Later the criticism will 
be developed that Heidegger's notion of the self-subsistence of the 
ex-sisting Dasein also leads to the encapsulation of man's Being, and 
therefore has the same result as the substantialist ontology he rejects. 




substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem 
quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indilgeat ad existendum. " Descartes, 
Principia Philosophiae Part If para. 51. Heidegger's translation is given 






Being of an entity is found by defining its attributes, amongst which 
for each instance there is "pre-eminently one property which constitutes 
its nature and essence, to which all the rest are referred". 
1 
For the 
res corporea this property, in Descartes' view, is extensa, or length, 
breadth and height. As Heidegger comments, "Extension is a state-of-Being, 
constitutive for the entity we are talking about". 
2 
It is that which 
remains constant though all other attributes may change. In other words, 
that which remains constant makes that being what it is. According to 
Heidegger, in Descartes' ontology this assumption is also applied to the 
Being of man. Dasein is defined in a way which compels us to accept 
that it is. The Being of man is defined by its compelling presence, 
which leads us to overlook its contingency, the fact that it might not, 
and will not exist. The same contingency is clouded over by the insistence 
that the Being of man is unchangingly constant, that Dasein is now in 
essence what it has always been and always will be. 
The conclusion from these points is this. Heidegger is 
claiming that an understanding of Dasein, and hence of the meaning of 
Being, requires a radical departure from the common sense starting point, 
namely the man who appears to our senses. It means turning away from 
the man who can be described, defined and circumscribed as an object 
can be defined. In a sense it means declaring that man is indefinable, 
if by that it is meant that his essential Being can be captured in a 
definition that remains unchanged through time. 
The problem then is that if man's Being cannot be understood 
by considering man as he appears, how can he be approached at all? 
1BT, 
p. 123/90 quoting Descartes' Principia Philosophiae 
Part I, para. 53. 
2Ibid. 
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Three ways have been indicated above which show how man can break through 
the confines of his present appearance. 1) Dasein is to be viewed in 
a close relation to the world; 2) his Being is not substantial but 
existential; and 3) his Being is related to time. By analysing these 
horizons of man's Being, his worldhood, his existentiality and his 
temporality, Heidegger leads us towards an understanding of selfhood. 
By investigating the horizons, what is near at hand is brought into 
focus in a way which would not be possible by looking directly at man 
as he appears to us. The purpose of the rest of this chapter is to 
reveal the nature of selfhood which emerges from viewing man as a 
being who ex-sists, who stands out from himself. 
It will be argued that Being and Time is misinterpreted 
unless it is seen as a defence of a radically individualised selfhood, 
i. e. the character of man's existence is such that he is only himself 
in relation to his own existence. In his Being he is isolated from 
others. This interpretation is opposed to that of several commentators. 
Macquarrie, for example, concludes: 
Heidegger's individualism appears to me to be accidental 
rather than essential to his philosophy which clearly 
recognises 'Being-with-Others' as a necessary way of 
being of the individual, a basic existential. 
1 
It will be shown in the following pages that Heidegger's undoubted emphasis 
on Seing-with-others' in no way detracts from the view that when Dasein 
is 'authentic', there is radical isolation. For Heidegger, individualism 
is by no means accidental to his concept of the 'owned' or 'authentic' 
self. Indeed, at one point he describes his standpoint as existential 
solipsism, but goes on to say that, far from divorcing an isolated subject 
1 
John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology (Middlesex: 
Pelican Books, 1973), p. 85. 
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from the world, what it does is "precisely to bring Dasein face to face 
with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as 
Being-in-the-world". 1 The exact nature of Heidegger's notion of 
individualised existence, and of the way Dasein exists in relation to 
others and to the world will be explored in what follows. 
Existence and Mineness 
The two concepts of 'existence' (Existenz) and 'mineness' 
(Jemeinigkeit) form the starting point for the analysis of Dasein's 
way of Being, and their meaning is unfolded throughout Being and Time. 
2 
'Existenz' is the term reserved uniquely for Dasein, in distinction 
from Existentia which is used for any other being. Such beings are 
classified by Heidegger as 'present-at-hand' (vorhanden) or ready-to- 
hand (zuhanden), 3 and they are distinguished from Dasein in that they 
are incapable of asking questions about their Being. 
For Heidegger, "the essence of Dasein lies in its existence". 
4 
This linking of 'essence' and 'existence' is crucial and must be explored 
in some detail. It is clear that, whatever Heidegger means here, the 
way through to an awareness of the 'essence' of Dasein lies in an 
examination of 'existence'. First, the approaches which Heidegger 
rejects will be outlined. 
1BT, 
p. 233/188. 
The terms are introduced in BT, p. 67/42. 
3Ibid. 
For definitions of vorhanden and zuhanden, see BT, 
p. 68/42 and p. 98/69. Heidegger's criticism of a substantialist ontology, 
as has been noted already is that no distinction is made between the 





1) He rejects the notion that what man 'is' he has always 
been; i. e. that he 'has' an essence which precedes existence. It has 
already been noted in the discussion on Descartes that to define the 
essence of man as that which persists unchanged through time is to 
circumscribe and limit his Being in the manner of things 'present-at-hand'. 
2) He rejects the view that Existence precedes essence, 
in Sartre's sense. In his Brief fiber den Humanismus, written twenty 
years later than Being and Time, Heidegger writes: 
Sartre states the axiom of existentialism in the following 
manner: "Existence precedes Essence". He uses the terms 
existentia and essentia here in the sense of metaphysics, 
which has maintained since Plato that essentia precedes 
existentia. Sartre turns this statement around. However, 
the reversal of a metaphysical statement is still a meta- 
physical statement and, like metaphysics itself, remains 
oblivious of the truth of Being. ' 
Sartre's own explanation of his meaning is "that man first of all exists, 
encounters himself, surges up in the world, and defines himself afterwards", 
2 
so that the individual by the performance of existing wills what he 'is'. 
In his existence he chooses and is responsible for his 'essence'. 
3 
Although Heidegger's phrase is similar to Sartre's, it appears that he 
criticises Sartre for considering how each man exists without questioning 
the ontological ground of his existence. Whatever Heidegger means by 
saying that the 'essence' of Dasein lies in 'existence', he does not mean 
that its 'essence' is uncovered once the practical everyday possibilities 
of choosing have been considered. Such an interpretation would reduce the 
meaning of 'existing' to its common meaning where it is used as a synonym 
1M. 
Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Warheit, Mit einem Brief 
über den Humanismus (Bern: A. Francke, 1947), p. 72. 
2Jean 
Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism , translated 
by Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 1948), p. 28. 
3Sartre, 
op. cit., p. 47. 
20 
for 'living'. In Heidegger's view the 'everyday' possibilities of life 
must be analysed further before they can reveal the full meaning of man's 
Being. 1 To take the everyday choice between this or that course of action 
as the full content of 'existence' would be to lose sight of the distinctive 
character of man's Being. Such choosing is merely the selection of one 
route through a maze of possibilities which are 'present-at-hand'. It 
is a manipulation of things in the world by a being itself within the 
world, which leaves unquestioned the relation of that being to the world. 
Heidegger's thesis is that man for the most part does abandon himself 
to definite, concrete possibilities within the world, seeking to understand 
the meaning of his Being by relation to other beings. In doing so he 
fails to look beyond himself to his 'horizon', his true "potentiality- 
for-Being" in terms of which alone he can be himself. 
2 
Only by relating 
to the 'possibilities' of his Being which lie far beyond the everyday 
possibilities is he freed to grasp fully these everyday choices. 
3 
Heidegger rejects Sartre because he too fails to look towards 
the 'horizon' in relation to which man becomes free. Instead he settles 
for a 'freedom' of choice amongst the possibilities of the moment. For 
Heidegger it is only because man is in some way ahead of himself that he 
can make these everyday choices his own. It is not that these choices 
are the ground of who he is. However, the everyday choices of living 
1See 
BT, pp. 33/12; 69/43; 360/312. He refers to the everyday 
choices of each man as his existentiell possibilities, which must then 
be analysed existentially to reveal their underlying ontological structure. 
His method is the well known hermenentical circle. In considering Dasein 
existentielly in his 'ontical' everydayness, existential-ontological 
conclusions are drawn, which are then used to re-interpret Dasein's 
everyday possibilities. 
2For Heidegger's use of 'horizon', see BT, pp. 91/1; 416/365. 
3See BT, p. 237/193. 
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are not irrelevant to the question of who man 'is'. Because Dasein is 
himself in relation to his 'horizon' he is then set free for the individual 
ways of being himself. The relation to the 'horizon' in no way imposes 
a bland uniformity on Dasein. Magda King puts the matter well: 
It is therefore not a priori determined by the structure of 
existence how a man's Being is to be his. On the contrary, 
it enables man to relate himself to his own ability-to-be in 
profoundly different ways, and so leaves it open how each 
factual existence is a self. Existence is thus a free way 
of Being, because the possibility of various modifications 
lies in its own structure. 
3) It might appear from the discussion on Sartre that Heidegger, 
with his talk of the possibilities of man's Being, has a concept of a 
fixed 'essence' ahead of man which must simply be worked out in his 
everyday existence. Such a view would accord with much contemporary 
thought on personal growth, which would see the goal of human existence 
as the development of one's full potential to be oneself, or in the 
words of Carl Rogers, "to be that self which one truly is". 
2 
It must 
be made clear that Heidegger's position on personal identity differs 
radically from any such developmental view of personality which implies 
that man can only become what he already is potentially. On this 
understanding the Being of man is no different from that of the seed of 
the plant which through time develops to the full flower. The seed is 
in essence the fully grown plant. The fact that man has a choice whether 
to grow or not whereas the plant presumably has not, does not alter the 
'closed' nature of such an ontology. 
It appears that this position is close to Heideggers, so 
1Magda 
King, Heidegger's Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1964), p. 54. 
2Carl 
Rogers, On Becoming a Person (London: Constable, 1967), 
pp. 163ff. Rogers is quoting from S. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death. 
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much so that Macquarrie seems to interpret his concept of selfhood in 
this way, which he compares to Aristotle's: 
According to Aristotle ... the self is the actualization 
of the potentiality of the body ..., the bringing to 
fulfilment of these potentialitigs provided by an 
embodied existence in the world. 
It seems to me that what Heidegger is doing is to resist precisely the 
conclusions of this model. He is fully aware that all talk of the 
"actualization of potentialities", or of development of selfhood, is 
brought up against the phenomenon of death. The "fulfilment of these 
potentialities provided by an embodied existence in the world", is death. 
The seeds of death are present in man from the moment he is born. "As 
soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die". 
2 
The 
conclusion could be that if man now is defined by what he can become, 
then death as the end of all that he is, threatens his identity now. 
Heidegger's task in Being and Time is to reject this line of reasoning 
by re-interpreting death existentially, 
3 
so that Dasein is not crushed 
by the ultimate possibility of its Being, death, but is free to exist 
towards it. 4 
Heidegger's intention is to protect the freedom of existence 
against the threat posed to it by the inevitability of death. It is 
interesting that he uses the analogy of the developing flower not to 
illustrate determinism but rather the freedom which belongs to Dasein. 
1John 
Macquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism (London: 
SCM, 1966) , p. 62. 
2BT, 
p. 289/245. 
3See BT, pp. 311/266,435/384. 
4The 
precise way in which Heidegger achieves this will be 
discussed in Chapter II. 
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The ripening fruit has the kind of Being to which becoming belongs. 
l 
Heidegger does not see the ripeness of the fruit as some 'destiny' or 
perfect state distanced from the fruit in its unripened state. The 
ripeness is "included as a 'not-yet' in the very Being of the fruit". 
2 
Dasein also, as long as it is, "is already its 'not-yet "'. 
3 
With 
respect to death, this means that the end of Dasein is incorporated into 
its "Being-towards-the-end". 4 Thus Heidegger rejects the idea that 
'man will become what he already is potentially'. 
By considering the views that Heidegger rejects it is now 
possible to arrive at a first understanding of the axiom, "The essence 
of Dasein lies in existence". To use the idiom of the last paragraph, 
Heidegger's own position could be expressed as, man is already what he 
will become. In Heidegger's own language, Dasein is its possibilities. 
5 
The possibilities' of Being which lie ahead of Dasein do not stand over 
against a 'present' self. These possibilities, as yet unclarified, make 
Dasein itself now, and they are already in the existing Dasein in the 
present. For Heidegger, the 'present' and the 'future' are not divided 
but are brought into relation in the existing Dasein. 
Such a relation can only be conceived of because of Heidegger's 
particular use of the word 'existence'. As has already been noted, it 
is not used in the sense of "the performance of living". Instead the 











from itself towards the 'possibilities' of Being. It is these possibilities 
which, when they are brought into the present, give Dasein its identity. 
If the meaning of that identity is to be unfolded, the way lies through 
an examination of Dasein's 'possibilities'. 
It is important to note that although Dasein's 'possibilities' 
define its Being, they do not circumscribe and limit it. They are not 
simply a list of characteristics which would make a complete identification 
of Dasein possible, in the same way as another being can be identified 
by its description. Certainly, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is 
intended to be exhaustive, so that with the 'possibilities' given in 
Being and Time, Dasein's way of Being has been completed outlined, but 
this does not imply that Dasein can be 'summed up' as a whole. The 
possibilities cannot simply be gathered up and considered all together. 
To do so would be to treat Dasein once more as a substance with its 
various characteristics which, when taken together, exhaustively describe 
it. I The possibilities' which define Dasein, or the 'Existentials' 
CExistenzialen) as they are frequently called, are not prescriptive in 
the sense of defining how Dasein is to exist in each case. Rather they 
define a range of possible ways to be, within which Dasein can 'be' in 
a way unique to itself in each case. 
2 
The Existentials cannot be isolated but must be understood 
"equiprimordially". This word is used frequently by Heidegger but is 
not defined explicitly. The sense is that each Existential implies all 




2See BT, pp. 70/44f. for a definition of Existentials. 
3BT, 
p. 170/131. As will be shown later, one Existential does 
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The range of the Existentials will be considered shortly, but first 
attention must be given to the other key concept of Heidegger's analysis, 
namely, 'Mineness' (Jemeinigkeit). 
Mineness 
The concept of 'mineness' is implicit in Heidegger's claim 
that 'the essence of Dasein lies in existence'. In contrast to other 
beings which are defined as members of a class of beings, and whose 
individuality is given only as one instance of that general class, the 
identity of Dasein cannot be given by comparison with other members of 
the human species. Since all that Dasein 'is' in each case is found in 
its capacity to ex-sist, there are no grounds for comparison. It is 
only the capacity to ex-sist which is common to human Dasein, and it is 
this same common capacity which radically individualises Dasein. Dasein 
is a being which, because of its ex-sistence is necessarily characterised 
by 'mineness'. 1 
Several points can be made: 
1) No other individual can ex-sist in place of my ex-sisting. 
"Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so 
by taking hold or neglecting. ,2 
2) By saying that Dasein is radically individualised, Heidegger 
does not invisage man as an isolated monad in a worldless vacuum. "Dasein 
occupy a special position for Heidegger, denoted as Care. It is important 
for him to see Dasein as a unified whole, for without such a perspective 
he cannot proceed to his question about the meaning of Being itself. 
(See BT, p. 274/231). 'Care' characterises the wholeness of Dasein in a 
way that no other Existential does. The importance of the wholeness of 
Dasein, and the meaning of care will become apparent in Chapter II. 
1 




has been individualised, but individualised as Being-in-a-world". 
1 
Being-in-the-world is something that "belongs essentially to Dasein", 
since the essence of Dasein lies in existence, and existence takes place 
only in-a-world. 
2 
3) In practice it is the case that man does attempt to define 
his identity by gathering together characteristics into a unique combination 
shared by no-one else. He seeks to achieve a 'personality' by comparison 
with others, but the very traits that he uses to distinguish himself 
from others are in varying degrees shared by all. His individuality 
gained in this way is no different in principle from the 'individuality' 
of a mass-produced object which is never precisely identical to its 
neighbours. 
4) The concept of lnineness' is being used ontologically, as the 
ground for the possibility of being a self at all. At this stage all 
that Heidegger claims is that man's Being is such that each existing 
Dasein is unique, and that this uniqueness stems from the fact that all 
it 'is' lies in its capacity to ex-sist. That is, Dasein is a being for 
whom 'mineness' is a defining category, for whom it is appropriate to 
employ the personal pronouns 'I' and 'you'. 
3 
Nothing has been said so 
far concerning how 'mineness' is constituted apart from the suggestion 
that it is related to existence. The concept of 'mineness' does not in 
itself imply the particular ways in which selfhood might be expressed. 
'Mineness' characterises Dasein in all its ways of existing, authentic and 








or inauthenticity possible. 
1 The very word authentic (eigentlich) 
better translated as 'own most' or 'owned', reveals its connection 
with 'mineness'. The whole of Being and Time is a search for the 
ways of existing in which Dasein is most itself, or owns itself, but 
however Dasein exists, it is characterised by 'mineness'. It is not 
the case that 'mineness' is a superior state of Being which is attained 
only by the few who achieve authentic existence. It is rather the fact 
that Dasein is always characterised by 'mineness' which makes authentic 
(owned) or inauthentic (dis-owned) existence a possibility at all. 
Since it is crucial for the argument of the thesis, it 
must be emphasised that in itself the concept of 'mineness' says nothing 
about how selfhood might be constituted. To employ a distinction that 
Heidegger does not use, it could be said that 'mineness' implies a 
particularised, but not necessarily an individualised existence. If 
all that Dasein 'is' lies in its capacity to ex-sist, then in each case 
the responsibility to be itself or not rests with it alone. No one 
else can"ex-sist for it. But to say that Dasein is in each case 
responsible for its own selfhood does not imply that the ground of that 
selfhood is found only within its own resources. 
Individualised Existence 
It has been argued that man's capacity to ex-sist does 
not necessarily imply that in being himself he is radically isolated from 
others in his Being. Heidegger does take this step, and claims that the 
very structure of existence leads to the isolation of each man, so that 
the existence of others is irrelevant to each man's project to be himself. 
1See BT, pp. 68/43; 78/53; 275/232. 
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Since this is a major point of difference between Heidegger and Buber, 
it must now be shown what leads Heidegger to his view that Dasein is not 
only 'particularised' but also 'individualised' by existence. 
To look ahead for a moment the plan is to show how 
Heidegger establishes that Dasein exists "for the sake of itself", 
"and selects the Existentials (i. e. the possible modes of Dasein's existence) 
which confirm this interpretation. 
1 
His argument is that whether Dasein 
exists authentically or inauthentically, it always exists "for the sake 
of itself". However, when man faces the fact of his isolation and 
embraces it, then he is freed to be himself. Having established that the 
individual's freedom comes about through his capacity to exist "for the 
sake of himself", he is then able to introduce the phenomenon of death 
and the possibility of non-existence as a confirmation of the self- 
relational identity. These phenomena are not understood as a threat to 
the freedom of the existing self, but as a confirmation and unveiling of 
it. In the second chapter the question will be put whether man is free 
as a being who relates only to himself, or whether the phenomenon of 
death ahead of every man forces him into self-relation. The answer to this 
question is crucial for the rest of this thesis. If the individual's 
isolation is a direct result of his capacity to ex-sist, rather than a 
result of the nature of the 'possibilities' towards which he ex-sists, 
then there is no ground for considering Buber's relational concept of 
identity in the same context as Heidegger. If Heidegger is correct, when 
it is a question of Being, a man is himself only in relation to his own 
'possibilities'. Others cannot have a part in making him who he is, 
1See 
Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, pp. 85f. for a 
helpful explanation of the meaning of the phrase "for the sake of itself". 
This notion runs through the whole of Being and Time. 
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for no-one else can exist for him. 
How then does Heidegger show that Dasein's individualisation 
emerges from his capacity to ex-sist? The answer to this requires a more 
detailed explanation of the meaning of 'existence'. The word has a 
much more dynamic tone than the paraphrase, "standing out towards 
possibilities", would suggest. For Heidegger, existence is thought of 
in terms of projection, in the root sense of "throwing forth". 
1 
In 
existing, Dasein does not simply have its "possibilities" in view, but 
"throws itself forth" towards them. Clearly, these possibilities are 
to be interpreted ontologically, and do not signify the concrete 
possibilities and choices which make up everyday life. These, by being 
grasped and realised, lose their character as possibilities. They 
cannot have ontological significance since Dasein is defined radically 
in terms of "what is not yet". 
2 
The 'possibilities' in relation to which 
Dasein is itself are not those which today are still outstanding but 
'one day' will be realised. If Dasein existed for possibilities which 
could be actualised, with their actualisation it would cease to 'be', 
since all that it 'is', is defined in relation to its possibilities. 
It is rather the case that as long as Dasein is, the possibilities of its 
Being lie ahead of it. One can go so far as to say that for Dasein's 
possibilities to remain as such, they are not only unactualised, but 
in principle unactualisable as well. 
If this is so, what connection can there be between Dasein 
and the 'possibilities' towards which it 'throws' itself? The image 
of a horizon is helpful, although Heidegger does not use it himself in 
1See 
BT, pp. 184/115 and 385/336. 
2See 
BT, p. 288/244. 
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this context. One of the characteristics of a horizon is that it 
cannot be reached. As one moves forwards, it is always beyond one, yet 
in that direction lies one's goal. The horizon, though distant, 
influences the way one acts. The possibilities of Dasein, though lying 
ahead and unreachable, are a part of existence now. 
1 
Heidegger's way 
of putting this is that; 
in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself in its Being. 
Dasein is always 'beyond itself', not as a way of behaving 
towards other entities which it is not, but as Being towards 
the potentiality-for-Being which is itself. 2 
Heidegger makes clear on the next page that it is this capacity to be 
ahead of itself which is the characteristic of being a self. This does 
not mean, of course, that Dasein exists in two 'states', the 'Self' as it 
is 'now', and some projected, future ideal image towards which the 
existing 'self' relates as to some superego. That would be to drive a 
wedge through the concept of selfhood and would result in one of two 
conclusions. Either man as he appears now could be taken as 'real man', 
in which case the man 'ahead' in the future would be more of a 'super 
man' and therefore not a 'real' man at all. Or the man'ahead' would 
be the 'real' man, leaving man as he appears with, in effect, a non- 
identity. Neither alternative represents Heidegger's view. Both 
result from a misunderstanding of the relation he sees between the 
present and the future. In the existing Dasein the sharp division 
between present and future becomes instead a close relationship. Dasein 
'now' is not a present self which can look into the future to itself as 
1The 
analogy of the horizon, like all analogies, breaks down 
at one point. On a journey, what at one time was the horizon can be 
reached and passed, although the horizon as such is always ahead. When 
Heidegger talks of horizon, he never implies that man can transcend his 
horizons. They constantly remain as the boundaries of his Being. Cf. BT, 
pp. 416/365 and 19/1 for Macquarrie's comment on the German connotations 





it will be. Rather Dasein ' now' is no more or less than the anticipation 
of the future possibilities of its Being. In Heidegger' s words, "Dasein 
is its possibilities". 
1 
For Heidegger all that man is, ontologically, 
lies in throwing himself forwards to the future possibilities of his 
Being, and returning to the present moment to concretise these possibilities 
in decisions. 2 There is no 'self' which then decides to project towards 
its future. Rather, Dasein in projecting towards its ownmost possibilities 
gathers an identity for itself. 
The selfhood which is thus created by "being-ahead-of-itself" 
is necessarily isolated and individualised by the very structure of 
existence. In existing, Dasein in each case throws itself forward to 
its own possibilities, and therefore "exists for the sake of itself". 
3 
This is not meant as an egotistical statement which could be refuted by 
showing that people do sometimes sacrifice themselves for others, and 
do not in general exist for themselves alone but in community. 
4 It 
simply means that Dasein's identity is in each case constituted in 
relation to its own possibilities, and to no-one else's. The individual 
cannot throw himself forth towards the possibilities ahead of another 
individual, since they do not form the structure of his own Being. 
With these arguments, Heidegger establishes that each individual 
is radically alone. It is important to emphasise that he is individualised 
and isolated purely by the fact that there are possibilities of his 
Being ahead of him. The character of the possibilities has played no 
1 
BT, p. 68/42. Cf. BT, p. 385/336. 
2CL. 
BT, p. 237/193: "In Being-ahead-of-oneself as Being towards 
one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, lies the existential-ontological 
condition for the possibility of Being-free for authentic existentiell 
possibilities". 
3Heidegger, 
Essence of Reasons, p. 85. 
4Heidegger himself makes this point; ibid., p. 87. 
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part as yet. For Heidegger, Dasein's possibilities may confirm and 
reveal aloneness, but they do not constitute it. 
1 
This does not mean 
that Dasein's possibilities play no part in identifying it. The 
capacity to ex-sist, and the possibilities towards which it ex-sists 
are interrelated. Together they reveal Dasein's radical aloneness. 
So far, all that has been established is that, for Heidegger, Dasein is 
isolated by its existence. This is a formal structure, and nothing has 
been said about the way in which Dasein is alone, or how it becomes aware 
of its aloneness. These questions must be tackled now. It should be 
clear that the approach to the character of Dasein's aloneness is not 
via an introspective examination of feelings. The whole direction of 
Heidegger's thought is away from the psychological self. His starting 
point is that Dasein's existence does not take place in a worldless 
vacuum, but only in a world in the presence of others. He constantly 
affirms that "Being-in-the-world" and "Being-with-others" belong 
inescapably to Dasein, in whatever state it is. 
2 
The only way to discover 
the meaning of the individual's isolation is through an examination of 
his "Being-in-the-world". The remainder of this chapter will be spent 
in showing how Dasein's presence in a world with others confirms and 
reveals its radical isolation rather than contradicting it. 
Isolation in a World 
From the introductory remarks on Descartes, 
3 it is clear that 
1As 
will be shown in the next chapter, this argument is 
essential to the success of Heidegger's project, for with it he hopes 
to control the threat which death poses to personal identity. 
2See BT, Division I, sections 12-27. 
3 
See above, p. 14. 
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whatever Heidegger means in saying that "to Dasein, Being-in-a-world 
is something that belongs essentially", 
1 
there is no suggestion that 
Dasein is viewed as an object within a world of objects. The 'world' 
is not a 'receptacle' within which man is placed. Instead Being-in-the- 
world must be taken existentially to depict a way in which Dasein is 
distinct from other beings. This means that we cannot argue from the 
fact that man does. indeed live in an environment to the conclusion that 
Being-in-a-world belongs inescapably to his Being. Living in an 
environment is not a characteristic of man alone! For Heidegger, 
beginning with man as he appears does not lead to an understanding of 
his ontological structure. That approach simply leads to the conclusion 
that man is present amongst other beings. 
2 
Heidegger rejects this line 
of reasoning, namely that Dasein is Being-in-the-world because he can 
be observed amongst other beings. He reverses the argument, claiming 
that it is only because Being-in-the-world belongs inescapably to Dasein 
that it has the capacity to exist at all. 
3 
This means that it is only 
by probing into the meaning of Being-in-the-world that the character 
of Dasein's existing can be reached. if the formal structure of selfhood 
is given by existing, as aloneness, the way in which that selfhood is 
worked out can only emerge from a study of the 'world', in relation to 
which Dasein is itself. 
What then does Being-in-the-world mean existentially? By 




Essence of Reasons, p. 43. 
3 
Ibid.,, p. 45: "Dasein, then, is not Being-in-the-world 
because and only because it exists facticallyy on the contrary, it car, 
only be as existing, i. e. as Dasein, because its essential constitution 
lies in Being-in-the-world". 
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separated from Dasein; 
Ontologically, 'world' is not a way of characterising 
those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is 
rather a characteristic of Dasein itself. 1 
In saying that Being-in-a-world is a characteristic, of Dasein, Heidegger 
means that the 'world' does not stand over against it, but that it is in 
relation to the 'world' that Dasein can come to be identified. 'World' 
is not some 'thing', nor the sum of all that is. Rather, "world simply 
means men in their relationships to Being in its totality". 
2 
The concept of 'world' provides a horizon which enables man 
to see the range of his possibilities. It reminds him that in seeking 
to understand his Being, it is not sufficient to ex-sist towards everyday 
possibilities within the world. Such possibilities do not pose to him 
the question of the meaning of his Being, or at best they do so only in 
a disguised form. Because man has the characteristic of Being-in-the- 
world, he is enabled to look beyond all possibilities within the world 
till at last, when all everyday possibilities have been stripped away, 
nothing is left but 'world' itself. From this perspective man discovers 
that he is not only a being amongst other beings, but a being who, from 
"the midst of being" is himself only in relation to "Being as a totality". 
The movement of understanding which "anticipates and encompasses this 
totality" is referred to by Heidegger as transcendence, or "surpassing 





of Reasons, p. 81 
3 
Ibid.,, p. 85. 'Transcendence, as Heidegger uses the term, 
does not imply a 'self' who then moves beyond himself. 'Transcendence' 
which in some respects is synonymous with 'Ex-sistencel, is what 
characterises Dasein in the first place. Only as a being which transcends 
can Dasein become a 'self' at all. See Essence of Reasons, p. 39, 
"Transcendence constitutes selfhood". 
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This relationship of beings to Being, the "Ontological 
Difference", ' which is unveiled through the concept of 'world', enables 
Dasein to approach itself; 
In approaching Being through the world, Dasein makes a 
self of itself, i. e. a being which is free to be. 2 
It is here that the significance of 'world' for an understanding of 
personal identity becomes clear. The ground for man's identity is to 
be found not in his actual physical characteristics, nor in some pre- 
formed notion of selfhood, but in his relation to 'world'. 'World' and 
selfhood are closely related. Indeed it is only by explaining the meaning 
of 'world' that selfhood can be defined. 
3 
When the relationship between Dasein and 'world' is explored, 
it turns out that the earlier designation of Dasein as existing "for the 
sake of itself" is indeed confirmed. 
4 
Being-in-a-world does not mean 
that Dasein's isolation is dispersed by involvement in the world. Instead 
the isolation is made more explicit since 'world' draws Dasein beyond 
all the possibilities which might disguise its isolation. 'World' as 
the horizon beyond all horizons within the world, reveals that all the 
projects for the sake of which man might exist are irrelevant when it 
is a question of his Being. When these projects are discarded, there 
is no thing or no-one within the world by which he might define himself. 
Dasein can then only exist for its own sake, but not in the sense of 
a self existing within the world, which is isolated from everyone else, 
and therefore must turn to himself. 'World' discloses the full force 
1Essence 









of the isolation of man because, by throwing' him beyond everything 
in the world, it shows him that he must renounce even the small comfort 
given by the thought,, "Because I feel alone and isolated, I must at least 
exist". The isolation which characterises Heidegger's'self' is more 
in the mood of the hollow emptiness at the centre of the wheel in Lao Tse's 
saying quoted in the Introduction. 
Such isolation is so different from an everyday understanding 
that it leads to the question, how can man come to be aware of his true 
character? So far it has simply been stated formally that it is by its 
relation to the 'world' that Dasein comes to itself, but the meaning of 
'world' still remains obscure. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact 
that by its peculiar nature 'world' cannot be compared to any thing 
within the world. How then can Dasein form an impression of 'world' as 
that horizon which brings selfhood into focus? Heidegger's answer lies 
with the phenomenon of Anxiety (Angst). 
The Function of Anxiety 
It is the phenomenon of Anxiety which reveals to Dasein the 
character of "Being-in-the-world", and confirms that its identity is given 
only in relation to itself. To arrive at the significance of Anxiety, 
Heidegger contrasts it with the phenomenon of Fear. Fear is always 
felt in the face of some definite threat within the world. 
1 
Although 
it may be felt as a desire to escape from the source of the fear, Heidegger 
argues that in fact the opposite is true. In fear Dasein flees, not 
away from "entities within the world", but towards them. Attention is 







"Entities within the world are not relevant to the threat which Anxiety 
discloses. That in the face of which we have Anxiety is completely 
indefinite. "' There is no possibility of identifying an object of Anxietyr 
as is the case with fear, and for that reason it is not possible for 
Dasein to escape the conclusion that what it is anxious about is itself. 
The indefinite nature of the threat is precisely what leads Dasein to 
itself for it brings the realisation that all of its "involvements" 
within the world are of no consequence. The world "has the character 
of completely lacking significance", where 'world' here means the sum 
of all that is. 
2 
Anxiety discloses that nothing in the world constitutes 
Dasein's . identity. 
3 
On the basis of this insignificance of what is 
within the world, "the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes 
itself". 4 Anxiety strips Dasein of the security of a network of relations 
within the world and leaves it face to face with the emptiness of the 
'worldhood' of the world. To borrow a phrase from one of Heidegger's 
later books, Anxiety opens Dasein to the question, "Why is there anything 
rather than nothing? " .5 It is the silence of the answer given by 
Anxiety that discloses Dasein to itself. Neither a relationship to 
projects within the world, nor a relationship to other human beings are 
able to erase the threat posed by Anxiety, the threat that the ground 
of what it is lies in nothingness. 
6 
In Anxiety, "Dasein finds itself 
1 
BT? p. 179/140. 
2 
Ibid., p. 231/186. 
3 
Cf. BT, pp. 231/187; 321/276; 393/343. 
4 
BT,, p. 231/187. 
5 
An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Ralph Manheim 
(Yale University Press, 1959), p. 1. 
Cf. BT, p. 232/187: "The 'World' can offer nothing more,, and 
neither can the Dasein--with of Others". 
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face to face with the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of its 
existence". ' 
Anxiety reveals to Dasein that the distinctive character of 
the horizon of the 'world' is its nothingness. If Dasein is itself in 
projecting towards the 'possibilities' of its Being, Anxiety shows that 
its owrimost possibility is of non-existence. The full significance of 
Heidegger's choice of the word 'Da-sein' as an ontological category 
becomes clear. It is 'Being-there as opposed to the possibility of 
'Being-not-there'. The role of Anxiety is to let this basic possibility 
of Dasein show itself as it truly is, undisguised by projects and things 
within the world. to which Dasein tends to cling. 
2 It is the possibility 
of the 'Not' belonging to each Dasein singly and uniquely which identifies 
it. In Magda King's words, 
In the finiteness of his Being, each man is sheerly 
uninterchangeable. No one can take his Being off him 
and bear it for him. 3 
It is the possibility of his non-existence which makes each man unique. 
Nothing else, or no-one else is ontologically relevant. Anxiety, by 
showing Dasein what the possibility ahead of it is, confi=s that it 
is individualised and alone. It indicates that the choice before it is 
to 'own' or 'dis-own' its aloneness, i. e. to be authentic or inauthentic. 
Heidegger's argument is that in this choice lies man's freedom. 
Anxiety frees man to be himself, or rather, it allows him to be free 
to choose whether to be alone as an 'owned' self or lose himself in the 
anonymity of the crowd. 
4 
He can do nothing about the fact that non-existence 
1BT, 
p. 310/266. 
2Cf. BT, p. 235/191. 
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lies ahead of him, but he can choose to accept that fact and make it 
his ownt or to try to deny what is inevitable. This point is important, 
for it touches on one of the crucial issues between Heidegger and 
Buber. Is man truly free as an individual whose identity is defined 
solely in relation to his own future, a future which is thrust upon him? 
Is one free in accepting the inevitable? The rest of Being and Time 
can be seen as an attempt to defend Heidegger's concept of selfhood 
against the threat posed to it by the unavoidable character of much of 
man's existence, and in particular his death. Heidegger's arguments 
will be considered in the next chapter, with these critical questions 
in mind. At present the point is raised simply to indicate that 
Heidegger associates the idea of freedom with man's aloneness. 
To sunmarise the arguments so f ar, it has been shown that for 
Heidegger, the uniqueness of each man comes from his capacity to ex-sist, 
to "throw himself forward" to the possibilities of his Being. No one 
else can exist for him. In his Being he is independent of others. His 
Being-in-a-world confirms rather than contradicts this isolation. The 
way he is in-the-world is revealed by Anxiety. Through Anxiety he is 
made aware that the possibility which makes him most himself is that of 
his own non-existence. of all possibilities, this is the one which he 
alone must face. In these arguments an ambiguity can be discerned. 
Heidegger seems to suggest both that the uniqueness of the individual 
comes from his ex-sisting and from the particular character of the 
possibilities ahead of him. At this stage the question must simply be 
asked whether man's aloneness is truly a result of his capacity to 
ex-sist or whether it is forced upon him by his possibility of non- 
existence. This question is connected with the issue of man's freedom 
and will be tackled in Chapter II. This chapter concludes with some 
comments on the significance Heidegger attaches to the, presence of others 
in the world. 
40 
Isolation in the Presence of Others 
In the last section it was shown that although Heidegger 
claimed that Being-in-the-world was essential to Dasein, this confirmed 
rather than contradicted his 'existential solipsism'. A similar 




claims that "Dasein is essentially Being-with" . In using the word 
'essentially', Heidegger implies that it belongs to the definition of 
Dasein that it exists with others. Does this mean that Dasein finds its 
identity not only in relation to its ownmost possibility but also in 
relation to other Dasein? From what has been said above, the answer 
should be 'no'. Anxiety has disclosed that each individual is made 
uniquely himself by the threat of Nothingness ahead, and this precludes 
any possibility that a relation of one individual to another could make 
him himself. 
What then does Heidegger mean by saying that 'Being-with' 
(Mitsein) is essential to Dasein? In the first place this is another 
symptom of Heidegger's antipathy to Cartesian ontology. It amounts to 
a refusal to start with an isolated ego which is supposedly the only 
'given', requiring that the existence Of others be proved. 
3 As Sartre 
comments: 
In his abrupt,, rather barbaric fashion of cutting Gordian 
Knots rather than trying to untie them, he gives in answer 
to the question posited a pure and simple definiticn. 
4 
1 
BT,, Division I. Chapter 4. 
2 
Ibid., p. 156/120: "Dasein ist wesenschaft Mitsein. " Cf. p. 163/ 
125. "In so far as Dasein is at all, it has Being -with-one -another as 




Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated and 
introduced by Hazel Barnes (London: Methuen, 1957), p. 244. Hereafter 
referred to as BN. 
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For Heidegger that question, "How do I know that others exist? " is far 
from being the starting point for philosophical inquiry. Just as a bare 
subject without a world is not 'given', neither is an isolated 
without others. others are already there with us in the world. 
' This 
does not contradict what has been said about Dasein's individuality. 
Heidegger's talk of Dasein as 'essentially' Being-with-others is not 
intended to dissolve isolation but to place it on the right foundation. 
Instead of an isolated Self in a worldless void, he advocates isolation 
as Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others. Only on the basis of Being- 
with-others is the isolated existence of Dasein realisable. Of course, 
as with Dasein's existence in-the-world, this does not mean that Dasein 
just happens to exist along with others. That would be a way of 
viewing man as an objectified self in the company of other selves. 
Heidegger's point is that Being-with-others must be viewed existentially, 
i. e. in a way which expressed Dasein's unique way of Being. When that 
is done, Being-with-others should reveal each Dasein's character as an 
isolated individual. 
How then is Dasein with others in the world, in a way which 
does not challenge its isolation? Sartre discusses this question, and 
observes that while the Idealists talk of Being-joE7others, Heidegger 
says that Dasein is with others. According to Sartre; 
Hegel's brilliant intuition is to make me depend on the 
other in my Being. I am, he said, a being for-itself 
which is for-itself only through another. Therefore the 
other penetrates me to the heart. 2 
On this understanding of personal identity, the other constitutes my 
1See 
BT, p. 152/116. 
2 
Sartre, BN, p. 237. Cf. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy 
of Religion, Volume III, pp. 10-24. 
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selfhood. If the relationship to the other is removed, 'V am lost. 
In this way an alternative to Cartesian solipsism is proposed. The 
existence of others is assumed, for without themi, there could be no 
self at all. According to Sartrer Heidegger takes this position and 
modifies it. Others are with Dasein but they are not a part of it. 
Instead of constituting the identity of the individual by relating to 
him,, the role of the other is to reveal that he is himself in self- 
relation only. Heidegger states clearly that, 
the expression 'Dasein' ... shows plainly that 'in 
the first instance' this entity is unrelated to 
others, and that of course it can still be 'with' 
others afterwards. 1 
It is Being-there, in the light of Being-not-there, which identifies 
Dasein and makes it unique in each case. Being-with-others cannot alleviate 
that isolation. Others are ontologically relevant to each Dasein only 
in that they share the capacity to ex-sist. Dasein finds that it is 
alongside others who are also projecting towards possibilities ahead of 
them. Of course the individual does not encounter these 'others' as 
examples of the human species who are merely 'there'. They have the 
character of Dasein itself as 'Being-in-the-world. Dasein itself forms 
part of the relational complex of their world. Others are 'with' Dasein 
in that they too are not ensnared as objects within the world. They 
share the characteristic of 'not being at home' in the world. 
2 
In shared 
Anxiety, Dasein discovers that the existence of others and the world 
itself can do no more than reveal aloneness. Sartre captures Heidegger's 




See BT, p. 233/189 for Heidegger's treatment of the "not-at- 
home' (unheimlich) character of Dasein. 
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the mute existence in common of one member of the crew 
[of a boat] with his fellows, that existence which the 
rhythm of the oars or the regular movements of the coxswain 
will render sensible to the rowers and which will be made 
Manifest to them by the common goal to be attýined, the 
boat or the yacht to be overtaken, and the entire world ... 
which is profiled on the horizon. It is on the common ground 
of this co-existence that the abrupt revelation of my 
"being-unto-death" will suddenly make me stand out in an 
absolute "common solitude" while at the same time it raises 
others to that solitude. 1 
Thus Dasein's isolated character does not mean that each 
individual ignores others. There is a common task, that of liberating 
others to be themselves, and being freed by them. Although ontologically 
man is himself in isolation, this is not clear to him. He needs to be 
freed from his everyday way of interpreting himself in terms of immediate 
concerns. For the most part he does not 'own' himself. He is absorbed 
with others from whom he does not distinguish himself. 
2 
It has been 
noted that Anxiety frees Dasein to be itself, but this is not something 
which takes place in separation from the existence with others. In a 
way it is the shared existence with others which mediates the power of 
Anxiety to isolate each individual. Earlier it was shown that,, for HeideTger,, 
it was only when Dasein realised the insignificance of the world as a 
whole that it was free to be itself. Here, using a similar argument, 
it can be said that Being-with-others is an inseparable aspect of Dasein, 
for only with them can the full extent of its aloneness be appreciated. 
The only possible ontological relationship between individuals 
which Heidegger can allow is the mutual concealing or exposing of this 
aloneness. It is now further clarified why Heidegger insists that existing 
"for the sake of oneself" is not a self-centred pursuit, carried out at 
1 
Sartre , BN, p. 247. Sartre is critical of Heidegger's 
notion of 'mute co-existence' because it ignores the conflict which 
characterises human relationships. For Sartre the other is a threat to 
identity. 
2 
See BT, p. 154/118. 
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the expense of others. Dasein's existence cannot be subdivided into 
concern for oneself and concern for others. In existing for the sake 
of one's own Being, one necessarily exists for the sake of the Being of 
others, one is freeing others to be their own selves. The choice 
between 'owned' and 'dis-owned' existence is not made in isolation 
from others but influences them and is influenced by them. 
1 Heidegger 
outlines the extreme ways in which this influence is expressed. In one 
extreme, an individual can attempt to 'bind' the others who form his 
world by 'leaping in' (einspringen) and taking over to himself the 
concerns which belong to the other. In so doing he is attempting to 
smother the radical aloneness of the other. By removing from him his 
responsibility for his own concern, he takes away from the other the 
opportunity to experience Anxiety and therefore to come to himself. 
In the other extreme, the individual does not 'leap in' 
for the other but 'leaps ahead' (vorspringen . The intention is not 
to take away the other's responsibility for himself, but to help him 
to realise the true nature of his existence. 
2 
The important point is 
10 
that the relationship between individuals is concerned with the mutual 
awareness of being a self, whether the intention is to conceal or expose 
that selfhood. Throughout, it is the aloneness of Being-there which 
dominates Heidegger's talk of Being-with-others. 
3 
1 
Cf. BT, p. 237/193. 
2 
See BT, pp. 158/122f. 
3 Cf. BT, p. 344/298. "Dasein's resoluteness towards itself 
is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' 
in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality 
in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates.... only by authentically 




In the light of this understanding of Being-with-others, 
it is not surprising that Heidegger has little to say about direct 
encounter. He talks of Dasein becoming aware indirectly of others 
through artefacts in the world. He is content with saying that "Others 
are 'encountered' in a ready to hand, environmental context of equipment". 
For instance a boat anchored at the shore is "indicative of others"-' 
Even in the description given in the last paragraph of the concern by 
one individual to free another to be himself, there is no suggestion of 
p a direct encounter. As Macquarrie notes, the word Fursorge (Solicitude) 
used by Heidegger to denote this concern does not mean a caring for 
another in a personal way but rather 'welfare work', or 'charity'. 
One could have concern for another without relating to them directly. 
2 
On this point Sartre is correct when he says that Heidegger changes the 
"frontal opposition" of the other over against one to an "oblique 
interdependence of individuals who in each case make a world to exist 
as a complex of instruments which they use for the ends of their human 
reality" and who find themselves caught up in each other's worlds. 
3 
In the section on Buber, an analysis of personal identity 
contrasting starkly with this model of indirect co-existence will be 
given. At this stage the question is simply raised as to why Heidegger 
is so wary of direct encounter between individuals. Could it be that 
he is forced to deny the ontological relevance of direct relationships 
with others because they challenge the whole structure of his ontology? 




Ibid., p. 157/121 footnote 4. 
3 
Sartre,, BN, p. 246 ý __ 
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claims that the only 'other' for Dasein is its own future non-existence. 
As will be discussed in the next chapter he acknowledges that death is 
the non-relational_possibility before all others. 
' 
In the face of that 
possibility he must discount a range of phenomena as of no ontological 
significance, or at best as an aspect of Dasein's tendency to 'lose' 
itself in absorption with others. For_Heidegger 
_'love' 
cannot be an 
ontological term. 
2 
If it were, this would imply that Dasein's identity 
was constituted not only in relation to its own existence, but also in 
relation to others. Heidegger cannot allow this, for each Dasein is 
responsible only for its own existence. All that can be done for others 
is to free them to be themselves- 
Heidegger's attitude to others is gathered together in a few 
words at the end of The Essence of Reasons: 
Man, as existing transcendence abounding in and surpassing 
towards possibilities, is a creature of distance. Only 
through the primordial distances he establishes toward 
all Being in his transcendence does a true nearness to things 
flourish in him. And only the knack for hearing into the 
distance awakens Dasein as self to the answer of its Dasein 
with others. For only in its Being-with-Others can Dasein 
surrender its 'I-hood' (Ichheit)in order to win itself as an 
authentic self. 3 
1 
BT, pp. 294/251ff. 
2 
Michael Gelven, op. cit., p. 53, observes that Heidegger does 
not talk of love, but he misses the significance of the omission. He 
thinks that Heidegger has chosen Existentials which are broadest in 
scope, and include all the others. Love, argues Gelven, is simply a 
special kind of caring. It is the argument of this thesis that 'love' 
cannot merely be added to the list of Existentials. It challenges the 
basis of Heidegger's ontology since if love is an ontological category, 
it demands that death be considered in a different light, as that which 
crushes personal identity rather than confirming it. 
op. cit., P. 131. 
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Summary 
Contrary to the popular impression that it is death alone 
which shapes Heidegger's concept of authentic existence, it has been 
shown here that the structure of personal identity has been laid down 
with hardly a mention of death. He argues that the isolation of each 
individual emerges directly from his definition of man as a being with 
the capacity to exist, i. e. to project himself towards his future. In 
a sense which has yet to be explained fully, man is a being who is 
ahead of himself. As the argument progressed, it became clear that the 
character of man's future played a large part in shaping the form of his 
existence now. This leads to the question whether the isolation, which 
Heidegger claims is an expression of man's freedom, is forced on him 
by the non-existence ahead of him. In the next chapter the role of death 
for Heidegger will be examined, with this critical question in mind, 
whether the 'freedom' of Dasein's aloneness turns out to be a false 
freedom. 
CHAPTER II 
DEATH AND THE FREEDOM TO BE ONESELF 
In the last chapter Heidegger's understanding of existence 
was presented in a one-sided way, by concentrating on the capacity to 
'stand out' towards possibilities. It has been shown that Dasein's 
identity is formed in throwing itself forward towards its ownmost 
possibilities. In this way "the self has been characterised ontologically 
by Being-ahead-of-itself". 1 
From what has been said,, an inaccurate impression could be 
gained, and this must now be corrected. It might appear that in defining 
Dasein solely by its capacity to ex-sist, Heidegger has presented an 
abstraction from the 'real' man who is not simply free in relation to 
the future, but is also bound by his present and past state. Is the 
freedom of Heidegger's 'man' established only by denying everything 
which is not under his control? In this chapter it will be shown that 
Heidegger by no means ignores the obstinate 'givenness' of much of man's 
existence, but there is sufficient ambiguity in his thought to give 
grounds for the impression. The confusion arises partly from his 
somewhat equivocal use of the word "existence", which Heidegger himself 
does not acknowledge. In the first chapter what might be called the 
narrow sense of "ex-sistence" was introduced. This denotes the freedom 
of Dasein towards its future, and in this thesis always appears hyphenated. 
In some contexts "existence" is used in a broad sense referring to all 
the dimensions of Dasein's way of Being. 
1 
BT, p. 237/193. 
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In the first sense, freedom is a defining characteristic of 
ex-sisting Dasein. For Heldegger, it is not the case that Dasein is free 
because of its capacity for ex-sistence. Rather the capacity for ex- 
sistence belongs to Dasein because it is free. In a way Dasein does 
not possess freedom; freedom possesses Dasein. In the words of one 
co=entator, Dasein is "constitutionally free" for it "contains within 
itself a dynamism that propels it towards achieving itself as transcendence, 
a propensity, so to speak, for authenticity". 
1 Dasein is, in a sense, 
condemned to be free, since it has no choice concerning its character 
as an ex-sisting Being, with which its freedom is associated. 
In the second sense of "existence",, Dasein's "constitutional 
freedom" is seen in relation to the other dimensions which determine 
its Being. The ambiguity in Heidegger's use of "existence" reflects 
a tension running through Being and Time, between freedom and determinism, 
a tension which, it will be argued here, remains unresolved. Attention 
will now be turned to this relation between Dasein's freedom to be itself, 
and its being immersed in a world which is not of its choosing. 
v 
First, the dimensions of Dasein other than the capacity to 
ex-sist must be outlined. Heidegger designates these as facticity 
(Faktizitat) and being Fallen (Verfallen). He seeks to define Dasein 
completely with these "Existentials". He affirms that Dasein's capacity 
to ex-sist is not some "free-floating" behaviour which attempts to escape 
the fact that it is "thrown" into a world it did not choose. 
2 Although 
1 
William J. Richardson, Heidegger (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), 
p. 187. Heidegger explicitly denies that freedom is a possession of 
Truth",, English translation in Dasein in the "Essay on the Essence of L 
Existence and Being, translated by W. Brock (London: Vision Press, 1949), 
p. 336. Cf. also Essence of Reasons, pp. 103,129. 
2 
For the concept of "thrownness" (Geworfenheit) see especially, 
BT, p. 174/135 and section 38, pp. 219-224 (176-180). 
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Dasein may choose to exist in various ways, it has no choice about the 
fact that it exists. Inseparable from the capacity to ex-sist is the 
fact that it is. of course, for Heidegger this does not simply mean 
that Dasein is, as a matter of fact, present as a being amongst other 
beings. Facticity must be understood existentially, so that it expresses 
Dasein's particular way of Being. There is no intention of considering 
man as the empirical being who can be observed factually. As always, 
Heidegger's method is to look beyond what can be observed, so that from 
a different perspective, that which can be observed is seen in a fresh 
and illuminating way. So with his consideration of facticity, Heidegger 
is attempting to avoid the 'brute fact' that we have no choice about 
being here. Instead his intention is to integrate that obstinate 
"givenness" into Dasein's existence. Thus for Heidegger, the fact that 
Dasein is "delivered over" or "thrown" into facticity is not something 
to be resisted, but embraced as an aspect of Dasein's way of Being. 
Facticity is not something set over against Dasein's freedom. It is 
an aspect of Dasein itself and pervades the whole of its Being. Thus, 
not only is Dasein "thrown" in the sense that what it has already been, 
and is now, is determined, but also it is "thrown" into its future. 
"It is thrown into the kind of Being which we call 'projecting'". 
2 
Secondly, the range of possibilities towards which it projects are not 
chosen. The nothingness surrounding Being is not chosen as a horizon 
by which Dasein is defined. The only choice open to Dasein is whether 
to accept these possibilities as its own, or to turn away from them. 
1 
Cf. BT,, p. 174/135: "facticity is not the factuality of the 
factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of 
Dasein's Being--one which has been taken up into existence, even if 
proximally it has been thrust aside. " 
2 
BT, p. 185/145. 
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Heidegger's analysis is that, for the most part, in its 
everyday existence Dasein does try to evade orignore its possibilities 
and thereby itself, by absorbing itself in the 'world' of its concern. 
This phenomenon is designated as Dasein's tendencY to fall (verfallen): 
Dasein has in the first instance fallen away from itself, 
as an authentic potentiality for Being itselý, and has 
fallen into the 'world'. ' 
Dasein retreats from the horizon of nothingness which bears down upon 
it, and in terms of which alone it can be released to be itself. Instead 
the attempt is made to find an identity in relation to things within the 
world. Dasein becomes absorbed in other people and projects within the 
world. It is inauthentic, or not-owned. Its identity is lost in the 
anonymous 'they-self' (Das Man). 
2 Its attitudes and behaviour are 
shaped by what 'they' think and do. 'They' are the anonymous mass, the 
'others' by comparison with whom Dasein attempts to measure itself. The 
attempt is made to draw together an identity by the differences from 
others, by asking whether it has lagged behind others or has some 
advantage over them which it seeks to maintain. Its Being-with-others 
is characterised by 'Distantiality' (Abstandigkeit) or as Magda King 
3 has it, by an "existential standoffishness" . 
This attempt to stand off from others in order to establish 
an identity is literally self-defeating. Comparison with others, whether 
as superior or inferior, means being judged by their standards, and is 
an evasion of Dasein's responsibility for its own self in each case. 
The others dominate Dasein and take its Being from it. 
1 
BT, p. 220/175. 
2 
See BT, Division 1: 4, pp. 163/126ff. 
3 
BT, p. 164/126. Magda King, op. cit. p. 112. 
IV/ 
ca 11% 
It is disburdened 
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of the Being which is singly and solely its own. 
1 
In this mode of 
existence which Heidegger describes as everydayness, Dasein is not 
itself. It is a 'they-self'. "The particular Dasein has been dispersed 
into the 'they' and must first find itself. .2 
Heidegger's conclusion is that, for the most part, the 'pull' 
of facticity is such that, 
as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, 3 and is sucked into the turbulence of the "they's" unauthenticity. 
In other words man never exists in some free realm which is untouched by 
his Ithrownness' into a world, not of his choosing, nor can he avoid 
the tendency to fall, i. e. to turn away from his destiny to be himself. 
4 
Does this mean that Dasein is condemned to be a divided being 
estranged from its 'true' self? Apparently Dasein cannot escape the 
everydayness which leads to being ensnared by 'falling', and alienation 
from 'self'. Has all talk of ex-sisting towards possibilities been a 
theoretical construction which cannot be realised in practice? It has 
been noted that Heidegger sees Anxiety as a phenomenon which brings 
Dasein to its self, but can Anxiety do any more than disclose the 
radical alienation of a being whose freedom is to stand out towards 
possibilities, but who is confined and crushed by facticity and the 
tendency to fall? 
The rest of Being and Time is concerned largely with these 
1 
Cf. Magda King, op. cit., p. 113. 
2 
BT, p. 167/129. 
3 
Ibid., p. 223/179. 
4 
It should be noted that for Heidegger "falling" has no 
theological connotation, nor does it imply a negative evaluation of 
Dasein. His concept operates simply as a phenomenological observation. 
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questions which may be summarised as follows: 
1. Is it possible for Dasein, characterised by the three 
dimensions of ex-sistence, facticity and fallenness, to 
be a whole? 
2. Is Heidegger's concept of identity realisable, i. e. 
can Dasein exist authentically? 
As Werner Brock points out, both questions are related to, and 
even subservient to another problem, that of Temporality. It is in 
terms of temporality that Heidegger finally understands the wholeness 
and selfhood of Dasein. This means that before the success of Heidegger's 
concept of identity can be judged, the analysis of Being and Time must 
be continued, as it moves towards temporality as the basis of man's 
wholeness. The importance of the concept of 'wholeness' for the thesis 
cannot be overemphasised. It is only on the ground of a wholeness of 
Dasein that selfhood can be understood. Indeed, since Heidegger has 
abandoned any pre-supposed notion of 'self' lying behind existence,, it 
0 
should be clear that once the wholeness of Dasein is established, the 
search for identity can go no further. For Heidegger, being oneself 
is nothing other than existing authentically as a whole. The task ahead 
is to examine critically the notion of wholeness, for if Dasein is not 
a whole but is a fragmented being, so is its identity. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it may help to give an 
over-all perspective, and an indication of the structure of this chapter. 
Heidegger's purpose in Being and Time is to raise anew the question 
of the meaning of Being. In this early stage of his thought he argues 
that Being cannot be questioned directly, but access is available through 
a study of Dasein. Dasein is a being which from within the midst of 
1 
Existence and Being, p. 68. The same questions are isolated 
by John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), 
p. 28. 
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beings relates to Being itself. The preliminary task in his analysis 
is to form an impression of Dasein in its wholeness, for until the Being 
of Dasein has been laid bare in its completeness, there is no possibility 
of proceeding to an understanding of the meaning of Being itself. In 
the published part of Being and Time, Heidegger does not succeed in 
moving beyond the preliminary task. The whole book is occupied, first 
with identifying the dimensions of Dasein, and secondly in showing how 
they are united. 
In the first section, the threefold structure of Dasein is 
identified as existentiality, facticity, and fallenness, but these 
Existentials raise a methodological problem which has not yet been 
mentioned. His argument is that the meaning of Dasein's Being cannot 
be investigated directly because of its tendency to fall, to conceal 
its Being by understanding itself in terms of projects within the world. 
The tendency to fall is not a characteristic which Dasein exhibits in 
some states only. All three Existentials belong inseparably to Dasein 
in whatever ways it 'is'. But if falling is an inseparable aspect of 
Dasein's structure, this means that there is the constant temptation 
to see itself in terms of other beings; it is "tranquill-ised" so that 
there is no awareness even that it is "entangled" in the "downward 
plunge" of Ifallingif. 
1 The fact that there is a distance between its 
'true' selfhood and the supposed identity it achieves in everydayness 
remains hidden from it. But if Dasein is unaware of alienation from 
its 'true' self, how can there be any possibility of attaining authentic 
selfhood, and how can an analysis of falling Dasein lead to a knowledge 
of the wholeness of its Being? Furthe=ore, Heidegger's thesis that 
I 
BTf pp. 222/178 f. 
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Dasein is distinctive in that its Being is an issue for it, seems 
refuted if it is shown that fallenness belongs inseparably to it, 
i. e. that in its everydayness Dasein has lost itself and is unaware of 
that fact. 1 
Heidegger's answer is that his thesis is refuted only if a 
radical division is created between man in his fallenness and 'true' man. 
He is resisting any notion that 'falling' changes Dasein's ontological 
status. If it did, no analysis of Dasein in the state of being . fallen 
would lead to a knowledge of authentic Dasein, since the empirical fallen 
Dasein would have no ontological connection with 'true' Dasein. It 
would amount to saying that man as he appears is not 'real' man. 
Heidegger's position is that fallenness is an inseparable aspect of man, 
which he displays even when authentic. There is no dichotomy between 
'fallen' man and 'real' man. 'Whole' or 'united' man is still fallen. 
2 
Thus fallenness does not represent a corrupt state which is set in 
opposition to a state of grace. For Heidegger the wholeness of man is 
a concept which embraces all three Existentials of ex-sistence, 
facticity and fallenness. The significance of this position is far 
reaching. At the end of the chapter this view of man will be criticised 
and the question raised whether the wholeness of man might not involve 
the rejection rather than the acceptance of facticity and fallenness. 
At this stage in the argument, the question is simply posed, is 
Dasein truly open to the future, if wholeness and authenticity involve 
acceptance of facticity, which emerges from the past, and fallenness 
which is concerned with the present? Is Dasein's selfhood truly 
1 
BT, p. 222/178. 
2 
Cf. BT, p. 225/181: "Being-in-the-world is always fallen. " 
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constituted by future possibilities or is it formed by what it already 
has been and is now? These questions indicate that the crucial test of 
Heidegger's notion of wholeness lies in how he relates past, present, 
and future. Can man truly be free and whole by accepting that he is 
already thrown into a world he has not chosen, and that in every present 
situation he has a tendency to turn away from authentic existence? 
It is not by chance that Heidegger declares in the preface to Being and 
Time that his plan is to present "an Interpretation of Time as the possible 
horizon for any understanding whatever of Being". 
' A new interpretation 
of time is demanded by the preliminary assumption that the freedomf and 
selfhood of man are found in his relation to the future. To defend 
that thesis, the parameters he must use are the past and the present. 
Thus the freedom and determinism debate is recast in temporal terms. 
The rest of Being and Time is taken up with that defence, and 
shows that the three Existentials of ex-sistence, facticity and 
fallenness, when analysed further reveal their ground in a temporal 
unity. This insight cannot be demonstrated directly but proceeds by 
a closer examination of Dasein's relation to its possibilities, and to 
the peculiar possibility of death. In Division II death is analysed 
as that which brings Dasein as a whole into view. In Division 112 
attention is turned from Dasein's future deatht to the present situation, 
and to the question of being authentic in the present. In Division 113 
the crucial link between death and the present situation is made, 
crucial because with that link Heidegger has established an intimate 
connection between future and present. This step enables him to present 




of the wholeness of Dasein. The last three sections of the book are 
taken up with going over what has been previously said, but with the new 
key of the unified understanding of time. The task here is to make 
clear the steps of Heidegger's argument, and to criticise the conclusions 
he reaches. The over-all intention is not simply to add yet another 
to the list of commentaries on Being and Time, but to show whether 
Heidegger's concept of personal identity as radical aloneness is coherent. 
How then does he defend the wholeness and therefore the identity of Dasein? 
'CARE' and Wholeness 
At the beginning of Division J6, Heidegger declares that the 
question concerning him in the first part of Being and Time is the 
relationship between ex-sistence, facticity and fallenness. These 
dimensions have been identified in the earlier pages as those which 
define Dasein, and now the question must be faced whether they form a 
united whole, or do they co-exist in uneasy tension. 
' At this stage 
Heidegger seems to brush over the problem of a supposed unity of ex- 
sistence, facticity and fallenness by announcing simply that they are not, 
... pieces belonging to something composite, one of 
which might sometimes be missing; but there is woven 
together in them a primordial context which makes up 
that totality of the structural whole which we are 
seeking. 2 
It seems that, for Heidegger, Dasein is a unity by definition. This 
supposItIon is strengthened by the emphasis he lays on the phenomenon 
of Care. 




Ibid., p. 235/191. 
3 
The concept is considered thoroughly in BT Division 16, 
pp. 225-273/180-230. ý 
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Dasein's Being in its wholeness, but the word 'care' in itself takes 
us no further towards an explanation of the unity of Dasein. It appears 
that 'care' is used simply to gather into one term the three dimensions 
of Dasein, without any demonstration that there is a corresponding unity 
in Dasein itself. Thus 'care' is defined, in cumbersome languagef as: 
ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being- 
alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). l 
Heidegger explains that 'care' is not primarily a psychological 
concept, and has nothing to do with meanings such as 'caring for' and 
barefreeness, ,2 thus the context of the term is given solely by the 
definition which does no more than juxtapose ex-sistence, factitity and 
fallenness. Heidegger hints at a ground for unity when he says that each 
part of this definition includes the others, so that when, for instance 
the capacity to ex-sist, or Being-ahead-of-oneself, is analysed closely, 
it transpires that it is never isolated from the fact that one is 
already in-the-world, and that Being-in-the world carries with it the 
constant temptation to be absorbed in the world. This, however is more 
a statement of the problem than a solution, a problem which he states 
directly in the same context, 
Existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially 
dete=ined by facticity. 3 
The problem is that if man's capacity to ex-sist is encompassed or 
determined by facticity, how can he be free in his ex-sistence? The 
concept of 'care', at least as it is defined at this stage of Heidegger's 
enqu2. ry,, cannot provide an answer to that question. Heidegger is aware 
1 
BT, p. 237/192. 
2 
Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p. 236/192. 
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that the complex structure of his definition is unsatisfactory, and 
takes the complexity itself as a sign that the structure of 'care' 
must be investigated further to discover a "still more primordial" 
phenomenon underlying it and providing the ground of its unity. 
1 As 
has already been noted, temporality is that which holds together the 
Being of Dasein, but this conclusion cannot be reached directly. It 
can only come as a result of analysing Dasein's existence. It is at 
this point that the phenomenon of death is introduced. Death, for 
Heidegger, is that phenomenon which enables Dasein to be viewed as a 
whole. Our analysis of Heidegger's concept of identity will conclude 
with a discussion of his treatment of death, and its significance for 
the existence of Dasein. Since the arguments presented by Heidegger are 
complex, it may help to isolate beforehand his motives for introducing 
the concept of death. 
1) For Heidegger, death opens the way to temporality and the 
whole unity of Dasein. Death is presented as the phenomenon which 
enables Dasein to be a unity of freedom and Ithrownness'. This unity 
is shown to be closely linked with the interplay of future, past and 
present, and thus leads to a theory of the unity of time, which Heidegger 
believed, is the key to Being itself. 
Dasein has already been defined as 'ahead-of-itself'. 
Death is chosen as the phenomenon which reveals Dasein as a whole, for 
of all the possibilities ahead, death is the one which cannot be avoided. 
It is Dasein's 'ownmost' possibility. 
Death not only has an integrating function, but also 
presents a threat to Dasein's identity. Heidegger argues that in relating 
1 
BT, p. 241/196. 
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to its own future, Dasein is free. This is'apparently not so with 
death, for far from being a possibility which frees Dasein to be itself, 
death is the end of all possibilities. To defend his notion of freedom, 
Heidegger must show how death can be a 'way of Being' of Dasein. He 
must existentialise death, and thereby remove the threat which it poses. 
The following pages are concerned with the steps in Heidegger's argument. 
Death and the Identity of Dasein 
It has been shown that by his capacity to step beyond the 
present moment, man is freed for the possibility of being himself. In 
projecting towards the possibilities which define his Being, man is freed 
from the 'they self' to 'own' his 'aloneness'. It was pointed out in 
the last chapter that there is an ambiguity as to what precisely 
constitutes personal identity. Is uniqueness conferred on each Dasein 
by the very character of ex-sistence, or by the particular nature of 
the possibilities which are faced? In the discussion on death this 
ambiguity appears again, but is complicated by a further problem. There 
are certain problems about describing death as a 'possibility' for 
Dasein, although undoubtedly it lies ahead of Dasein in every case. 
Death appears to'be a 'possibility' which accomplishes something 
different from Heidegger's expectation for it. Far from constituting 
the identity of Dasein, or even revealing an identity given solely by the 
capacl. ty to ex-sist, death seems to annihilate Dasein even as it ex-sists. 
By his very insistence that Dasein is itself in projecting towards the 
future, Heidegger has made it vulnerable to death as the cancellation 
of the future. If identity was given in some non-temporal way then 
death as a future phenonemon would not affect it. But if identity is 
given in relation to the future, the future has a direct influence on 
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identity 'now'. How then can Dasein's wholeness be revealed by 
relating to death? 
Heidegger first tackles the seemihg impossibility of 
applying the concept of wholeness to Dasein. 
1 
He has shown that as long 
as Dasein exists, it is ahead of itself. There is "always something still 
2 
outstanding" . Dasein is a whole when there is no longer anything 
outstanding, but at that point Dasein no longer is at all. The 
conclusion seems to be that as long as Dasein is itself, i. e. a being 
which projects beyond itself, it cannot be a whole. By the very basis 
of its existence, Dasein is condemned to travel toward a destination 
which it will never reach. Is it not then a hopeless task to search for 
a wholeness of Dasein? Before accepting that conclusion Heidegger asks 
if the relation of Dasein to what is ahead is being understood correctly, 
i. e. in an existential way. 
3 
If it is possible to consider the 'end' 
existentially, then a concept of the wholeness of the existing Dasein 
may be reached. 
Having argued that wholeness, when analysed existentially 
lp 
is approprIate to Dasein, Heidegger returns to his task of interpreting 
death as that phenomenon which enables Dasein to be a whole. Here 
the ambiguity mentioned above comes to the fore. It is argued that of 
all Dasein's possibilities death has a particular place. None of 
Dasein's 'everyday' possibilities have the power to release authentic 
selfhood, for in all such possibilities one can be represented by another. 
Indeed in everyday existence, "one 'is' what one does .... Here, one 
1 
BT, pp. 276/253 ff. 
2 
Ibid., p. 279/236. 
3 
Ibid., p. 280/237. 
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Dasein can and must, within certain limits# 'be' another Dasein". 
1 
The result of such an equation of 'being' and 'doing' is that the basis 
of a unique identity is lost. If one 'is' what one does, then one's 
actions can be carried out by another playing the same role. one can 
be "represented" or 11 deputised' by another. 
2 Indeed, the matter can 
be stated more strongly than Heidegger does. 'Deputising' suggests 
that someone ' stands in' temporarily for some one else. But if one's 
identity is completely reduced to one's function, then one can not only 
be represented, but even replaced by another. Not only can one's 
role be taken over, but since role is equated with all that one 'is', 
one's identity is replaceable. one does not have a unique, irreplaceable 
identity. 3 
However, when the issue is death, there is no possibility of 
substitution. This thought is encapsulated in the famous statement: 
No one can take the Other's dying away from him. 
4 
Following on from this point logically, Heidegger would be expected to 
I 
conclude that dying, as the one, 'possibility' in which there could be 
no substitution, is what makes each Dasein unique, and brings it back 
from its lostness in the anonymous mass. But at this point he does not 
do that. Instead he argues that it is death which is individualised, in 
1 
BT,, p. 284/240. 
2 
See BT, p. 283/239, where Heidegger uses the word 'vertreten' 
in the sense of 'deputising'. 
3 
For a full discussion of the differences between 
representation and substitution cf. Dorothee SO*lle, Christ the Representative 
(London: SCM Press, 1967), pp. 17ff. 
4 
BT,, p. 284/240. The sacrifice of one's life for another 
does not affect this claim, since the other must still die himself. In 
the context of Atonement theory, how then could Christ as an individual 
die for others? Cf. Chapter IV, p. 156. 
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each case by the existing Dasein. That is, at this stage of the 
argument, he maintains that the uniqueness of each man is given by the 
fact that no one else can exist for him. on that basis death is not 
simply a general phenomenon but is individualised: 
Death is in each case mine, in so far as it 'is' 
at all .... mineness and existence are ontologically 
constitutive for death. 1 
His purpose at present is to establish that death must be considered 
existentially, as a way of Being of Dasein, if not the way. The importance 
of this method cannot be overemphasised. The uniqueness of Dasein in 
each case has already been firmly established without mention of death. 
Death is not introduced as something which could shatter that uniqueness, 
but as the way in which that uniqueness is revealed. Thus from the outset 
Heidegger has defended himself against the notion of death as that which 
threatens Dasein. To say that death is that which constitutes identity 
and confers uniqueness would allow it too much power. Death is to 
be seen in Heidegger's terms not as a threatening phenomenon external 
to Dasein, nor as an end to existence but as the way of existing. This 
is the thrust of Heidegger's argument, but as has been noted, many 
passages are ambiguous. Is it death which confers a unique identity 
on Dasein in each case, or does Dasein, whose identity is given by the 
capacity to ex-sist, individualise death, i. e. make it its own and no 
one else's? 
Sartre has observed this ambiguity, and accuses Heidegger of 
presenting a circular argument. He claims that simply because no one 
else can die for me does not give dying a special position. None of 
my actions can be undertaken by anyone else, for no one else is 'me'. 
1 
BT,, p. 284/240. 
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It is the uniqueness of 'myself' which confers uniqueness on my actions. 
But surely it is precisely the character and meaning of 'myself' which 
is under question? Sartre's response is that Heidegger presupposes a 
'self' who exists when he declares that Dasein is always characterised 
byinineness'. Thus death "becomes my death only if I place myself 
2 already in the perspective of subjectivity" . For Sartre this perspective 
is given by the 'pre-reflective cogito'. Thus Sartre removes the 
ambiguity concerning what constitutes identity, but perhaps too easily. 
He seems to have misinterpreted Heidegger's concept of 'mineness', by 
taking it in the sense of a 'given' subjectivity which is then the ground 
for the uniqueness of all Dasein's possibilities, including death. He 
has hypostasised 'mineness'. 
It is precisely this concretising of 'mineness' that 
Heidegger rejects. He does not presuppose that 'V and 'mine' have 
any meaning in themselves, but begins radically with Being-there, Da-sein. 
His starting point is ex-sistence; not that there are beings which 
exist, but simply there is the capacity to ex-sist. From that point he 
discovers that ex-sistence cannot be a shared activity. It necessarily 
individualises Dasein so that Dasein in each case determines its own 
character alone. 'Mineness' for Heidegger is simplyan expression of 
this self-dete=ination. The 'mineness' of Dasein cannot be separated 
from the dynamic process of ex-sisting. 
It seems that Sartre does attempt to separate 'selfness' 
from ex-sistence, so-that the 'selfness' or 'mineness' of Dasein is 
something different from the 'standing out towards possibilities'. 
1 
Cf. Sartre.. BN, p. 534. 
if 
2 
Ibid. f p. 535. Heywood Thomas in "Immortality and Humanism", 
The Modern Churchman, Dec. 1959, New Series, Vol. 3, p. 33 uses a linguistic 
argument to 
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that distinction were true, it would of course follow that all of 'My' 
Possibilities are 'mine'. But Heidegger will not permit this separation. 
There is no 'V who btands out'. Dasein as 'standing out' is in each 
case 'V. It is the perfo=ance of ex-sistence which gives Imineness' 
its meaning. 
1 
Thus Sartre's interpretation of Heidegger is rejected but 
the ambiguity remains. Is it death which confers uniqueness on each 
Dasein, or is it the 'mineness' of each Dasein which makes death its own? 
It can now be said that the question presents a false alternative, and 
that a complete view of Heidegger's position requires both sides of the 
ambiguity. There is a dialectic between the identity given by ex-sisting; 
and that given by the possibilities which are confronted. with his 
concepts of 'mineness' and 'existence', Heidegger has shown that the 
identity of Dasein is already found in reaching forward to one's own 
possibilities, and making them one's own, i. e. being responsible for them. 
His Purpose is to establish that death must also be. considered as a 
possibility of Dasein's Being. This is one pole of the dialectic. 
The other pole is admitted when he says that "Death signifies 
a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very Being of one's own 
Dasein is an issue", 
2 
i. e. death has a peculiar role in forming Dasein's 
identity, but this is admitted only from the standpoint of the ex-sisting 
Dasein. 
defend Heidegger against Sartre. He suggests that dying is different from 
all other actions in that the past tense can be used only metaphorically, 
i. e. "I have died", makes no sense literally. Heywood Thomas does not 
draw any clear conclusion from this argument, and it does not seem to 
take us any further. 
1 Cf. Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, p. 39. "In 
surpassing, Dasein attains to the Being that it is; what it attains to 
is its 'Self'. Transcendence [i. e. ex-sistencel constitutes selfhood. " 
2 
BT, p. 284/240. 
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The two poles remain in an uneasy tension, which can be 
highlighted by asking a further question: Is the role of death to 
bring us to an awareness of our uniqueness, or does it have a further 
role constituting that uniqueness? In other words, if man did not die, 
could he in principle have a unique identity? 
Some commentators have interpreted Heidegger as supporting 
the 'strong' role in which death makes Dasein who he is. Thus Vincent 
Vycinas states that: 
Death is that which makes Dasein really Dasein, just as 
night makes day to stand out as da death is the 
power which holds Dasein together. 
on this view the 'wholeness' of Dasein is conceivable only because of 
its death. Now Heidegger does suggest thisr as we shall see in the 
next section on the meaning of death as 'end'; but he does not thereby 
admit that death has the power to create the identity of Dasein. The 
ambiguity of his position is retained more faithfully by Magda King 
in the concluding paragraph of her sensitive book: 
Far from declaring man's Being to be meaningless because 
it is finite, Heidegger shows for the first tipie that an 
understanding of Being, and with it, an understanding of 2 
meaning and purpose, is only possible for a finite existence. 
Lest it should be imagined that she is arguing that man needs an end in 
order to be himself, she continues, 
Man exists finitely, not because in fact he does not live 
for ever, but because to him a NOT is in advance revealed, 
and this harsh inexorable N(>T alone has the revelatory power 
to enable him to understand Being and so bring him into the 
dignity and uniqueness of a finitely free existence. 3 
Vincent Vycinas, Earth and Gods (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1969), p. 55. For similar views cf. James Demske,, Being., Man 
and Death (Kentucky: University Press,. 1970),, p. 25; "Death is an 
essential part, if not indeed, the culmination and crown of human life. " 
Cf. also John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (London: Lutterworth Press, 
1968), p. 30. 
2 op. cit., P. 180. 
Ibid. 
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Magda King is arguing that it is not death itself which brings identity 
but the awareness in advance, the capacity of Dasein to reach forward 
to this uttermost possibility and anticipate it. But can Dasein maintain 
the 'wholeness' of its Being in anticipating deathr and how is it 
possible for Dasein to be free in the face of thislend'. 
I; ' With these 
questions we have returned to the point where the discussion on the 
role of death began. There still remains unresolved the dialectic 
between Dasein's free existence and its Ithrownness', exemplified 
by death. The way ahead taken by Heidegger to resolve the ambiguity is 
to redefine death. 
An Existential Interpretation of Death 
Heidegger has declared that death must be viewed existentially 
if it is to constitute the wholeness of Dasein. How then is Dasein's 
'end' to be understood? Certainly not as that which puts a stop to life. 
The 'end', to be interpreted existentially, must be incorporated into 
the performance of ex-sistence. In explaining his meaning, Heidegger 
employs the analogy of the fruit. which includes its 'end', i. e. its 
ripeness, in the ripening process. Ripeness is not something that happens 
to the fruit from outside itself. The 'not-yet' of the ripeness is 
involved in the becoming of the fruit. Similarly, Dasein, "as long 
as it is, is already its 'not-yet". 
' 
Heidegger admits that the analogy 
breaks down on the question of fulfilment. The fruit is fulfilled when 
it is ripe but this cannot be said of Dasein. With Dasein's death, far 
from having "exhausted its specific possibilities", it is deprived of 
fulfilling further possibilities. 
2 
Dasein ends in unfulfilment. 
1 
BT,, p. 288/244. 
Ibid. 
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Heidegger could be expected to conclude that death as the'endjdisrupts 
identity, constituted as it is by possibility. But he concludes 
instead that fulfilment cannot belong to Dasein's Being. Fulfilment is 
a characteristic of beings other than Dasein. 
What then is the meaning of Dasein's'end/, and how is 
Dasein related to it? Heidegger describes it as the "uttermost-not- 
yet" of Dasein. 
1 
It must not be seen as something external to existence 
but as the ground of existence. Here Heidegger introduces a crucial 
distinction: 
The 'ending' which we have in view when we speak of death, 
does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end (Zu-Ende-sein), 
but a Being-towards-the-end (sein zum Ende) of this entity. 
Death is a way to be which Dasein takes over as soon as it 
is.. 'As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old 
enough to die., 2 
As a phenomenon which belongs to Dasein, "death is only as an existential 
3 
Being-towards-death" . Heidegger's conclusion is that the 'end' towards 
which Dasein projects itself remains inappropriately defined by the 
notion of Being-at-an-end. The 'end' as an external event which will 
one day happen to Dasein reduces Dasein to the level of an object in 
the world. 
4 Death is not to be understood as something which is still 
outstanding, something which will happen to Dasein only at the end. 
The key to Heidegger's understanding of death is Dasein's 
character as 'ahead of self'. Because Dasein is ahead of itself it is 
able to include the uttermost 'not yet' of death into its Being. Indeed 
death can be considered in relation to Dasein only as it contributes to 
1 
BTr p. 253/250. 
2 Ibid., p. 289/245. 
3 
Ibid., p. 277/254. 
4 Cf. BT, p. 293/250. 
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an understanding of Being-ahead-of-self. There are several points 
of importance here. In this section Heidegger states what has been 
implicit, namely that the primary mode of Dasein's Being is the 'ahead- 
of-self'. Within the threefold structure of ex-sistence, facticity, 
and fallenness, ex-sistence is primary. Thus he states: 
The phenomenon of the 'not-yet' has been taken over from 
the ahead-of-itself; no more than the care structure in 
general can it serve as a higher court which would rule 
against the possibility of Being-a-whole. Indeed this 
'ahead of itself' is what first makes such a Beiný 
towards-the-end possible. ' 
Being-ahead-of-self is presented as the source of Dasein's unity and 
wholeness. This confirms what was suggested in the first chapter, 
that it is the capacity to ex-sist, or project ahead of self, which is 
the primary characteristic of Dasein, but in this section of Being and 
Time more is being claimed. Not only is Dasein's relation to the 
future primary, but it is also that orientation which integrates 
Dasein into a unified whole. It now becomes clear why Heidegger 
introduces the boncept of death to the discussion. The structure of 
'being-ahead-of-self' was laid down formally in the first part of 
Being and Time. It must now be shown how in practice Dasein can be 
ahead of itself, and be a unity. Heidegger argues that Dasein is 
authentically ahead-of-itself in relating to death. His approach to 
death is guided by the question of how the phenomenon reveals Dasein's 
character as ahead-of-itself. It is for that reason that death as a 
phenomenon external to Dasein must be discarded. Similarly any notion 
of death as the termination of Dasein's way of Being must be rejected, 
since it would not then impinge on its character as ahead-of-self. 
1 
BT, p. 303/259. my emphasis. Cf. BT, p. 279/236: "The 
primary item in 'care' is the 'ahead-of-itself". 
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It could be asked, what is distinctive about death in 
revealing how Dasein is ahead of itself. Heidegger's answer has 
already been noted above. Death is the one phenomenon lying ahead 
which cannot be denied or passed on to someone else. It cannot be 
dismissed as something which will happen one day but has no relevance 
for existence now. Whether Dasein faces the possibility authentically, 
or attempts to deny it, death has a formative influence on the present 
moment. Indeed the meaning of the 'present moment' requires redefinition 
when it is considered in relation to death. This last point discloses 
Heidegger's ultimate intention in introducing the concept of death. 
Death is discussed not because it is of interest in itself but because 
it is the phenomenon which shows how a future possibility is closely 
related to the present. Heidegger's over-all purpose in Being and Time 
is to discover the ground for the unity or wholeness of Dasein. A 
consideration of Dasein's Being-towards-death provides access to the 
relation of Dasein to its future . 
Having presented the conditions under which death is to 
be examined, i. e. as an existential phenomenon, Heidegger proceeds to 
the question of how Dasein can relate authentically to its own death, 
in practice. 
1 
Advancing Towards Death 
Authentic Being-towards-death is described as 'anticipation' 
of this possibility or, better, 'advancing' in this possibility. 
2 
1 
See BT, pp. 304-311/200-267. 
2 
BTr p. 306/262. 'Anticipation' is Macquarrie's translation 
of Vorlaufen- In this rendition there is the suggestion of actualising 
an event before it is due, which does not correspond with the root 
meaning of vorlaufen as 'running ahead'. The word is translated as 
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Heidegger is careful to state that this does not in any way mean that 
death as a possibility of Being is somehow actualised in advance. In 
fact; "the closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a 
possibility, is as far as possible from anything actual". 
' 
What does 
this mean? Surely that death is a possibility which is non-actualisable. 
For Heidegger, the actualisation of a possibility destroys its character 
as possibility. Death, as a possibility of Being which cannot be 
actualised by Dasein, shows that D4sein cannot find its authentic 
existence in any actualised state at all. The relation to death 
therefore reveals that the focus of authentic existence lies in the 
future, but not in a future which, one day, will be the present. 
Authentic existence is found in 'advancing' towards death as the future 
which is no future, towards the "possibility of the impossibility of 
3 
any existence at all". This does not mean merely contemplating that 
'impossibility', but 'running ahead' on ground which is no ground. 
This groundlessness is not a future event only but the foundation of 
Dasein, as it ex-sists. 
'Advancing' thus confirms and elaborates what was laid 
down in Division I of Being and Time,, that Dasein is itself in projecting 
towards its possibilities. The full meaning of Being itself is projecting 
towards death. But this also means that Dasein as individualised 
non-relational existence is confirmed. In advancing towards death, 
'advancing' in this thesis, thus retaining the sense of movement in 
Dasein's relation to its end. 
1 
BT, p. 306/262. 
2 
Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logicre Philosophicus 6.4311 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 147: "Death is not an 
event in life. We do not live to experience death". 
3 
BT, p. 307/262. 
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Dasein is "wrenched away" from the anonymous mass to exist only for 
its self. The "non-relational character of death, as understood in 
advancing, individualises Dasein down to itself", and shows that all 
relations with others and with the world "fail us when our ownm0st 
potentiality-for-Being is the issue". Dasein can be authentically 
itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord. 
1 
The relation to death radically isolates Dasein in all its possibilities. 
Since death is the possibility by which all others are to be understood, 
the non-relational character of death is carried into all concrete 
possibilities that lie before death, i. e. the conclusion that authentic 
existence is non-relational can be read back into all of Dasein's 
possibilities. The implication Heidegger draws from this 'reading back' 
is that the "whole of Dasein can be taken in advance ". 
2 
Thus, by confirming the non-relational character of Dasein, 
death enables it to exist as a whole in advance. The conclusions which 
Heidegger makes in this section on death confirm the previous analysis 
in Division I where Dasein was characterised as Being-ahead-of-itself- 
for-the-sake-of-itself. 
Freedom and Death 
Heidegger associates 'advancing' with Dasein's freedom in 
the following ways: 
1) In'advancing' "one is free for one's own death"; 
1 BT, p. 308/263. 
2 
Ibid., p. 309/264. 
Ibid., p. 308/264. 
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2) one is freed from everyday possibilities which obscure 
the ultimate ground for authentic existence: 
Advancing discloses to existence that its 
uttermost possibility lies in giving itself 
up, and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness 
to whatever existence one has reached. ' 
3) One is freed for the first time to choose authentically 
among the everyday possibilities making up existence. This 
is summarised in the well known passage: 
Advancing reveals to Dasein its lostness in the 
they-self, and brings it face to face with the 
possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported 
by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, 
rather in an impassioned FREEDOM TOWARDS DEATH, 
a freedom which has been released from the 
Illusions of the 'they', and which is factual, 
certain of itself, and anxious. 2 
The Argument Thus Far 
Heidegger's declared intention in the second Division of 
Being and Time is to show how Dasein can be conceived as a whole, given 
the three characteristics of ex-sistence, facticity and fallenness. With 
the discussion on death he argues that in relating to its'end"Dasein 
can be a whole even as it exists. This wholeness is conceivable only 
because Dasein has the capacity to 'be ahead of itself'. Death is 
interpreted in conformity with this structure, and in the process of 
analysis, the meaning of Being-ahead-of-self is also interpreted and 
taken further. Being-ahead-of-itself authentically means 'advancing' 
towards death in such a way that the future is not encapsulated in the 
'present'. Instead the boundaries of the 'present' are expanded in 
relation to the 'end'. In relating to its future as death, Dasein is 
freed to choose authentically amongst present possibilities. For 
1 
BT, p. 308/264. 
2 
Ibid., p. 311/266. 
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Heidegger death confirms Dasein's character as a "futural" being, and 
as one whose Being is radically isolated, or non-relational. 
1 
The 
notion of Dasein as Ifutural' will be expanded shortly since it holds 
the final key to the unity of Being for Heidegger. Before that point 
one more step needs to be taken. Having analysed Being-towards-death 
Heidegger asks what connection there is between this analysis, and the 
ways that Dasein exists in fact. He has simply shown at this point 
that it is ontologically possible for Dasein to be a whole in relating 
to its death, but that demonstration is worthless unless he can go on 
to show that Dasein "does ever throw itself into such a Being-towards- 
death". 
2 
He must remove any suggestion that the wholeness of Dasein 
as 'advancing-towards-death' has been imposed "from outside", having 
no correspondence with the ways in which Dasein exists in practice. 
3 
Before even that question can be tackled, Heidegger first investigatest 
in Division 112, whether in any way Dasein shows that from within its 
own resources it can achieve authentic existence. Leaving aside for 
the moment whether Dasein can 'be' authentically towards death, can 
it authentically 'be' itself at all in a current situation? If he 
can establish that Dasein "demands" from within the realisation of 
selfhood in a current situation, then he has a phenomenal basis for the 
further question of whether an authentic Being-towards-death, and thereby 
'wholeness' can be realised. The problem reserved for Division 113 is 
the relation between being an authentic self in the current situation, 
and authentic Being-towards-death. 
4 In this chapter it will be made 
1 
For the concept of Dasein a3lfuturall, see BT, pp. 373/325; 
437/385.2 
BT, p. 311/266. 
Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 311/267. 
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clear that these problems ultimately rest on the question of the 
relation of future, present and past in Dasein's existence. 
Dasein and the Current Situation 
The tensions outlined in this chapter, have yet to be 
I resolved. Heidegger has simply declared Dasein's 'freedom towards death' 
but has not shown how it can be worked out in the current situation. 
The analysis of death has confirmed Dasein's character as in some way 
'futural', in which lies freedom. This could be seen as an attempt 
to deny facticity unless he can show how Being-towards-death relates 
to the present. Related to this problem is the other tension also 
unresolved, of an identity constituted both by ex-sistence and in some 
way by the possibility of death towards which Dasein ex-sists. Until 
the relation between these poles is satisfactorily explained Heidegger 
has not answered the fundamental problem of how Dasein can be free in 
2 the face of facticity. His solution is developed in Division II 
The assumption is made that, despite the fact that for the 
most part it is lost in the anonymous mass, Dasein can by itself attain 
an authentic selfhood in the concrete situation. Heidegger finds in 
the phenomenon of conscience (Gewissenheit) that which 'calls' Dasein 
to be its 'self I. 
1 
The role of conscience is to let Dasein understand 
itself for what it is, and thus bring it to the point where it can 
'choose' its self. The importance of conscience for Heidegger is that 
if it did not reveal the ways that Dasein can be in the current situation, 
Dasein could not be aware of what it truly 'is' and could not choose 
to be that self. It would remain ensnared in anonymity. Whereas Anxiety 
and death have the power to disclose Dasein's true character in relation 
1 BT, pp. 313/268 f. 
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to the future, conscience unveils Dasein to itself in the current 
situation. Conscience confronts Dasein, from within itself, with the 
'thrownness' of its existencer that it is there and has not chosen 
its 'thereness I. 1 
As something thrown, Dasein has been thrown into 
existence. It exists as an entity which has to 
be as it is and as it can be. 2 
Conscience is a call which comes from Dasein itself, Dasein "which 
3 finds itself (sich befindet) in the very depths of its uncanniness" . 
Clearly the Dasein which calls must be distinguished from the Dasein 
which is called. The caller is the 'self' who is thrown into a non- 
relational individualised existence, who cannot escape being identified 
by the 'Not' ahead of it. Richardson remarks that the caller has almost 
an otherness for Dasein "which however does not come from an other 
Dasein but out of Dasein's own depths "04 The call is a summons to 
Dasein in the fallenness of its everyday self where it "makes no choices, 
yet is carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in in- 
authenticity". 
In the smmons Dasein is called to be its owrunost potentiality 
for Being its self, and thus is disclosed as "Being-guilty". 
6 "Guilt" 
1 
BTj pp. 315/270 f. 
2 
Ibid., p. 321/276. 
3 
Ibid. 
4 W. J. Richardson, op. cit., p. 80. Cf. BT, p. 320/275: 
"The call comes from me and yet from beyond_m The caller is. simply 
Dasein in the brief moments when it glimpses the dread-ful nothingness 
ahead of it. In particular Heidegger mentions that God should n ot be 
considered to be the source of the call. Even though the call comes 
from 'beyond' Dasein, it must be analysed existentially, i. e. as a 
phenomenon of Dasein. 
5 
BTt p. 312/268. 
6 
Ibid., p. 314/269. Cf. paragraph 58, pp. 325/280 ff. 
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is associated with the everyday usage of the word 'conscience', but 
Heidegger uses "Guilt" differently. Through a survey of co=onsense 
meanings, he arrives at an existential interpretation which accords with 
Dasein's character. In Richardson's words, the "common denominator" of 
these meanings is the 'lack' or 'absence' of "what can and should be". 
' 
In the context of relationships with others Dasein is guilty when it is 
responsible for the 'lack' of something in an other. 
2 
However, since 
the concern is with Dasein's authentic, non-relational 'self', the 
relationships to others are insignificant, leaving the conclusion that 
in Being-guilty, Dasein is responsible for a 'lack' in itself. Heidegger 
takes care to emphasise that ' lack' when applied to Dasein does not 
suggest the absence of some characteristic from Dasein which could be 
supplied to complete it. In this sense there can be nothing lacking in 
Dasein, "not because it would then be perfect, but because its character 
remains distinct from any presence-at-hand". 
3 In Richardson's words 
there can be no 'lack' in Dasein "which already is what it can be, i. e. 
its own potentiality "-4 
Dasein is 'guilty', not in the sense of being responsible 
for the 'lack' of some characteristic in its Being, but in being 
responsible for the lack of a basis for its whole Being. 
The self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, 
can never get that basis into its power; and yet, as 
existing, it must take over Being-a-basis. 
5 
1 
op. cit., P. 81. 
2 
BT,, p. 328/282. 
3 
BT, p. 329/283. 
op. cit., P. 81. 
5 BT, p. 330/284. 
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Dasein's guilt arises from the tension, noted frequently in this 
cnapter, between ex-sistence and Ithrownness'. In accordance with its 
character as ex-sistence, Dasein must be responsible for determining 
its own Being. In other words as an ex-sisting Being it must 'be' 
its own foundation. Yet ex-sistence is not chosen by Dasein, it is 
thrown into ex-sisting. It cannot therefore be the ground of its own 
Being. Its Being is grounded not inýex-sistence, but in the 'not' 
ahead. Dasein is guilty in that, simmoned by conscience to be its own 
foundation, it cannot fulfil the demand, for it can never 'get behind' 
its 'thrownness I. 1 This guilt is inescapable for Dasein, because it is 
rooted in the very structure of its Being. 
The question arises as to how authentic existence is 
possible at all, if existence is surrounded, and determined by Ithrownness'. 
Heidegger's answer is that the way to authenticity is to be authentically 
ilty. The call of conscience brings Dasein to this understanding. 
By confronting Dasein with its thrownness, conscience leads it to 
accept its Being-guilty. Dasein thus takes over its guilt; it chooses 
to accept its inevitable ontological guilt, and thus chooses itself in 
its existence and Ithrownness'. In choosing to own its guilt, it 
chooses itself. 
3 
Heidegger emphasises that conscience itself cannot be 
chosen for that would allow existence to get behind 'thrownness' in some 
way. The only choice before Dasein is to accept or attempt to deny its 
own 'null' basis. 
4 Conscience calls Dasein to 'be' its 'self', and that 
1 
BTjp p. 330/284: "As existent, it never comes back behind 
its thrownness in such a way that it might first release this 'that-it- 
is-and-has-to-bel from its Being-its-self and lead it into the 'there'". 
2 
Ibid., p. 333/287. 
3 Ibid., p. 334/287. 
4 Ibid. 
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'self' is now concretised in the current situation as 'Being-guilty'. 
In Heidegger's words, Dasein's Being "means as thrown projection, 
Being the basis of a nullity (and this Being-the-basis is itself null)". 
1 
In spite of the tortuous language, this definition provides 
Heidegger's answer to the problem of freedom and 'thrownness'. The 
point is that any notion of freedom as an escape from the bounds of 
'thrownness' must be abandoned. Instead of talking of freedom or 
facticity, we should talk of freedom in and through facticity. There 
is no freely existing 'self' threatened by facticity, the fact that 
Dasein is given over to the way it has to be. As an existent being 
Dasein can never get behind the fact that it 'is'. It is not the 
foundation of its self. And yet the existing 'self' is not merely 
a product of the fact that it is and has to be. The ex-sisting Dasein 
must take over and 'be' its own foundation. How is this possible? 
By projecting itself upon possibilities which have been forced upon it 
in its thrownness. As Being-a-'self', Dasein has been released from 
the 'not' which is its ontological basis in order to take hold of that 
W 
basis and to 'be' it. 
2 
That is, there is no 'self' which releases 
Dasein. It is "released from its basis, not throughitself, but to 
3 itself, so as to be as this basis" . Thus there is no room for a 
'self' who then projects its own foundation. The foundation is given, 
and, if Dasein is being authentically its self, it takes this over and 
is responsible for it. Dasein's freedom is not to be found in the 
struggle of a 'self' to overcome 'thrownness'. Instead, Dasein is free 
1 
BT, p. 331/285. 
2 
Ibid., p. 330/285. 
3 Ibid. 
80 
in its capacity to be its own incapacity. 
The call is heard correctly when Dasein lets itself be 
called forth to its ownmost 'Being-guilty', i. e. when it projects 
itself towards the null basis of its Being, the projection itself 
being null,. 
1 
In this projection Dasein owns its 'self'. This 
authentic selfhood in the current situation Heidegger designates as 
'Resoluteness' (Entschlossenheit). Resoluteness, that authentic 
response to the call of conscience, is defined as a "reticent self- 
projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty in which one is ready for 
anxiety ". 
Resoluteness involves a decision. Dasein chooses to exist 
as Being-guilty. It chooses to 'be' its own 'null' foundation in the 
present situation, i. e. to grasp its own emptiness. In that decision, 
according to Heidegger lies freedom. 
3 
It should be emphasised that 
'freedom' in no way implies that in deciding Dasein puts the determined 
past behind, and chooses in an existentially open future. The freedom 
of resoluteness is a taking over of the past, of what Dasein alrea was. 
4 
1 
BTj, p. 331/285. 
2 Ibid., p. 343/297. 
3 
The word Entschl6ssenheit is ambiguous, since it can be 
translated both as 'Resolve' meaning 'decision'; or 'Resoluteness' 
suggesting determined action in the face of all opposition. Most 
commentators emphasise the first sense. Thus Richardson: "Resolve is 
fundamentally a choice that could be refused .... The choice consists 
in choosing to be what conscience lets Dasein see that it is, i. e. 
finite.... This choosing that is Resolve is profoundly an act of freedom". 
op. cit., p. 189. Cf. Michael Gelven, op. cit., p. 170, "To be 
authentic means to be resolute, to be free to choose one's own manner 
of existence". These interpretations are misleading since they suggest 
that in decidingr Dasein frees itself from the grip of 'thrownness'. 
The other aspect of Resolve, a silent acceptance of existential guilt, 
corrects that impression. 
4 
Cf. BT, p. 373/325. 
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In accepting the 'givenness' of its existence Dasein is freed to see 
the 'present' situation in its reality, simply as an opportunity for the 
expression of authentic selfhood. 
To recall the purpose of this section, Heidegger is 
concerned with the way in which Dasein can be its 'self' in the concrete 
situation, whereas the previous section dealt with Dasein's Being-a- 
whole in 'advancing' towards death. The final task, if he is to 
demonstrate the united character of Dasein, is to prove a genuine 
connection between 'resoluteness' and 'advancing'. In Heidegger's words 
"what can death and the concrete situation of taking action have in 
.: > if 
1 
common. He has argued that in being resolute Dasein can own its 
self, but can resoluteness extend to the whole of Dasein's existence 
including Being-towards-death? Heidegger's answer is that resoluteness 
must be thought through to the end: 
What if Resoluteness ... should bring itself into 
authenticity only when it projects itself not upon 
any random possibilities which just lie closest, but 
upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of 
every factical potentiality-for-Being of Dasein, and 
as such enters more or less disguisedly into every 
potentiality-for-Being of which Dasein facticdlly takes 
hold? What if it is only in the anticipation of death 
that resoluteness, as Dasein's authentic truth, has 
reached the authentic certainty which belongs to it? 2 
In other words, resoluteness does not merely have a connection with 
advancing-towards-death, but is only fully itself in projecting 
resolutely towards its end. It has been shown that Dasein is authentically 
its self, i. e. resolute, when it exists as the 'thrown' basis of itself. 
It can take over in its existence "the fact that it is the null basis 
of its own nullity". Now it is confirmed that the 'nullity' is not 
1 
BT, p. 349/302. 
2 Ibid., p. 350/302. 
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fully understood as a present factical nullity but has its ground 
in death as "the utter nullity of Dasein". 
1 
Thus Dasein is authentically 
its self as advancing resoluteness, as freely ex-sisting towards 
the uttermost nullity of death which is the ground of its Being-guilty 
in every concrete situation. Deatho or more precisely Being-towards- 
death, has been brought into Dasein's current situation by being the 
basis of every factical possibility of which Dasein can take hold. 
With this linking of Dasein's projection in the current 
situation, and death as the ground of every possibility in that 
situation, the full meaning of freedom in Ithrownness' is disclosed, 
and with it Heidegger's resolution of the dialectic between 'mineness' 
and death. Dasein's freedom lies in the capacity to 'be' what it 
already is, and 'what it already is', is revealed most surely by death. 
The solution to the dialectic is that death does constitute Dasein's 
identity, but that death becomes the possibility of Dasein only when 
the ex-sisting Dasein, which alone is responsible for its Being, 
decides to project towards this uttermost possibility. 
Temporality and the Wholeness of Dasein 
It should be recalled that in Division II of Being and Time 
Heidegger is concerned with how Dasein's wholeness can be shown, and 
how it can exist authentically. 
2 
The concept of death was introduced 
to the analysis as a way to solve these problems, and with the 
disclosure of 'advancing resoluteness' as Dasein's way of being wholly 
authentic, the solution is within his grasp. One final step must be 
1 
BT, p. 354/306. 
2See 
abovet P. 53. 
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taken. 'Advancing resoluteness' must be interpreted to discover the 
ontological ground which unites it. With 'advancing resoluteness', 
the ontological ground of Dasein's unity is finally shown to lie in 
the unity of time. By arguing that 'advancing' is not simply connected 
with resoluteness, but that resoluteness in a current situation is 
grounded in advancing-towards-death, Heidegger has demonstrated that 
the future is the ground of the existential reality of the present. 
The ultimate value of the analysis of death is to indicate that past, 
present and future are not separated, but intimately related to each 
other, and that this unity of time is bound up with the unity of Dasein, 
providing the basis for its wholeness. This unity of time is worked 
out as follows. 
First, Dasein's character as Being-ahead-of-itself, which 
is authentically expressed as 'advancing resoluteness', is possible only 




that Dasein is "futural" . In other words,, it is characteristic of 
Dasein that it is always ahead, coming towards itself from the future. 
In advancing-towards-death, Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being 
comes towards it; it is "authentically futura of . 
Secondly, 'thrownness' always belongs to Dasein's Being. 
In 'advancing resoluteness' Dasein exists authentically as its 'thrownness'. 
It accepts its 'Being-guilty', and therefore accepts itself "as it 
1BT, 
paragraph 63, p. 358/311. 
2 Ibid., p. 372/325. 
3 Ibid., p. 373/325: "By the term 'futural' we do not have 
in view a 'now' which has not yet become 'actual', and which sometime 
will be for the first time. We have in view the coming (Kunft) in which 







It takes up its past into its existence. But ' being' 
its past is only possible if the past is finally rooted in the future. 
There could be no connection between Ifuturall Dasein and its past 
unless that past arises from the future. Thus being "as it already was" 
does not, for Heidegger, mean being trapped by a 'closed' past. Dasein 
'is' its past authentically only as it is taken over by its future. 
Thirdly, Dasein is authentically present as 'advancing 
resoluteness' not by isolating a 'now' from past and future, but by 
"waiting-towards" the future. 2 Being 'present' authentically is very 
different from being present in time. When resolute, Dasein is 
authentically 'there' in a "moment of vision", in which the 'present' 
3 is seen as the concretising or "temporalising" of the "authentic future" . 
Thus Dasein's 'present' as well as its 'past' emerges from its 'future'. 
In its character as futural, Dasein continually "comes back" to itself, 
resolutely bringing itself into the current situation by "making 
present". Thus the three dimensions of time are not separate: 
The character of 'having been' arises from the future, 
and in such a way that the future which 'has been' 
(or better which 'is in the process of having been') 4 releases from itself the present. 
This unity of future, having been and the present is designated by 
Heidegger as 'temporality'. The search for the ground of Dasein's 
wholeness and authenticity is at an end. "Temporality reveals itself 
as the meaning of authentic care. "5 Only as temporality can the Being 
1 
BT, p. 373/325. 
2 
Ibid., p. 387/338. 
3 
Ibid., p. 388/338. For "moment of vision" Cf. BT, 
pp. 376/328; 437/385. 
4 




of Dasein finally be understood. Heidegger's aim in Being and Time, 
to interpret "time as the possible horizon for any understanding 
whatsoever of Being" has been achieved. 
Although temporality is a unity, within its structure a 
certain bias prevails. The present is secondary over against the future 
and the past. It is authentic only as it is created by them. If the 
present is detached from future and past, as an isolated moment, it 
makes Dasein inauthentic and thus gives rise to falling, which is 
therefore also grounded in temporality. 
2 
Furthermore, if the present 
is secondary to past and future, the future has priority over its 
'having been': 
Primordial and authentic temporality temporalises itself 
in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that 
in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the 
Present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic 
temporality is the future. J 
This future must not be assumed to stretch forward endlessly. The 
future forming the structure of temporality is finite. 
The ecstatical character of the primordial future lies 
precisely in the fact that the future closes one's 
potentiality-for-Being;. that is to say the future itself 
is closed to one, and as such it makes possible the resolute 
existentiell understanding of nullity. 4 
Unless the future is finite, Dasein could not be resolute. This is not 
to deny that time may go on "in spite of my no-longer-Dasein",, 
5 but this 
1 
BTf 
2 Cf. BT, p. 376/328. This point is also made by Helmut Dopffel, 
The Conceptof Death in Heidegger's 'Being and Time'l unpublished M. Th. 
Thesis (Edinburgh, New College, 1976), p. 51. 
3 
BT,, p. 378/329. 
4 
Ibid., p. 379/330. 
5 
Ibid., p. 378/330. 
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is not authentic temporality, which is always related to Dasein as it 
exists finitely. Indeed, Heidegger argues that the concept of infinite 
time is derived from 'primordial''time, which is finite* 
1 
Heidegger's task is almost completed. The rest of Being 
and Time is taken up with going over the previous analysis of Dasein in 
its everyday inauthenticity to show that throughout its existence the 
ground of all its ways of Being lies in temporality. For the purposes 
of this thesis, no further comment is necessary, since in the last 
three chapters of the book, no additional contribution is made to 
Heidegger's notion of personal identity. 
Summary 
In the above analysis it has been shown that for Heidegger 
each man is unique by virtue of his capacity to ex-sist, to project 
towards his own possibilities of Being. This capacity is no property 
of some pre-existing self but is simply that which characterises the 
Being of man. However, the possibilities towards which existence 
projects enables an 'owned' self to be achieved. In particular, death 
has the power to individualise existence in a way that no other phenomenon 
can, for it reveals the ultimate non-relational character of existence. 
1 
The implication of this conclusion for the concept of 
eternity does not go unnoticed. If the meaning of Being can be understood 
only within a horizon of temporality, then God's eternity must share this 
temporal character. This means that traditional notions of eternity 
suggesting constant presence in a timeless 'now', or everlasting time, 
must be abandoned, since they are based on an ordinary way of interpreting 
time. But is any concept of eternity compatible with temporality since 
temporality is declared to be finite, and eternity surely implies 'infinite' 
time in some sense. The concept is still viable if God's 'infinity' can 
be understood temporally; i. e. maintaining the interrelatedness of past, 
present and future. It would have to be argued that underlying Dasein's 
finite temporality is a "more primordial temporality which is 'infinite, ". 
(BT, p. 499 n. xiii. ) 
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In relating to death, each man is irreplaceable. By establishing 
a relationship between death and the present situationj, Heidegger 
is able to show that man's identity as an ex-sisting being is not 
achieved over against the Igivenness' or 'thrownness' of his existence, 
i. e. the fact that he is as he is. Authentic selfhood comes in choosing 
to accept his Ithrownness' and, in that choice to be what he already 
is, each man is free for the present situation. The final step in 
the argument is to show that the ground of selfhood lies in the nature 
of time itself. The present is the concretion of the future and the 
past, from which it is released. Therefore, there is no 'self' which 
is 'present' at a given moment. Thelpresent moment' itself is real 
only as the presence of the future and 'having been', in the resoluteness 
of Dasein. Only as the concretising of future and past can a 'self' be 
said to be present at all. 
Criticism 
The coherence of Heidegger's concept of personal identity 
rests on one argument, that man is freed to be himself in choosing to 
accept the way that he is. As was mentioned in Chapter Il he wishes to 
avoid the conclusion that man is bound by what he already is, by his past. 
Rather,, he hopes to show that man 'is' what he will become. Having 
isolated the three dimensions of ex-sistence, facticity and fallenness, 
his task was to demonstrate their unity. This was achieved by asserting 
the primacy in Dasein of the capacity to ex-sist, grounded temporally in 
a primacy of the future; man's identity and his freedom are given in 
relation to his future. By choosing its Ithrownness' the ex-sisting 
Dasein pulls the whole of its Being, including its 'having been' into the 
open future where it decides freely about its Being. 'Thrownness' can 
be taken over precisely because it is characteristic of Dasein's past, 
1 See above, pp - 19f f- 
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which can be taken up into the open future of ex-sisting Dasein. 
1 
Thus Heidegger can say that Dasein is "constantly 'more' than it 
factually is", yet never, "more than it factically s,,. 
2 In other 
words man is not defined by what he already is in fact, but he is 
defined and limited by facticity. Heidegger can say this without 
jeapordising the freedom of Dasein, because of Dasein's capacity to 'own' 
its facticity, from the standpoint of existence. Facticity is not a 
threat to the freedom of Dasein because it is embraced by Dasein's 
capacity to ex-sist, and therefore brought into the open future. 
The clearest challenge to the coherence of this theory lies 
in the phenomenon of death, for here is an aspect of man's future which 
far from being the source of man's freedom, seems to be the end of all 
freedom. As was shown above, Heidegger's solution was to 'existentialise' 
death, to reinterpret 'death' as 'dying', or in Heidegger's own 
language, to interpret 'Being-at-the-end' as 'Being-towards-the-endi. 
3 
It is not denied that death is an aspect of Dasein's Ithrownness', 
i. e. death as the end is not chosen, but this Ithrownness' is admitted 
only within the framework of Dasein's capacity to ex-sist. By'being' 
its own 'thrownness', by letting death become powerful in itself in 
'advancing' towards it, 
Dasein understands itself in its own superior power, 
the power of its finite freedom, so that in this freedom 
which 'is' only in it having chosen to make such a choice, 
it can take over the powerlessness of abandonment to its 
having done so. 4 
1 
Cf. Dopffel, op. cit., p. 60. 
2 
BTt p. 185/145. 
3 
Ibid., p. 289/245. 
4 
Ibid., p. 436/384. 
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At this point the critical question must be asked, whether 
the power of death is stronger than Heidegger admits. Death is shown 
to serve Dasein only if it is reducible completely to 'dying', but is 
there not an irreducible element to death, a power which cannot be 
encompassed by existence, even if the power of existence lies in 
powerlessness? Against the view that death itself is the final decision, 
the act which consummates human life, 
1 
is not death as the 'end' 
completely beyond the power of existence. It cannot be performed by 
Dasein. It does not even 'happen' to Dasein, for the term 'Dasein' 
refers only to existence. The concept of 'dead Dasein' is self- 
contradictory. 
2 
Far from being the phenomenon which supports and 
integrates Dasein, death is surely not a phenomenon of existence at all. 
It is not a 'possibility' of Dasein, not even the "possibility of the 
impossibility of existence", but a negation of all possibilities. 
It cannot be drawn into existence but has the power to destroy it. 
These issues seem to demand examination, and yet from 
Heidegger's viewpoint they do not affect his project, for they treat 
death in a way which is inappropriate for Dasein. The phenomena which 
characterise Dasein can be approached only as they illuminate the 
capacity to ex-sist. Considering death as a 'brute fact' beyond 
existence is to treat Dasein in the same ontological category as objects 
present-at-hand. 
However, within Heidegger's own thought structure these 
same questions can still be pursued, for it seems that existential 
1 
Cf. Eberhard Jungel, Death, the Riddle and the Mystery 
(Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1975), p. 91. 
2 
Cf. BT,, p. 280/237 ff. where the ambiguity of Heidegger's 
position is indicated with the problem of the ontological status of 
"no-longer-Dasein". He is not content to conclude that in death, Dasein 
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Being-towards-the-end is dependent for its meaning on Being-at-the-end. 
As opposed to Heidegger whose argument is that death as lend' is 
significant for Dasein only from the perspective of ex-sistence, it is 
proposed here that the existential concept of Being-towards-the-end can 
arise only because there is death as the lend'. 
' Heidegger's attempt to 
interpret death entirely as 'dying' cannot be justified, for the 
latter notion is dependent on the former. Heidegger himself to some 
extent acknowledges the distinction when he talks of death as 'pure', 
i. e. unrealisable, possibility, but this admission is always from the 
standpoint of Dasein ex-sisting in freedom. But if death as end is to 
be distinguished from dying, it remains as one phenomenon which cannot 
be encompassed by ex-sistence, nor strictly speaking can it be touched 
by it. In this case, death poses a threat to the success of Heidegger's 
whole project which depends on viewing death as a dimension of existence. 
Death as end cannot be taken over by existence, for it lies completely 
beyond its grasp. Dasein cannot exist as its end. This means that 
Being-at-the-end must be understood as an element of Dasein's 
'thrownness' rather than the capacity to ex-sist. 
2 
The significance 
of this conclusion must be emphasised. Heidegger allows that 'thrownness' 
is an aspect of Dasein, but 'thrownness' does not disrupt freedom since 
it can be chosen by the ex-sisting Dasein and, in that way, mastered. 
The unique characteristic of death is that it lies beyond all choice, 
and ends all choosing. It has the character of 'pure thrownness', 
is a mere 'thing'; it is "no-longer Dasein", but even that characterisation 
is significant only for those who remain in-the-world. It would seem to 
follow that for that existing Dasein itself, its own death is completely 
inaccessible to it, but Heidegger does not take this view. 
'Cf. H. Dopffel, op. cit. p. 63. The arguments presented on 
death as 'end' are considerably influenced by Dopffells comments. 
2 
Cf. Dopffel, op. cit., p. 65. 
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untouched by existence. Thus it stands as an insurmountable threat to 
the coherence of Dasein's identityr which depends on the possibility of 
being a united whole. Such wholeness, is not attainable by the 
existing Dasein, when death is beyond its reach. 
This power of death to destroy Dasein's identity lies 
not solely in its character as 'pure thrownness' but because it is 
also a phenomenon of the future. The unity of Dasein was shown to be 
grounded ultimately in temporality; the freedom to 'be' its past and 
present was released from the horizon of the future. The disclosure of 
death as future thrownness 
1 
requires a re-examination of the coherence 
of Heidegger's interpretation of temporality and therefore of personal 
identity, for the function of the future is not as Heidegger understands 
it. His thesis depends partly on showing that Dasein can be freed from 
the grip of the factual, freed to take up Ithrownness' as a being which 
'is' its own empty ground. This freedom was dependent on an 'open' 
future of possibilities, from which Dasein could embrace its past 
'thrownness'. With the disclosure of death as future 'thrownness', it 
appears that the future considered existentially, is no different from 
the past. Heidegger's 'future' cannot take the burden of freedom laid 
upon it, for it is too like the 'trapped' past. 
In this case Dasein's identity is constituted as much by its 
past as by the future. The choice made by Dasein in resoluteness is 
the choice of a being which can be no more than it already is. 
2 Dasein 
is surrounded and encapsulated by 'thrownness'. Referring back to the 
1 
Dopffel, op. cit., p. 68. 
2 
Cf. Rudolph Bultmann, Existen 
- 
ce_Fýnd Faith, translated by 
Schubert Ogden (London: Fontana Library, 1964), p. 128: "In every actual 
choice in which man chooses a possibility of existing authentically he 
in fact always chooses what he already is--thus he never gets rid of his 
past and therefore is never free. For this reason, however, he is also 
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discussion on 'mineness' and death, in which Sartre claimed that 
Heidegger operates with a pre-supposed*lself' it must be concluded 
that Sartre has caught the true implication of Heidegger's thought, 
but not the intention. The only significant difference between the two 
on this question is that whereas for Sartre selfhood is given by the 
'pre-reflective cogito', for Heidegger the actual Idecidings' of Dasein 
coincide with selfhood. But whether or not there is a 'self' lying 
behind the 'deciding' does not alter the implication that the 'authentic' 
self is constituted by its past, by what it already is. 
This conclusion announces the failure of Heidegger's project 
to understand man in relation to his future. The extent of this failure 
must be appreciated. By defining man entirely by his relation to the 
future, Heidegger has expressed his vulnerability. The disclosure of 
death as 'future thrownness' leads to the conclusion, not that man has 
a non-relational, or self-relational identity, but that he has no identity 
at all. He has a non-identity! Death, as the horizon which ends all 
possibilities, destroys the identity now of a being which is defined 
solely by its possibilities. 
What way forward can there be if we wish to retain an 
'ecstatic' view of identity, i. e. one which seeks the focus for personal 
uniqueness beyond the boundaries of man as he appears? One solution is 
to modify our understanding of the relation of ex-sistence to 'thrownness', 
so that death as end is not something alien to Dasein but a part of its 
Being. This is the approach taken by Dopffel: 
never genuinely historical insofar as historicity means the possibility 
of an actual, i. e. a new occurrence. " 
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Dasein is existence, but it is not pure existence. 
Existence is necessarily and thoroughly determined 
and limited by its thrownness. It has not laid its 
own ground, nor will it perform its own end, nor has 
it chosen either of them. But these limits belong 
nevertheless essentially to existence and are by no 
means alien to it, since they make existence possible 
at all. ' 
With regard to death, this means that Dasein must abstain from any 
attempt to perform its own death, since this is not in its power. 
can die only as it acknowledges that this is not its ability, but 
it 
nevertheless its Being. As Dasein comes to death, it does not disappear 
but 'is' in its death. "And in death the Being of Dasein is whole. So 
it is not nothing but its whole Being. Dasein is dead. ,2 This is so 
because 'pure thrownness' is seen not as a threat to Dasein's Being but 
a dimension of it. The 'conclusion of this line of argument is that,, if 
death is conceived as a mode of the Being of Dasein and not its 
extinction, then the Being of Dasein is eternal, or at least is capable 
of 'eternal death'. Dopffel argues that only on this basis is the 
ontological possibility of eternal life opened up: 
If theology wants to speak of eternal life, it must develop 
an understanding of man's Being as eternal, which presupposes 
a concept of death as a mode of Dasein's Being. Now only is 
sensible discourse on eternal life possible. If death were to 
extinguish the Being of Dasein, then man would have to be 
created anew for eternal life--and I cannot but call this a 
man altogether different from historical man, who is mortal 
man. Only man who is capable of death and therefore is in 
death, can be eternally alive, because his ontological identity 
is preserved through death. 3 
On this argument death is to be accepted as a condition of man being 
himself. Only on the basis of that analysis of man can theological 
1 
Dopffel, op. cit., p. 71. 
2 
Ibid., p. 73. 
Ibid., p. 74. 
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asser ions about eternal life be made. Methodologically, this procedure 
accords with Heidegger's own. 
1 The point is crucial, and the theological 
implications must be made clear. 
1) If the Being of man is defined without reference to God, 
the existence of God can in no way affect man's Being. As Bultmann 
comments, "all that he (Heideggerl would say is that his analysis 
exhibits the condition of the possibility that a man can comport 
2 himself faithfully or unfaithfully" . Bultmann himself accepts 
Heidegger's analysis of man's existence as the ontological ground for 
his theological comments, and argues that any theological concepts have 
a content that could be "determined ontologically prior to faith and 
3 in a purely rational way" . In general for Bultmann,, theology can make 
fruitful use of a "philosophical" analysis of human existence, "for the 
man of faith is in any case a man". 
4 
What happens in Christian "rebirth" 
is not a "magical transformation that removes the man of faith from his 
humanity". 5 
In asserting an ontological continuity between the 'natural' 
man and the man of faith there is a laudable concern to affirm the full 
humanity of man in relationship with God. The implication however is 
1 
Cf. Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, p. 91. "The ontological 
interpretation of Dasein as Being-in-the-world tells neither for or 
against the possible existence of God. One must first gain an 
, 
adequate 
concept of Dasein by illuminating transcendence. Then, by considering 
Dasein, one can ask how the relationship of Dasein to God is ontologically 
constituted. " 
2 
op. cit., P. 108. 
3 
Ibid., p. 112. 
4 
Ibid., p. 112. 
5 
Ibid., p. 112. 
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that the existence of God fails to affect the Being of man as Being- 
towards-death. The definition of man is complete without reference to 
God. The grace of God could not create in man a new Being' if 
Being-towards-death has been defined as man's wholeness. This 'new 
Being' would be something other than a man; a sort of super man. 
As Dopffel concludes, man is eternal, but is "distinguished 
from God by his limits". 1 In other words, death is one of the limits 
without which man would cease to be man. With this premise, it has to 
be concluded that death is part of God's intention for man, and for the 
rest of creation, for which He should be praised. The denial of death 
would be an attempt to be something more than man. God's ultimate 
intention for man is to be mortal. 
Any theological concept of eternal life would still 
retain a non-relational concept of personal identity since, as 
Heidegger has shownr Being-towards-death is inevitably isolated. This 
position maintains that man is whole in relating only to his own death. 
Even if these theological implications are acceptable one 
phenomenon challenges the view that man's wholeness lies in accepting 
death, namely the phenomenon of love. The concept of love cannot 
simply be added to Heidegger's analysis, for as an essentially 
relational phenomenon it is incompatible with a non-relational existence. 
If Heidegger's analysis is accepted, it must be concluded that love 
is not I an ontological phenomenon, i. e. a dimension of man's Being. 
2 
1 
op. cit., p. 75. 
2 Cf. Bultmann, op. cit., p. 113, who declares that he can 
give a "clear conceptual statement of what 'love' means in a Christian 
sense only on the basis of the 'care' structure of man's nature". But 
he has to deny that love is an ontological phenomenon, i. e. one concerned 
with man's Being. It is merely an ontic modification of the primary 
structure of care. Cf. Bultmann, p. 121; "Heidegger speaks as an 
ontologist and therefore has neither the occasion nor the right to speak 
of love". See also Bultmann, p. 361 note 16. 
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Yet can love be dismissed so easily? As an undeniably 
relational phenomenon, it is in no way enhanced or disclosed by death. 
At the very least, its existence leads us to question whether Heidegger 
has indeed arrived at an adequate view of the wholeness of man. Can . 11. ove 
simply be ignored in the ontological inquiry when it appears to have 
as deep a connection with man's desire to go beyond himself as does his 
projection towards the future? 
At this stage of the thesis no reasons have been given for 
rejecting Being-towards-death as a definition of man's wholeness, 
except for the observation that in this system the phenomenon of love 
is an anomaly. At this point it is sufficient for our purposes to note 
that,, if love is to be considered as an ontological phenomenon, i. e. as 
that which constitutes man's Being, then far more is implied than that 
it be somehow added to Heidegger's anthropology. Indeed a radical 
reformation of what it is to be man would be required. Heidegger has 
shown clearly that his concept of a non-relational identity is inseparable 
from an understanding of 'world' and 'time'. If it can be shown that 
man becomes himself in relating to what is other than himself, then 
a reinterpretation of Being-in-the-world and the character of the 
future would be necessary. 
1 Death would have to be rejected as a 
condition of the world, and man being himself. As Heidegger has 
demonstrated, Being-towards-death implies a non-relational identity 
for man. If a relational identity is an ontological possibility, then 
the understanding of man as Being-towards-death would have to be 
rejected, i. e. it would have to be argued that man-towards-death is not 
'man' at all. 
1 
Cf. Bultmann.. op. cit., p. 112, where he argues that he can 
clarify conceptually what Christian eschatology is only when he knows 
in general what 'future' can mean for man through Heidegger's analysis. 
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How this rejection of the power of death could be formulated 
without denying its reality remains unclear at this stage. Could it be 
that, in the face of death, Dasein would exist authentically, not by 
accepting the end resolutely but by resisting in all his weakness its 
power to annihilate his Being. In this case the power of death would 
remain, but there would be no pretence that wholeness could be achieved 
in the face of it. Indeed, since death has been shown to be 'pure 
thrownness', the refusal to accept death as a condition of identity would 
mean the refusal to accept 'thrownness' in any form. Logically, this 
would mean refusing the facticity of the past as well as the future. 
1 
In effect a reversal of Heidegger's project to find man's 
wholeness in a unity of 'ex-sistencel, 'facticity' and 'falling' would 
be required. The freedom to be oneself would lie in refusing rather than 
accepting facticity. The individualised, non-relational identity would 
not then be the expression of freedom, but of man's non-identity. Only 
if a way through the power of death could be found would that 'non-identity' 
be overcome. It should be clear that such a way through death would 
not apply only to man's existential state, leaving unchanged the 
structures of the world, for Heidegger has demonstrated the inter- 
relatedness of identity and 'world'. However incredible it might appear, 
however much a denial of what cannot be denied.. an alternative relational 
1 
It would seem that the facticity of birth also presents a 
threat to identify based on relation, for "as soon as man comes to life, 
he is at once old enough to die". (BT,, p. 289/245) A freedom from the 
facticity of the future requires also a freedom from the facticity of 
the past--indeed any feature of existence which compels man to 'be' as he 
is. This thought will be taken further in Chapter -V, but it should be 
noted here that talk of freedom from the past is not meant to suggest 
a pretence that it never happened, or that it can somehow be obliterated. 
Heidegger's analysis has shown that the past, or future (death) cannot 
be ignored. Its power to constitute identity may be refused, but its 
reality cannot be denied. 
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identity would seem to imply that the 'natural' world also must be 
freed from the grip of death in order to 'be' itself. 
However difficult it is to accept these conclusions, they 
seem to follow if it can be shown that man is himself in relation 
to what is other than himself. The next chapter is taken up with that 
claim represented in this thesis by the work of Martin Buber. 
CHAPTER III 
MARTIN BUBER'S CONCEPT 
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
At the beginning of the last chapter, attention was directed 
to the problem of the wholeness of man in the face of death. The intimate 
link between wholeness and death was explored. Dasein could in each 
case be a whole because an'end1was in view, and because that'end'could 
be understood existentially as Being-towards-the-end. Death had an 
integrating function in the here and now existence of man, but not in 
the sense that a man's death could somehow be brought forward into the 
present situation. The reverse was true. Because the'end'provided a 
temporal 'horizon' for man, he was freed from encapsulation in the present 
moment, in order to stand out in his destiny as a 'futural' being. In 
other words he is one whose wholeness comes not from the integrating 
capacity of the 'ego' to gather separate 'nows' into a whole existence. 
Rather, wholeness for man is a possibility only because of his 
relationship to 'temporality' itself, which for Heidegger is an ecstatic 
unity of past, present and future. 
1 
Thus the 'end' could bring wholeness to man because it was 
the'primordial' phenomenon of temporality, i. e. that phenomenon which 
enabled man to be temporal and thus in Heidegger's terms to -'be' at all. 
For man to exist authentically in a current situation meant, not to 
experience the present moment as an instant in a succession from past 
to future, but from the horizon of the ecstatic unity of past, present 
and future, to be resolute. And for Heidegger to be resolute was to be an 
authentic (owned) self 
1 BT, p. 377/329. 
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In this way wholeness, temporality and personal identity 
were closely linked, and it was clear that if the wholeness of 
temporality could not be defended, then Heidegger's notion of 
selfhood also collapsed. The argument of the last chapter was that 
wholeness could not be maintained since death which was supposed to 
have an integrating function, could not be domesticated. It could 
crush rather than constitute the wholeness of man. 
This leaves a dilemma. Heidegger has shown convincingly 
that the question of who I am must be given in terms of temporality. 
A man is defined by the relation to death, as that phenomenon which 
reveals most clearly the character of the future. Personal identity is 
a function of the future; yet the future as death shatters identity in 
the present. Are we then left with a self-contradictory being who is 
destroyed by the very future which defines him? 
The possibility of finding an identity which acknowledges 
the dimension of temporality without succumbing to its annihilating 
power forms the guiding problem for the final section of this thesis. 
For that task to proceed, a critical stance must be developed over 
against Heidegger's view of identity, and such is the purpose of this 
section. 
It has been shown that Being-towards-death and an individualised, 
non-relational concept of identity belong together. At this stage 
no arguments have been developed as a criticism of Being-towards-death. 
The method instead will be to offer an alternative to the individualised 
non-relational view of identity. The plan of this chapter is to offer 
Buber's concept of personal identity as a critical tool, which will 
itself be open to criticism from the perspective of Being-towards-death, 
a perspective which leaves no room for a relational identity. 
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Before proceeding, some comments will be made on the requirements for 
an alternative view, taking further what was said at the end of the 
last chapter. it seems that for an alternative view of identity to be 
viable, it must be shown: 
a) that Being-towards-death, and therefore individualised 
existence, do not adequately express the wholeness of man, 
and 
b) that wholeness is a realisable possibility. 
on the first requirement it would have to be shown that 'man' is not 
man at all as one who dies; i. e. that his identity is countered by 
death rather than being confirmed by it. It has been suggested above 
that such a position requires a re-examination of the relationship 
between identity and the 'world',, for Heidegger has shown that the 
character of 'world' and the question of who I am are closely related. 
More precisely it would mean that the ground for personal identity is 
to be sought beyond man's physical and mental nature, for as an embodied 
existence, man is inextricably part of the world of causal necessity 
leading to decay and death. Yet, given the linking of identity and the 
space-time world, it could not simply be said that man's identity is 
grounded in an immaterial soul or spirit with a capacity for immortality. 
If he did have such a capacity to transcend death, it would be 
difficult to explain the forming effect which death undoubtedly has on 
his identity. From Heidegger's analysis it can be concluded that an 
alternative identity requires an alternative understanding of space and 
time. 
Given that requirement, the problem of how wholeness could 
be a possibility for man remains unsolved, for the inevitability of 
death cannot be ignored. This means that any talk of wholeness as a 
I present' possibility must include hope as an indicator of the temporal 
dimension. This hope is that the structures of space and time could be 
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transformed so as to support rather than destroy wholeness. 
The task of this section is to discover how Martin Buber's 
concept of personal identity stands up to these criteria, and whether 
he does enable a way to be found beyond Heidegger. 
The Homelessness of Man 
Buber's concept of personal identity stands opposed to 
Heidegger's though not quite in the way he himself supposes. In his 
essay, "What is Man? "' Buber's criticism is that Heidegger's man is 
self-relational in contrast to the view that he is "essentially related 
2 to something other than himself" . According to Buber, with Heidegger: 
... the anthropological question, which the man who has 
become solitary discovers ever afresh, the question about 
the essence of man and about his relation to the Being 
of what is, has been replaced by another question, the 
one which Heidegger calls the fundamental-ontological 3 
question, about human existence in relation to its own Being. 
Buber explains that in past ages the man who has felt the 
burden of solitude in the world has been able to "stretch out his hands 
beyond the world" to meet the "divine form of Being with whom, solitary ,? A
as he is, he can communicate". But since the cry "God is Dead". the 
4 
solitary man can seek an "intimate communication only with himself". 
This is where Heidegger stands, so that he has to say that 
... the individual has the essence of man in himself 
and brings it to existence by becoming a 'resolved' 
self. Heidegger's self is a closed system. 5 
1 
This essay, written in 1938, is found in translation in 
Between Man and Man (London: Fontana Library, 1961), pp. 148-247, 
hereafter referred to as BMM. 
2 
Ibid., p. 202. 
3 
Ibid., p. 204. 
4 Ibid., p. 203. 
5 Ibid., p. 208. 
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With these criticisms Buber seems to have misunderstood 
Heidegger's intention, which certainly is concerned with the question 
of the meaning of Being, not simply the Being of man. He does not 
portray man as standing in relation to himself, but to Being. The idea 
of the individual having an 'essence' of man in himself is alien to 
Heidegger's thought and contrary to his founding concept of Dasein as 
Being-in-the-world. Further, as Jean Wahl comments on these passages: 
The self of resolute decision is not necessarily--and 
even is necessarily not--a separate self. 1 
These points have been established in previous chapters and need no 
elaboration here. Buber is misguided in thinking that the issue between 
Heidegger and himself is whether man is related only to himself or to 
others. This alternative is the result of a deeper issue. Both 
philosophers understand man in relation to 'Being'. The point of 
distinction is whether the ground of identity is the 'not' which condemns 
man to a non-relational rather than self-relational existencef or 
whether the ground is such as to enable man to find his identity-in- 
relation. 
It is for this reason that the chapter does not begin with 
an account of the 'I-Thou' relation, but with Buber's understanding of 
the ground of personal identity. 
A convenient starting point is his feeling for the 'home- 
lessness' of man which, it could be argued, lies behind much of his work. 
There is an awareness of both the "cosmic and social homelessness" of 
man, who is individualised and separated from his fellow man, and also 
Jean Wahl, "Buber and the Philosophers of Existence", in 
The Philosophy of Martin Buber, The Library of Living Philosophers, 
Vol. XII, edited by P. A. Schilpp and M. A. Friedman (Illinois: Open 
Court, 1967), p. 496. Hereafter referred to as PMB. 
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bound by his finitude as a creature of space and time. 
1 
For Buber, as 
for Heide. gger, it is the phenomenon of 'homelessness' 
2 
which first 
enables man, from within a world of beings, to understand his relation 
to Being. 3 It is only the man who is aware that he is solitary who 
discovers that he is a 'problematic' being. Only when he has let go 
of the pretence that he is at home in the universe can man begin to 
feel the mystery of his Being-there at all, and at this point he can 
begin to discover who he is. For Buber, the question "What is Man? " 
cannot be answered: 
... on the basis of a consideration of the human person 
as such, but (so far as an answer if possible at all) only 
on the basis of a consideration of it in the wholeness of 
its essential relations to what is .... Since the depths 
of the question about man's Being are revealed only to the 
man who has become solitary, the way to the answer lies 
through the man who overcomes his solitude without forfeiting 
4 its questioning power. 
Both philosophers are critical of attempts by man to evade homelessness 
and anxiety attempts which let man turn away from the wholeness of 
his Being. For Buber, man seeks security from solitude in either 
individualism or collectivism, but neither "advances to man as a whole". 
"If individualism understands only a part of man, collectivism 
understands man only as a part. ,5 Both evade the "questioning power" 
of solitude. Individualism is interpreted as an acceptance and 
glorification of solitude, but at the cost of isolating self from the 
1 
BMM, p. 242. 
2 
Cf. Heidegger's term, unheimlich which is associated with 
Anxiety, in BT, p. 233. 
3 
BMMj, p. 233. 
4 
Ibid., p. 240. 
5 
Ibid., p. 241. 
105 
world. Collectivism is an attempt to escape man's "destiny of solitude" 
by : b3mersing oneself in the group.. but the problem of man's isolation I 
is not solved here. it is"overpowered and numbed". 
' Heidegger would 
agree with this preliminary analysis for he too rejects the isolation 
of self from the world, and the absorption of self in the world, as 
adequate descriptions of authentic existence. Both philosophers offer 
a concept of authentic or 'owned' selfhood which is achieved only when 
man looks beyond what is within the world, to the 'world' as a totality. 
They argue that it is only when man holds on to the insecurity of his 
solitude that he can find a way through to wholeness. The difference 
lies in the path taken to authenticity, for while Heidegger finds in 
solitude itself the way to personal identity, Buber investigates man's 
solitude in order to point towards a world in which he is far from 
solitary. For Buber man is authentically himself as "the single one" 
(der Einzelne), but that focusing of identity is found not in the 
'existential solipsism' of Heideggerr but in encountering others. 
2 
In 
the relationship of man with mant Buber finds a new world, a "genuine 
third alternative" to individualism and collectivism. 
3 
The Sphere of 'Between' 
This new world is named by Buber as "the sphere of 'betweentil, 
4 
from which a new concept of personal identity can arise. For Buber the 
1 
BMM,, p. 242. 
2 
For Buber's development of the concept of der Einzk1ne, in 
contrast with der Einzige, the solitary ego, see BMM, pp. 60-108. 
BMMI p. 244. 
Ibid; cf. p. 126. 
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sphere of 'between' is a "primal category of human reality". The 
"fundamental fact of human existence is man with man", from which the 
individual and the aggregate emerge as "mighty abstractions"-' 
Once man is aware that he is solitary he is then able to 
recognize the 'other' in all its 'otherness'. The 'between' is the 
term Buber gives to the sphere of 'meeting' (Begegnung) in which one 
person faces another recognising him in his otherness and thereby 
stepping into relation with him. 
The view which establishes the concept of the "Between" 
is to be acquired by no longer localising the relation 
between human beings, as is customary, either within 
individual souls or in a general world which embraces 
and determines them, but in actual fact between them. 
"Between" is not an auxiliary construction but the 2 
real place and bearer of what happens between men. 
Buber insists that the 'moments' when men meet or "'happen' to one 
another", even though they are fleeting, cannot be reduced to feelings 
within the participants in the encounter: 
The dialogical situation can be adequately grasped only 
in an ontological way. But it is not to be grasped on 
the basis of the ontic of personal [i. e. individual] 
existence, or of that of two personal existences, but of 
that which has its being between them, and transcends both 
On the far side of the subjective, on this side of the 
objective, on the narrow ridge, where 'V and 'Thou' meet, 
there is the realm of the 'Between ,. 
3 
1 
BMM, p. 244. The curious passage at the end of Part II of 
I and Thou becomes clear if seen as Buber's way of saying that all 
security is illusory. The seeming choice between isolation and absorption 
is depicted by two rows of pictures entitled "One and All". Either the 
'V is immersed in the world; or the world is absorbed inthe 'I'. Both 
pictures make a man shudder for they offer a false security. But a time 
comes when he sees both pictures together, and a deeper shudder seizes 
him. Although Buber ends the section there, it seems that the 'deeper 
shudder' occurs because the man realises that to be whole he must abandon 
the security of any form of 'I', and must step into the insecure, 
literally in-substantial realm of the 'between', which for Buber is the 
only reality. See Martin Buber, 
,I 
and Thou, 2nd. edition, translated by 
R. Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1958), p. 72. 
BMMj p. 245. 
3 
Ibid., p. 246. 
107 
Buber's insight, as presented in the book forming the heart 
of his philosophy, I and Thou is that both 'I' and 'Thou' have no reality 
apart from the relation between them. There is no 'I' taken in itself 
but only the 'I' of the primary word 'I-Thou' and the 'I' of the 
primary word I-It. 1 The relational principle is stated in the first 
paragraphs of I and Thou in Buber's insistence that the 'primary words' 
I-It and I-Thou are not constructed from pre-existing components, 'V, 
'Thou' and 'It'. In themselves the primary words express reality, and are 
irreducible. Far from reaching a deeper level by isolating the components, 
all that is done is to create abstractions. There is no 'I' who relates 
to 'Thou' but only the relation I I-Thou. I 'Who' man is in his 
wholeness can be answered only from between man and man. Apart from 
the relation between man and man, there is no Being of man, for Being 
is relation. What makes a person unique, and identifiable is the 
unrepeatable set of relationships with others. Remove the relationships 
and that person is no more, for he 'is' the relationships. 
2 
It might appear from the above quotations that Buber attempts 
to dissolve the concrete reality of the participants in dialogue in favour 
of the realm of the 'between', as if to say that the relationship itself 
is the only reality. If this is Buber's position, it is open to the 
criticism that a person as a creative centre is infinitely more than the 
and Thou, p. 4. 
2 
Buber does not make clear whether his analysis of personal 
identity is intended as descriptive or prescriptive. He presents the 
primary words as though they reflected the actual world, in which case 
I and Thou is an essay in descriptive metaphysics; but as will be shown 
later in the chapter, there are strands of his thought in which he seeks 
to justify his categories, and is concerned to produce a better structure 
of thought about the world, or in P. F. Strawson's words, to essay a 
"revisionary" metaphysics. Cf. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: 
Methuen, 1964), p. 9. 
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relationships in which he is involved. Are we to cast aside the 
peculiarities of personality, and the creative gifts which make another 
person special to us, as of no ontological significance compared to 
the 'between"? Indeed, does it make sense to talk of relation without 
also talking of the terms which are related? Thus Gabriel Marcel comments: 
It seems to me rather difficult not to translate the 
term Beziehung as relation. Yet every relation is a 
connection between two terms .... But can 'V and 'Thou' be regarded in this way? l 
Marcel's conclusion is that the English word 'relation' 
as a translation of Beziehung is confusing because it seems to imply 
the possibility of considering the 'poles' of the relation on their 
own, apart from the relation between them. According to Marcell Buber 
does not use the word Beziehung in this sense: 
It seems to me he has in mind something much more 
mysterious which cannot be defined in an arithmetical or 
geometrical language. He means basically that, in the 
presence of human beings there is created among them, 
let us not say even a field of forces, but a creative 
milieu, in which each finds possibiliti es of renewal. 
The term 'meeting' (, Begegnung , is here far more 
adequate than that of 'relation. 2 
In focusing attention on relation, on the 'between', Buber does not 
conceive of the relation between I and Thou as a "kind of stellar space 
existing independently of the two terms which it separates". 
3 
Nor does 
he deny the concrete reality of the participants in dialogue. Indeed, in 
I 
"I and Thou" in PMB, p. 44. Similar criticisms are made by 
Philip Wheelright, "Buber's Philosophical Anthropology", PMB, p. 94: 
"Do we not affirm rather than deny the two personal existences when we 
speak of what lies 'between' them? ". Cf. Steven T. Katz, "Dialogue and 
Revelation in the Thought of Martin Buber",, Religious Studies, Vol. 14, 
March 1978, pp. 57-68, who claims that in his view of the I-Thou relation, 
Buber ignores the concrete spatio-temporal character of the participants. 
In effect, 'Thou' is a word without the power to differentiate between 
one person and another (p. 65). 
2 
op. cit., PMB, p. 45. 
3 Emmanuel Levinas, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge", 
PmB,, p. 139. 
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a biographical note describing hip first awareness of the I-Thou relation, 
Buber states that what shook him was the "immense otherness of the Other". 
1 
For Buber,, "Only when the individual knows the other in all his otherness 
as himself, as man, and from there breaks through to the other, has he 
broken through his solitude in a strict and transforming meeting". 
2 He 
does not deny the centredness of identity, but argues that it is an 
abstraction to consider the 'I' in separation from the relationships 
in which it participates. His concept of the 'between' arises from 
his conviction that a meeting of dialogue is not exhaustively depicted 
by reference only to the subjectivity of A and B considered separately, 
and of their mutual effects on each other. A phenomenological analysis, 
for Buber, demands the use of the category of 'betweenness': 
I proceed from a simple real situation: two men are 
engrossed in a genuine dialogue. I want to appraise 
the facts 6f this situation. It turns out that the 
customary categories do not suffice for it. I mark: 
first the 'physical' phenomena of the two speaking and 
gesturing men, second, the 'psychic' phenomena of it, 
what goes on 'in them'. But the meaningful dialogue 
itself that proceeds between the two men and into which. 
the acoustic and optical events fit ... remains 
unregistered. What is its nature, what is its place? 
My appraisal of the facts of the case cannot be 
3 
managed 
without the category that I call 'the between'. 
Buber, like Heidegger is attempting to show that man can find 
his true self in going beyond the boundaries of himself. With the 
concept of the 'between', he believes he has found the ontological 
ground for man's wholeness achieved in relation, as opposed to Heidegger's 
wholeness in isolation. In the context of this thesis, the question must 
be asked of Buber, what enables him to find in the realm of the 'between' 
1 
BMMI P. 41 
Ibid., p. 243. 
3pMB, 
p. 706, "Replies to my critics". 
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an alternative to Heidegger's ontologY? 
The 'between' and the Eternal Thou' 
Buber indicates in a biographical note how, in the face of 
solitariness he came to a hope in man's wholeness through relation. He 
recounts how at the age of fourteen, he was overwhelmed by the lostness 
of man in the universe; 
I had to try again and again to imagine the edge of space, 
or its edgelessness, time with a beginning and an end or 
a time without beginning or end, and both were equally 
impossible, equally hopeless--yet there seemed to be only 
the choice between the one or the other absurdity. 1 
The threat of space and time to his Being became so strong that he admits 
he contemplated suicide. Salvation came in the form of Kant's 
Prolegomena to all Future Metaphysics which 
... showed me that space and time are only the 
forms in which my human view of what is, necessarily 
works itself out; that is, they were not attached to 
the inner rture of the world but to the nature of 
my senses. 
The significance of this interpretation of Kant was that the threat to 
10 his Being was removed: 
Being itself was beyond the reach alike of the finitude and 
the infinity of space and time, since it only appeared in 
space and time but did not itself enter into this appearance. 
At that time I began to gain an inkling of the existence of 
eternity as something quite different from the infinite, 
just as it is something quite different from the finite, 
and of the possibility of a connection between me, a man, 
and the eternal. 
3 




Ibid., p. 169; cf. "Autobiographical Fragments, PMB, p. 12. 
BMM, P. 169. 
ill 
way was opened up to him to ask the question: 
But if time is only a form in which we perceive, where are 
'we''. ) Are we not in the timeless? Are we not in eternity? 
By that ... what is meant is ... that which sends forth time out of itself and sets us in that relationship to 
it that we call existence. To him who recognises this, 
the reality of the world no longer shows an absurd and 
uncanny face: because eternity is. ' 
With this reference to eternity the f irst- clue is given as to how Buber 
takes a different path from Heidegger. The realm of the 'between' is 
grounded in Being, which is eternal. Because of eternity, man's 
finitude need not be encapsulating. His solitude only crushes him if 
he seeks the ground of his Being within the world. Solitude can have 
a positive value if it reminds man that the ground of his Being is God. 
For Buber, man is only man when, finite as he is, he participates in 
the eternal through the meeting with others. At this point Buber's 
anthropology diverges decisively from Heidegger's, for his definition 
of man involves a relation to God. Man is only man in relation to God. 
2 
Limited and partial in himself, man can become whole in relation to 
another self. "The other self may be just as limited and conditioned 
as he is; in being together the unlimited and unconditioned is experienced. " 
3 
This is so because the meeting with the other "beings the radiance of 
eternity to me. 
4 
In the human relation there is a meeting with the 
1 
PMB, p. 13. 
2 
Cf. Heidegger's position as shown in the last chapter, in 
which the question of God can be raised only when the analysis of man 
is complete. 
3 
BMM,, p. 204. There is no 
frees one from finitude but in the mei 
meeting with the Eternal Thou. It -Js 
the grip of mortality. Cf. Feuerbach 
BMMI P. 182. For Feuerbach "man with 







ity 'in' the other person which 
with the other, there is a 
which frees the person from 
whom Buber claims inspiration, 
the unity of I and Thou is God" 
BMM, p. 50. 
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Eternal Thou, and such relations are as strong as death. 
A qLeat relation exists only between real persons. 
It can be as strong as death, because it is stronger 
than solitude, because it breaches the barriers of a 
lofty solitude, subdues its strict law, and throws 
a bridge from self-being to self-being across the 
abyss of dread of the universe. 1 
Buber is aware of mortality, but unlike Heidegger he is able to release 
man from its grip by his belief in eternity. He is able to admit that 
his human life "imprinted with mortality cannot run its course in 
wholeness; it is bound to separation and division". He can admit that 
because what is done in this "sphere" can receive its "legitimacy from 
the sphere of wholeness", i. e. God's sphere. Human wholeness is 
ultimately found in relation to God. 
2 
But God's sphere appears to be "supra historical", and 
therefore in the encounter with man would seem to lift him above history 
and his temporality. Buber specifically criticises Heidegger for 
leaving no room for a "supra-historical reality that sees history and 
judges it". The concept of "eternity set in judgement above the whole 
course of history is not admitted". He complains that the knowledge has 
vanished that 'time' whether contemplated as finite or infinite, cannot 
be taken as "a finally existing reality, independent and self-contained". 
For Heidegger, "time is not embraced by the timeless and the ages do not 
shudder before One who does not dwell in time but only appears in it". 
3 
Has Buber found an alternative to Being-towards-death, but at 
the high cost of a dualism between a sphere of wholeness, and a sphere 
1 
BMM, p. 212. 
2 
M. Buber,, Pointing the Way (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1957), p. 211. Hereafter referred to as PW. 
3 Ibid., p. 215, my italics. 
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of separation? From the above quotations it seems that way. Wholeness 
for man appears to be a possibility only in relation to the timeless one. 
As far as man is a creature of space and time, he is destined to death, 
but in the moments of meeting between man and man,, he is raised to 
another timeless sphere. 
Buber himself strongly denies any such dualism. He concedes 
that in his early period he saw the "religious experience" as a way of 
being lifted beyond the space-time world. In the mystery of the 
'moment' of experience "illumination and ecstasy and rapture held, without 
time or sequence". in his later thinking, he saw "the illegitimacy of 
such a division of the temporal life which is streaming to deathr and 
eternity". Only in embracing this temporality by living fully in the 
"everyday" and accepting "each mortal hour's fulness of claim and 
responsibility" could the eternal come to pass in time. 
In the latter part of this chapter, Buber's notion of eternity 
will be examined more closely to discover whether in fact he does over- 
come the dualism, and so arrive at a position where man's wholeness is 
a present possibility in the face of death and the constrictions of the 
space-time continuum. Before that pointr the I-Thou relation and I-It , 
will be discussed, and the problem of how they can co-exist will be 
tackled. It seems that, despite protestation from Buber, there are 
suggestions that the two ways of Being are separated from each other. 
The Connection Between I-Thou and I-It 
In I and Thou there is much to suggest that for Buber there 
is a dichotomy between man's freedom in the I-Thou relation, and his 
1 
BMM#, pp. 31f. For a denial of dualism cf. M. Buber, 
The Eclipse of God (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1957), pp. 44,127. 
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bondage to a life towards death. In I-Thou and I-It we find two ways 
of being in the world, and two corresponding ways of being oneself. It 
is not, as Steven Katz suggests, that the I-It relation is primarily a 
utilitarian relation which in no way touches the deeper level of man's 
personal existence and the meaning of his own life. 
1 The I-It relation 
creates man's identity as much as does I-Thou, although the two ways of 
being oneself are radically different. 
The 'I' of the primary word I-It is denoted as individual 
(Eigenwesen), the subject who stands over against the world and others 
as object. The individual becomes aware of himself as the "subject of 
experiencing and using .2 His identity 
other individuals. The individual knows 
a being' and no more than this. He "nei 
3 
reality" By this Buber means that the 
is found by distinction from 
himself to be 'such and such 
ther shares in nor obtains any 
individual cuts himself off 
from the source of life by seeking the ground of his identity within 
himself. All that he can achieve is "'life)that is, dying that lasts 
the span of a man's life ". 
4 
In contrast, the 'I' of the I-Thou relation is called 
#-.,:,, rson', and is identified solely by entering into relation with other 
persons who equally are identified only by their relationships. The aim 
of the person is to find the source of true life, "for through contact 
with every 'thou' we are stirred with a breath of the 'Thou', that is, 
of eternal life". 
5 
1 
op. cit., p. 58. 
21 
and Thou, p. 62. 
3 
Ibid., p. 64. 




In contrast to the word 'I-It', the primary word 'I-Thou' 
can only be spoken with the whole Being-1 "One stands with the whole of 
one's Being over against another being and steps into essential relation 
,2 with him. The purpose of the person, as opposed to the individual, is 
not to discover what sort of being one is but to discover that one is. 
3 
By this Buber does not mean that the person gives up his 
particularity, his being different; only that his distinctness is not the 
observation point from which he can organise and use the other but only 
"the necessary framework through which Being can appear". 
4 
Thus the 
purpose of the person is to share in reality whithout appropriating it 
to himself. The person becomes aware of himself as "sharing in Being, 
5 
as co-existing, and thus as Being" . The person finds the reality of 
himself in transcending his boundaries to share in Being. The person is 
free as one who "believes in reality,, i. e. "he believes in the real 
solidarity of the real duality [Zweiheit], I and Thou". 
6 
Buber tries to 
defend himself against dualism by claiming that the distinction between 
individual and person does not mean that there are 
... two kinds of man, but two poles of humanity. 
No man is pure person and no man pure individuality. 
None is wholly real and none wholly unreal. Every man 
lives in the twofold 1.7 
11 
and Thou, p. 3 
2 
Eclipse of God, p. 128. 
3 





Ibid., p. 59. Robert E. Wood, Martin Buber's Ontology: an 
analysis of I and Thou (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). 
p. 82, critising Gregor Smith's translatiorisays that "there is not one 
entity, not even a two fold entity, rather there are 2 distinct entities, 
facing each other in their otherness but bound together by that very fact". 
This explains nothing. The two persons are not bound together by their 
otherness, but by their capacity to share in the primal reality which lies in 
the relation itself. It is the sharing which confirms. the distinct Being of 
each person. 7, I and Thou, p. 65. See also Pointing the Way, p. 211; Eclipse 
of God, p. 127. 
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Man is seen to be dipolar; each man lives in the tension between the 
poles of individuality and personhood. 
The problem of the connection between the two 'Ills is 
not disposed of this easily. Indeed it is highlighted when Buber shows 
that in the relation of 'I' to the other, there is also a relation to 
the world. Does man exist in two worlds? 
The World of Freedom and of Causality 
To man the world is twofold in accordance with the two ways 
of being himself. 
1 
Buber is aware that the I-It way of Being binds man 
to the world of causality. When an individual says III to the world 
he is placed at a particular point in space and time, over against the 
objects of his perception. Whether this object is another human being 
or not, it is limited and bounded by the I-It word, as is the speaker. 
Both are trapped at a "specific point in space and time within the net 
23 
of the world". Within the world of 'It' "Causality has unlimited reign" . 
Opposed to this world is the world of the I-Thou relation, 
the world of freedom. For man the world of It does not weigh heavily 
on him, for he is not limited to it but can continually leave it for 
the world of relation. 
4 
The freedom brought about in the I-Thou relation is: 
i) a freedom from the boundaries of self. It is a freedom to 
participate in 'Being' which is discovered only in the midst of relation. 
5 
11 
and Thou, pp. 3; 31ff. 
2 
Ibid., p. 8. 




Bmm, pp. 63,71. 
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ii) A freedom from space and time, in which man can be whole. 
Instead of being seen as a 'part' of the world in connection with other 
'parts', in the I-Thou relation, persons are, "set free.; they step forth 
in their singleness", ' i. e. by entering into relation, I release the 
other to be a whole being. For a moment# I dissolve the network which 
binds him to his social context as a part of the world. I relate to a 
being who in all his partial nature as one of a family, class and 
society represents a world. In relating the 'Thou' "fills the heavens ". 
2 
By relating, I give the other freedom to be; and in so doing I myself 
am given freedom. I avoid the danger of slipping into an I-It way of 
being with the other which binds not only the other but myself. 
3 
iii) This freedom resists 'order'. 'Order' belongs only to the 
world of 'Xt' where there is a continuum. In the world of 'Thou' there 
are only 'moments' which are unrepeatable, ever new. 
4 
iv) Freedom is not only between man and man. The non-human world 
can be freed by man stepping into relation with it. Buber's famous 
encounter with the tree releases the tree from being an object in space 
and time. When he no longer sees the tree but meets it, he is "seized 
by the power of exclusiveness". 
5 The tree becomes 'Thou' to him for 
a moment. For that moment "the winds of causality cower at his heels 
and the whirlpool of fate stays its coursell. 
6 
11 
and Thou, p. 15. 
2 Ibid., p. 78. 
3 Cf. BMMf p. 88, where the task of the Single One is to set 
others free from the crowd, and put them on their way to the kingdom. 
41 
and Thou, pp. 31f. 
5 
ibid., pp. 2,23. The possibility of relation with the 
non-human world must be emphasised, against the common misunderstanding 
that man has an I-It relation with nature, and I-Thou only with persons. 
Ibid., 
118 
The problem of the connection between these two worlds of 
freedom and causality is a crucial one. Do they simply stand in opposition? 
If so, and if in scme sense Buber claims that identity is 'given' and 
realisable in the present, as opposed to being glimpsed or anticipated 
as an eschatological hope, then his ontology as an alternative to 
Heidegger's Being-towards-death, seems to fail, for the delicate, 
momentary appearance of the I-Thou relation does not appear to survive 
the unbroken continuum of the I-It world. As flashes in the darkness 
the 'moments' of I-Thou would not have the power to overcome causality, 
but would merely be strange unexplained instants in the world of 'It'. 
If the presence of the Eternal Thou meant only that in these moments 
we are transported to another realm separate from the flow of time, this 
would appear only to be a diversion from man's destiny towards death. 
If an identity formed in the I-Thou relation is to overcome Being-towards 
death, then it is imperative that a connection be shown between I-Thou 
and the spatio-temporal world, for there must be the possibility that 
the space-time structures do not crush identity but support it. 
Buber is aware of the delicate nature of I-Thou, 
1 but does 
not seem to appreciate the threat posed by causality. He acknowledges 
the transience of the I-Thou relation. No sooner has the moment of 
meeting passed than the 'Thou' is bound to become an 'It' again. 
2 
He 
describes the movement as the "cosmic pathos of the '1"', 
3 
the 
"melancholy of our fate 11 .4 It is the 
destiny of the relational moment 
11 
and Thou, p. 98. 
2 
Ibid., p. 33; cf. pp. 17,39. 
3 
Ibid., p. 22. 
4 
lbid., r pp. 16,13,33,98. 
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that it shines out from the depths, to be at once extinguished by the 
world of 'It'. 
How does Buber defend the I-Thou relation? In some of his 
arguments he seems oblivious to the seriousness of the problem. He 
argues for the necessity of the world of 'It', for the maintenance of 
human life. A life of unbroken 'I-Thou' would be unlivable. The world 
of 'It' beings a necessary order; it is a 'solid' world in which moments 
of 'I-Thou' are uncanny, tearing us away to dangerous extremes, moments 
that can be dispensed with. 
1 Yet the world of 'It' is not sufficient 
to sustain man as man: 
Without 'It' man cannot live. But he who lives with 
Vito alone is not a man. 4, 
You cannot meet others in it. You cannot hold on to 
life without it, its reliability sustains you, but should 
3 you die in it, your grave would be in nothingness. 
This is simply a statement of the problem, not an answer. 
There is no indication how man can go beyond the world of 'It'. Buber 
has seen the constructive aspects of the world of 'It', but seems to 
have ignored another aspect, of which Heidegger was aware, the notion 
of facticity. Is there any hope that man can avoid a "grave in 
nothingness"? From what has been said above, the difficulty about 
accepting the I-Thou relation as an alternative to Heidegger's Being- 
towards-death can be summarised as follows. It seems that some connection 
must be established between the 'moment' of I-Thou encounter and the 
world of space and time with its inevitable movement towards death. This 
connection must be such that the I-Thou relation is the ontological ground 
1 
I and Thou, p. 34. 
Ibid. 
3 
Ibid., p. 32. 
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for the I-It, but certain observations could lead to the opposite 
conclusion. In particular, it seems 1) that the 'moment' of I-Thou JLS 
transitory, and is preceded and followed by I-It; 2) the 'moment' of 
I-Thou itself seems infused with I-It. The criticism has been made that 
the I-Thou is dependent on I-It. Thus Steven Katz: 
We must take full cognizance of the substantial and 
particular nature of the 'Other' in order to relate 
to him as a 'Thou' .... This means that when I know 
another as 'Thou', say in the case of husband and 
wife, I know my wife as 'Thou' only in and through 
her being 'objectively and determinately who and what 
she is .... I do not just have a spontaneous 'Thou' 
relation to her in some space-time vacuum as Buber's 
description of I-Thou would suggest. The meeting with 
my wife as 'Thou' is grounded firmly in space and in 
time and is the product of events and conditions in the 
general spatio-temporal continuum which Buber would 
separate off and relegate exclusively to I-It. ' 
If as Katz claims I-Thou is a product of I-It, then the attempt to find 
in Buber's thought an alternative to Being-towards-death should be 
abandoned. But has Katz interpreted Buber correctly? The intention 
in these pages is to show that Buber does see a connection between I-Thou 
and the space-time structures, and that the I-Thou relation is the primary 
ontological category. 
Buber's defence is presented here in two parts. The first 
is concerned with showing that the I-Thou relation is the primary 
ontological category, and not dependent on I-It. The second is concerned 
with the relation of the 'moment' of I-Thou to temporal succession. Both 
parts together indicate how Buber meets the second criterion, raised 
in the introduction, viz. how human 'wholeness' can be a present possibility 
in the face of death. 
1 
Steven Katz, op. cit., p. 62. Cf. Ronald W. Hepburn, 
Christianity and Paradox (London: C. A. Watts, 1958), p. 35. "A crucial 
role is played by knowledge about John even in my III and 'Thou' relation 
with him". 
121 
Distance and Relation 
In a later essay entitled Distance and Relation (1951)l 
Buber makes a distinction which is not explicit in I and Thou, viz. 
between 'primal distance', Urdistanz, and the 'I-It'. It seems that 
'I-It' is not a threat to 'I-Thou' because 'I-It' is for Buber a 
secondary phenomenon. The separation, or division between man and mant 
and between man and nature is not demanded by the nature of the world 
itself, but is brought about by man. 
In this essay Buber still recognises the "twofold principle 
of human life", but it is not a duality of I-Thou and I-It, of freedom 
and necessity as I and Thou seems to imply in places. The duality is 
clarified as a twofold movement--"the primal setting at a distance"--and 
"entering into relation". The first movement is the presupposition 
for the second, for "one can only enter into relation with being which 
has been set at a distance, or more precisely, has become an independent 
opposite 11 .2 
It is important to emphasise that "setting at a distance" 
is not to be equated with 'I-It', although "entering into relation"-can 
be identified with the I-Thou relationship. 
3 
Urdistanz is given to man 
as man. It is at this point, says Buber that the "real history of the 
spirit begins", 
4 for having set the I other I at a distance, he must now 
decide how to respond to that 'other'. 
1 
Urdistanz und Beziehung, published in English in The 
Knowledge of Man, translated by M. Friedman (London: George Allen 
Unwin, 1965), hereafter cited as KM. 
. Mý 
Ibid., p. 60. 
3 
See M. Friedman, Martin Buber, The Life of Dialogue (London: 
Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1955), p. 83. 
KM, p. 6 4. 
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Maurice Friedman, commenting on the connection between 
Urdistanz and 'I-It', says that when man fails to enter into relation, the 
Urdistanz "thickens and solidifiesp so that instead of being that which 
makes room for relation, it becomes that which obstructs it. This 
failure to enter into relation corresponds to I-It, and Urdistanz thus 
becomes the presupposition for both I-Thou and I-It". 
' The difference 
between the two ways of Being lies in how the Urdistanz is coped with. 
According to Friedmant who claims Buber's help in private 
discussion, the difference is that in 'I-It', man shapes and alters the 
given Urdistanz, and in so doing "the primary state of things is 
2 
elaborated as it is not in 'I-Thou"' . The point that Friedman intends 
to make is that "the I-It or subject-object relationship is not the 
primary one, but is an elaboration of the given as the I-Thou relationship 
is not". 
Friedman does not take the matter further, but it seems that 
here is one of the key notions which explains Buber's confidence in the 
ontological value of the I-Thou relationship. The I-It world is not a 
threat to man's freedom and wholeness, because it is a derivative and 
a distortion of the 'primal distance' whereas I-Thou is not. To use 
terms which Buber himself does not, it could be said that Urdistanz 
expresses the DIFFERENCE between man and man, which is preserved in the 
I-Thou relation. Buber advocates personal identity summed up as 
IDENTITY IN DIFFERENCE. In the 'I-It' relation, difference becomes 
hardened into DIVISION, which is then the basis of identity. 
1 




Relating this to the discussion on freedom, if we accept 
Buber's view, the dichotomy between freedom and necessity would seem to 
be a distortion of the primal tension. That dichotomy suggests that man 
has to safeguard freedom in opposition to the I-It world of space and 
time, which threatens to crush him. For Buber the tension is in man 
himself in his relation to the world. Freedom stands not in opposition 
to 'external' necessity but to man's own distortion of reality into the 
subject-object relationship. Man stands in freedom when, instead of 
binding the world and himself in a position of division he enters into 
relationship with the world which is differentiated from him. 
In this movement freedom comes because man is standing in 
relation not to part of the world, nor to the sum of the parts, but to 
2 the "world as such" . This understanding is possible only when what 
is over against me in the world is seen "in its full presence" and when 
I too am "present in my whole person, in relationfl. 
3 
Freedom only comes 
when the I-Thou relationship goes beyond the mutual confirmation of 
the other's uniqueness to the acknowledgement of the presence of the whole 
world in this meeting. In this event, there is a "making present" of a 
reality which is contained neither by the two persons nor by a supposed 
unity which obliterates their differences but in the 'between', the 
primal category of human reality. 
4 
1 
Cf. Heidegger who does accept the 'thereness' of space and 
time. One of the guiding questions of the thesis is how man can be free 
in the face of necessity. Buber's position here seems simply to be an 
evasion of that question. 
KM, p. 6 2. 
3 
Ibid., p. 63. 
4 Ibid., p. 70. 
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In a way ) what Buber 
is attempting in the essay Distance and 
Relation is an interpretation of the spatiality of man, one which avoids 
the disruptive effect on Being-in-relation which the notion of a man at 
a distinct point 'in' space implies. Instead of seeing man in space, 
he sees space 'in' man, i. e. distance is not independent of man but 
changes its character depending on how he reacts to it. 
Clearly, with his notion of the spatiality of man Buber does 
not advocate a dualism between that which constitutes personal identity 
and the physically present body. He is concerned to find a connection 
between the I-Thou relation and the spatio-temporal world, without 
concluding that the I-Thou relation is a product of that world. Thus 
Katz does not represent Buber accurately in claiming that for Buber the 
I-Thou meeting takes place in a 'space-time vacuum'. Katz's question: 
How would I know I was having a 'Thou' relation with my 
wife rather than my neighbour's wife ... if all physical 
criteria were absent from the I-Thou relation and from 
all saying of the Thou? l 
seems from Buber's perspective to create an unnecessary dichotomy between 
the I-Thou meeting and the spatio-temporal world. Both are grounded in 
the 'primal distance' which enables one to recognize the concrete 
existence of the other without objectifying him. For Buber, to 
acknowledge that the other has an embodied identity does not imply that 
his identity is a product of the spatio-temporal world. 
Is Katz's criticism met by this argument? It is all very 
well to talk of the concrete existence of the other, and of 'difference' 
rather than 'separation' between I and Thou, but how is 'difference' 
established if not by recognising the separateness of our bodies? 
1 
op. cit., P. 65. 
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Granting for the moment that it is possible to recognise the 'concrete' 
otherness, the embodied character of another person without necessarily 
treating them in an I-It way, Buber has not so far given any convincing 
argument that the I-Thou relation is grounded on anything other than the 
physical presence of that person. As has been noted above, if the ground 
of a person's identity lies in physical presence, then death forms the 
ultimate horizon for man, since death clearly brings the end of physical 
1 
presence. 
The problem of the connection between I-Thou and the spatio- 
temporal world seems to come down to what is meant by being 'present' as 
a person. Buber wants to avoid saying: 
i) that a person is identified only by his physical presence, 
3A) that his identity, established in some way by his relationship 
with other persons, is still a product of physical presence. 
Yet he also wants to avoid saying that personal presence has nothing to 
do with the physical body. How then is personal presence to be understood 
in a way which is not reductionist? 
Personal Presence and the Eternal Thou 
Buber is confident that persons are present to each other in 
freedom because for him the I-Thou meeting is based on the 'presence' of 
the Eternal Thou who "by its nature cannot become It, j,. 
2 "In each 'Thou' 
we address the Eternal'Thou'. " 
3 
It seems to me that the success of this 
idea depends on whether the 'presence' of the Eternal Thou is seen as a 
1 
If relation is grounded in physical presence, how could an 
I-Thou relationship with God be a possibility? 
21 
and Thoul p. 112. 
Ibid., 
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'given' reality, or as an eschatological hope which can be glimpsed or 
anticipated in the present. 
There is much in Buber's writings to suggest that he does 
advocate the presence of God as an immanent reality. He emphasises that 
it is in this world that he seeks the 'presence' of God. 
1 
When this 
world is seen in its true light, it is seen as a world of glory, of 
connection rather than separation. The artist, in particular "learns 
the glory of things so that he expresses them and praises them and 
2 
reveals their shape to others" . It is not that a veil is lifted to 
reveal another world beyond this one, but this world is seen in its 
fullness as in the presence of God. The concept of Urdistanz indicates 
that there is one world, of which the causal world is a distortion created 
by man. on this view the meeting of I and Thou is not an escape from the 
spatio-temporal world into a world of freedom, but is a meeting with 
the world in its fullness: 
I know nothing of a 'world' and a 'life in the world' 
that might separate a man from God. What is thus 
descrihed is actually life with an alienated world of 
'It', which experiences and uses. He who truly goes 
out to meet the world goes out also to God. 3 
The criticism has been made that Buber advocates pantheism. 
4 
It is easy 
to see how that impression could be formed, even from the motto on the 
title page of I and Thou, 
So, waiting, I have won from you the End: 
God's presence in each element. 
Goethe 
1 
PW, p. 28. 
2 
Ibid., p. 29. 
31 
and Thou, p. 98. 
4 
James Brown, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber and Barth (New York: 
Collier Books, 1962), pp. 142ff. 
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But his view could more accurately be described as 'panentheistic'. 
It is not that God is identified with the spatio-temporal world, but that 
the world is identified in Him; 
For to step into pure relation is not to disregard 
everything but to see everything in the 'Thou', not 
to renounce the world but to establish it on its true 
basis. To look away from the world, or to stare at it, 
does not help a man to reach God, but he who sees the 
world in Him stands in His presence. 'Here world, 
there God' is the language of 'It'; 'God in the world' 
is another language of 'It'; but to 
i 
eliminate or leave 
behind nothing at all, to include the whole world in the 
'Thou', ... to include nothing beside God but everything 
in him--this is full and complete relation .... Of course 
God is the 'wholly Other'; but He is also the wholly Same, 
the wholly Present. 1 
Can this view counteract the suggestion that the I-Thou 
meeting depends on physical presence, and therefore that death is the 
horizon for man? It seems that it cannotf precisely because God is 
claimed to be "wholly present". Although not identified with the 
spatio-temporal world, the suggestion that it is identified with Him 
implies that He cannot critically 'distance' himself from the world. 
Buber tries to avoid the position in which the spatio-temporal world is 
God--"God comprises, but is not the universe ,2 --yet the claim that He 
comprises the world is sufficient to make His relationship to the world 
one of natural identity rather than of freedom. If, in the I-Thou 
encounter, the world is seen to be as it 'really' is, as the Presence of 
God, then there is no possibility that man can be freed from the grip of 
death. If God is already 'wholly Present' in the world there seems to be 
no hope of a 'transformation' of the space-time structures in which, to 
1 
I and Thou, p. 79. 
Ibid., P. 95. 
0 
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use the words of the Book of Revelation, 
God himself will be with his people; he will wipe 
away every tear from their eyes, and death shall 
be no more. 
Rev. 21: 3-4 
A hope for the 'transformation' of creation seems to require that God is 
in some way not identified wholly and exhaustively with the world as it 
is now containing suffering, decay and death. It seems that for hope to 
be viable, the 'focus' of God's presence must lie beyond history, 
although He may in some sense be present in history. For Buber, in 
the passages considered so far the focus of God's Presence seems to be 
history itself, albeit the strange history of the meetings of 'I' and 
'Thou '. 1 
This identification of the spatio-temporal world with God 
does not mean that He necessarily endorses suffering, decay and death, 
but that He is powerless to alter the situation. With respect to the 
basis of personal presence it means that ultimately one's identity is 
grounded in the physical body. If this represented Buber's position 
*completely, then the project to establish a relational identity in the 
face of death would fail. However, another strand can be traced in 
Buber's thought, one in which the relation of the Eternal Thou to 
history is seen eschatologically. 
The Eschatological Presence of 
the Eternal Thou 
It has been argued that Buber's concept of 'primal distance' 
fails to prevent the isolation of persons, if it is seen as a description 
1 
The' point can be put another way by asking the question, Is the 
creation necessary for God to be God? Does God sustain the world 
voluntarily, or does he have a natural relation with creation? 
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of the way the world is. However there are passages which suggest that 
Buber introduces a temporal dimension to his understanding of primal 
distance, i. e. personal presence is interpreted as the 'making present' 
of the future. Just as the separation of bodies in space is, for Buber, 
a distortion of the spatiality of man, so is the division of time into 
discrete moments of past, present and future a distortion of the temporality 
of man: 
The present, and by that is meant not the point which 
indicates from time to time in our thought merely the 
conclusion of 'finished' time, ... but the real filled 
present, exists only in so far as actual presentness, 
meeting and relation exist. The present arises only in 
virtue of the fact that the 'Thou' becomes present. 
Personal presence for Buber is a possibility because man is not trapped 
at a point in space and time. In the I-Thou meeting he becomes open to 
the Eternal Thou whose Presence is not encapsulated by the moment. This 
position seems to be directly contradictory to the sense of the passages 
quoted earlier in which the Eternal Thou is said to be 'wholly Present'. 
Buber, while appreciating the difference between the two interpretations 
of 'Presence', does not appear to appreciate the importance of stating 
precisely what he means. For example he can say that "human life" 
is "created" by the "central Presence of the 'Thou', or rather, more 
2 truly stated, by the central 'Thou' that has been received in the present". 
As has been noted above, the modification is vital if there is to be a 
hope for the transformation of the space-time structures. In the 
following pages it will be argued that, alongside his 'panentheistic' 
view, Buber also has a view of presence in which a 'distance' is 
1 
1 and Thou, p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 46. 
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maintained between the 'Eternal Thou' and history. 
In form this view is close to Heidegger's, in that it 
receives its orientation from the future. For Buber there is what mig'. 'It 
be described as a horizon of presence, rather than Heidegger's ecstatic 
horizon of absence. For both, to live a life as a succession of 'nows' 
from birth to death is to 'be' in a way which avoids wholeness. For each 
the understanding of wholeness is mouldedby the horizon. Only because 
Buber believes in a horizon of_presence can he maintain that the 
wholeness of man's Being is found in the I-Thou relation. In that 
relation there is the possibility of encounter with the 'central Thou' 
who is not wholly reducible to the present moment, nor wholly outside itt 
but who raises the moment into the Eternal Presence, uniting past, present 
and future. This is a "continuous present", in which the "redemptive 
function of the absolute future is prepared in the present". 
How is the'bLbsolute future" made present? Buber is clear 
that "Redemption", or the freeing of persons and world, must be effected 
in space and time, 
2 
but not in the sense that the Eternal Thou is 'wholly 
present' in any datable historical 'event' of the past. 
1 
Buber,, in a letter to Hugo Bergmann in 1917, quoted by 
Paul R. Flohr in "The Road to I and Thou. An Inquiry into Buber's Transition 
from Mysticism to Dialogue", in Texts and Responses, ed. by H. A. Fishbane 
and Paul R. Flohr (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), p. 224. Cf. BMM, p. 225, 
11 ... a way to eternal Being still stands open, in the content of eternity 
of each moment into which the whole existence is put and lived". 
21 
and Thou, p. 110. The meaning of the Presence of the 
Eternal Thou "is not that of 'another life', but that of this life of 
ours, not one of a world 'yonder' but that of this world of ours, and it 
desires its confirmation in this life and in relation with this world". 
3 
Flohr, op. cit., 224, "Through the redemptive function 
the absolute future is prepared in the present, the continuous present. 
The consummation (Vollendung) of this future time is beyond our 
consciousness; on the other hand its execution (ýLojlzLaE) is indeed 
accessible to our consciousness .... But precisely from thfs fact it 
follows that the consummation cannot be an event--it is not to be located 
in a dis6rete, conscious instance of the historical past. " 
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Thus: 
God's redeeming power is working everywhere and at all 
times ... yet' nowhere and at no time is there a state 
of redemption. ' 
It is not that, for Buber, God's redeeming power is ineffective but 
that it cannot be restricted to one 'event': 
The moment of redemption is real not only with respect to its 
fulfilment, but also in itself; the moments of redemption 
cannot be added up; although they form a series, yet each of 
them reaches the secret of fulfilment ... ; each of them takes its place in the sequence of time ... but each of them also bears its own testimony .... This however does not mean that 
each moment becomes a mysterious, timeless now; rather does 
it mean that each moment is filled with all time: In the 
hovering fraction of time, the fullness of time is manifested 
*.. * It is a mistake to regard the Jewish teaching about the 
Messiah merely as a belief in a unique, final event and in a 
unique, human being as the centre of this event .... The Messiahship of the end of time is preceded by one of all 
times, poured out over the ages. 2 
Indeed, Buber explicitly rejects the interpretation of the Messiah as 
a "special category", the One Man who in one 'event' would bring about 
redemption. 
3 
Why should Buber be so eager to deny the presence of God in 
one complete 'event' of redemption? Could it be that to acknowledge a 
unique, final 'event' within the historical time sequence would be to 
view God's act in an I-It way, to use Buber's term. Would such a 
redemptive act mean the compelling presence of God in one 'event', and 
thereby limit his presence to that objectifiable place and time? Buber's 
argument seems to be that the redemptive power of the Eternal Thou appears 
in every 'event', but is not exhausted in any 'event'. The significance 
1 
M. Buber, "The Two Centres of the Jewish Soul" in Mamre, 
Essays in Religion, translated by Greta Hort (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1946), p. 25. Hereafter referred to as Mamre. 
2 
M. Buber,, "The Interpretation of Chassidism" in Mamre, 
pp. 115ff. 
3 
M. Buber, The Prophetic Faith (New York: Harper, 1949), 
p. 144. Hereafter referred to as PF. 
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of each 'event' is not to be found in itself but as it anticipates the 
"absolute future". ' 
What is the meaning of the "absolute future"?, Having 
rejected a final redemptive event in the past, does Buber also discount 
a future event of consmmation? He certainly rejects an apocalyptic 
hope for a future which is "no longer in time", 2a future which would 
be divorced from this world of space and time as much as would a timeless 
'present'. For Buber there can be no dichotomy between the historical 
continuum and a future in a new world. 
what he calls the prophetic expectation. 
Against this view Buber places 
As opposed to some apocalyptic 
writers who believed in the "supersession of creation by another world 
completely different in its nature"j, 
3 he shares the Messianic hope of 
the prophets. According to Buber, the starting point for this hope 
is not in eschatology understood as a mythical last event breaking into 
the historical series of events. Such a hope would miss the "special 
concrete historical core" of the faith of the prophets, a core which 
"does not belong to the margin of history where it vanishes into the 
realms of the timeless, but it belongs to the centre, the ever changing 
1 
The concern behind Buber's words is made clear in his 
essay "The Two Centres of the Jewish Soul"; it is that to Jewish eyes,, 
the world has an unredeemed character: "the Jew as part of the world, 
experiences, perhaps more intensely than any other part, the world's 
lack of redemption .... He cannot concede that the redemption has taken 
place .... none which by its nature would be unique, which would be 
conclusive for future ages and which only just had to be consinmmated .... 
The Christian is to the Jew the reckless man, who in an unredeemed 
world affirms that its redemption is accomplished. " Mamre, pp. 25ff. 
Christian theologians who assert that redemption took place in the 
'Christ event' must face the problem of why suffering, death and 
Auschwitz still take place in a 'redeemed' world. 
2 
PW, p. 203. 
3 
pp. 192ff. Mamre, p. 27. Cf. PF, pp. 141ff.; Pw, 
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centre, that is to say, it belongs to the experienced hour and its 
possi bility. 111 
How then can redemption take place at all in space and time 
if not in any particular event? Buber's answer is that it happens in 
the primary event of the I-Thou meeting in the light of which all 
discrete events in the succession from past to future must be teinterpreted. 
The I-Thou event is not an isolated moment but the one event in which 
past, present and future are gathered. 
2 
The corollary of the idea that "Presence I is not exhausted in 
any one event is that in every event of I-Thou, there is a 'Presence' 
which transcends the event, temporally. Redemption is a present possibility 
only because the meaning of the event is not fully expressed in contingent 
te=s, but only in hope of a consummation of creation. 
3 
In light of what has been said above, the 'event status' of 
this 'consi=ation' is problematical. Hugo Bergmann expresses the 
difficulty well: 
The notion of a "messiahship ... of all times, poured out 
over the ages", suppresses, I am alraid, any real belief 
in the ultimate Messiahship--in the redemption of nature, 
in the overcoming of hostile forces and the conquest of 
death (Isaiah 25: 8; Hosea 13: 14). 4 
In other words, unless there is a hope for a future consummation in which 
the capacity of nature to destroy personhood is reversed, there can be 
1 
PF,, p. 142. 
2 
In his "Replies to my Critics",, in PMB, p. 712,, Buber states 
that he prefers to use "Relationship" (Beziehung rather than 'Meeting' 
(Begegnung in order to avoid the temporal limitation suggested by the 
latter. 
3 
See Mam e, pp. 27ff.; p. 17. 
4 "Martin Buber and Mysticism" in PMB, p. 305. 
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no personal presence now. Buber himself, in response to Bergmann 
af f irms his belief in an eschaton, but not in a happening which usurps 
man's freedom to respond. He believes in consummation, but only as an 
'event' which is prefigured in the I-Thou relation. As such the 'event' 
of consummation itself seems to be one in which man is involved. 
1 
Thus 
Buber declares that the Messianic prophecy conceals an alternative. There 
is no prediction concerning the future, but an offer, in which "something 
essential must come from man". In this is shown the "paradox of man's 
independence, which God has willed and created; we stand in the dramatic 
mystery of the one facing the other". There is an openness in the 
future given with the Messianic promise, which needs man's active decision. 
The fulfilment of the promise "must rise out of the historic loam of 
man is .2 There is no need for a special category of Messiah but simply 
man with man. For Buber, man in relation to the 'Living Centre' is 
where God brings newness and transformation to the world. "Man is 
created to be a centre of surprise in creation. ,3 In the I-Thou 
relationship, in which the Eternal Thou is received in the 'present', 
the world of It is transformed. 
4 
In the meeting of 'I and Thou' the 
dichotomy between wholeness and separation is overcome, but only because 
in the meeting, the consummation of creation is anticipated. "There is 
not one realm of the spirit and another of nature; there is only the 
coming realm of God. 115 
1 "Replies to My Critics" in PMB, p. 714: "1 believe in the 
redeeming act poured forth over the ages in which man has a share. These 
events do not add themselves to one another, but all together they cooperate 
secretly in preparing the coming redemption of the world. 
2 
PF i p. 144. 
3 
Pwf P. 198. 
41 
and Thouf p. 100. 
5 
mamref P. 25. 
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How can this transformation be realised in the face of the 
painful separation which characterises the world? Clearly not by 
attempting to join together the isolatýed transient moments of 'I and Thou' 
into a continual act of redemption prolonged through history. There is 
no suggestion that man's relation to nature, to his fellow man and to 
the Eternal Thou, is developing in history. Rather, the transformation 
is glimpsed in the fleeting moment of 'I-Thou' relation, in which man 
is not in space and time, but they are caught up in him. 
1 
Then, without 
strivingto overcome the connection with 'It'. "the time of human life 
is shaped into the fullness of reality" by the relation to the Living 
Centre. When that happens life is "so penetrated with relation that 
relation wins in it a shining streaming constancy; the moments of 
supreme meeting are then not flashes in darkness but like the rising 
moon in a clear starlit night". 
2 
Similarly space is transformed by men's relation with their 
"true Thou", who stands at the centre of radial lines that form a circle. 
only then, when space and time are "bound up" in a Community that is 
made one by the Eternal Thou at its centre, only then does there exist 
"a human cosmos with bounds and form, grasped with the Spirit out of 
the universal stuff of the aeon, a world that is house and home, a 
dwelling for man in the universe,,. 
3 
With Buber's references to the transformation of space and 
time,, it is clear that his hope for the future is not merely the 
realisation of a perfect society within the existing space-time structure. 
That hope cannot be reduced to a hope in a Kingdom on earth brought 
1 





about by man. in response to Urs von Balthasar who censures Buber for 
offering man only a social future, he replies that he believes both in 
a future perfection of society, and in a future transformation of the 
world, in one: 
Only in the building of the foundation of the former 
I myself may take a hand, but the latter may already 
be there in all stillness when I awake some morning, 
or its storm may tear me from sleep. And both belong 
together, the 'turning' and the 'salvation'; both 
belong together, God knows how, I do not need to know 
it. That I call hope. ' 
The only certainty in this hope is that salvation will take place in 
community, which in the present is the only arena in which the Eternal 
Thou 'is I, 
2 
For Buber, it is the presence of the Eternal Thou in time 
which can save man from the inexorable necessity of the world of 'It'. 
Even though man does live from birth towards death, even though he 
knows he is going to die, 
3 
yet he is related to the Eternal Thou in the 
meeting with man. The Eternal Thou gathers together past, present and 
future, so that the meeting of 'I' and 'Thou' is not timeless, by timeful. 
Summary and Criticism 
We have come full circle, from the homelessness of man to 
Community as man's home, his dwelling place in the universe. The question 
must now be asked whether Buber's view of identity provides a successful 
alternative to Heideggerfs Being-towards-death. 
PMB, p. 715, commenting on von Balthasar's remarks on p. 356. 
2 
Cf. BMMI p. 24: "It is the night of expectation--not a vague 
hope, but an expectation. We expect a theophany of which we know nothing 
but the place, and the place is called community. " 
3 
Cf. BMMr p. 150. 
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The key issue is the one to which attention has been given 
in this chapter, viz. the connection of the 'free I person to the space- 
time structures. Buber, like Heidegger, rejects a personal identity given 
by the physical presence of the self-subsistent individual. This would 
mean a compulsion to recognise the 'other' by the very fact that he was 
'there', and for Buber this inevitably is an I-It way of Being with him. 
The problem has been how to establish the freedom of personal presence 
without advocating a dualism between 'person' and 'body', in which the 
significance of physical presence for personal identity is ignored. 
Buber's solution to the problem of how a person can be 
freely 'present' in space and time is to turn to Community round the 
Living Centre. Community cannot be empirically observed, 
1 it can only 
be participated in. In community, the members recognize each other not 
by physically observable 'present' characteristics, but by being 
confronted by a love which requires the free presence of the other person 
for its reality. 
2 
For Buber, the fact that a person is also physically 
present does not contradict his 'free' presence in relation, for that 
freedom is grounded in the Eternal Thou in whom space and time will be 
transfo=ed. 
Does this mean that a viable alternative to Heidegger's 
ontology has been found? It might seem so, since Buber is offering 
a way of 'being oneself' which is not based on the physical body with 
its inevitable passage towards death. There is not here a denial of the 
connection between personhood and the 'body', but that embodiment is in 
1 
Buber uses Tonnies' distinction between Gemeinschaft and 
Gesselschaft. only the members of a society can be observed, but not 
those of a community. 
2, Love' here is not a psychological phenomenon, a feeling 
which would be no more than a function of the Individual. 'Love'is 
relational. 
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community round the 'Living Centre'. 
But how can we say that the 'body' of the community is free 
from death? What can a person-in-community hope for? No more than a 
spiritualising of present life in which there is openness and acceptance 
of the 'other'. There is no hope for a personal transcendence of the 
limitations of space and time. The person dies, and with him dies the 
community. In the end the world of separation has its way. 
In his recognition of the necessity for a consimmation of 
creation Buber is admitting that man's wholeness is not yet fulfilled. 
The person who is 'present' here and now is so only because of his 
relation to the Eternal Thou who is not wholly present but is only 
"received in the present". Yet there appears to be no hope of a 
transformation of space and time which would truly change man's Being- 
towards-death, for man, if he is a personal presence is also physically 
present in a mode of Being which is destined to death. To say that 
personhood is 'embodied' in community in relation to the Eternal Thou 
does not alter that fact. Although personhood is defined by the 
I-Thou relation and not by the physical body, it is dependent on it if 
with the death of the body of 'V and 'Thou' there is separation which 
destroys the I-Thou relation. Buber can offer no hope that the same 
fate does not come to persons-in-community. If that is so, then the 
'transformation' of space and time is reduced to an alteration in the 
way we perceive our relation to space and time. In the spatio-temporal 
structure itself there could be no ontological change which would enable 
us to hope in the face of death. 
The answer to the question raised above concerning the 'event 
status' of the consummation seems to be that for Buber, the future holds 
no 'event' which could transfo= space and time so that death no longer 
1 
Cf. the remarks by Jurgen Moltmann on "Eschatology and 
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reigned. This means that man is a being who is caught in contradiction 
as a present body destined to death, and as a person whose presence is 
realised only in the freeing of that body from its limitations. Buber's 
attempt to avoid the dualism between person and body by eternalising 
the moment of I-Thou in fact condemns man to it for ever, because it 
posits an unbridgeable gulf between God who, for Buber, is outside time, 
and man who is bound to space and time. Earlier it was claimed that the 
identification of God's presence with the historical process would deny 
to Him a necessary critical 'distance' from history, and would ensnare 
Him in a dying creation. In some areas of his thought, Buber avoids 
this position but seems to arrive at another position in which the 
Eternal Thou is equally powerless to bring about the redemption of 
nature and the conquest of death. Here the problem is that if God is in 
Himself timeless and only appears in history without being in it, he 
is removed from space and time and no transformation could be effected. 
Buber understands the 'moment' of I-Thou as a glimpse into eternity, 
in which the divisions of space and time are overcome. History is to 
be interpreted through the 'event' of I-Thou which is not an 'event' in 
Revelation", Theology of Hope (London: SCM Press, 
of the openness of man is bereft of its ground, if 
not open at all but is a closed shell. Without a 
can be no assertion of an eschatological existence 
eschatology therefore cannot reconcile itself with 
and reality. " 
1967), p. 69: "Talk 
the world itself is 
cosmic eschatology there 
of man. Christian 
Kantian concepts of science 
1 
Cf. Buber,, PW, p. 215, criticising Heidegger for whom "time 
is not embraced by the timeless and the ages do not shudder before one 
who does not dwell in time but only appears in it". See above, 
Wolfhart Pannenberg has a stimulating discussion on "Appearance as the 
Arrival of Future", in which he contrasts two meanings of the word 
'appear'. When some one appears to us, he not only seems to be there; 
he really is there. But someone may 'appear' to be present without in 
reality being there. See Pannenberg's Theology and the Kingdom of God 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), pp. 127ff. Buber's idea of the 
Eternal Thou who "appears" in time seems to accord with the latter meaning. 
God only seems to be in history. 
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a temporal succession, but the event in which all history is represented. 
The result is that, in avoiding the identification of God and history, 
Buber collapses history into the 'moment' of I-Thou which is connected 
transcendentally with an "absolute future" which, for all Buber's 
protestations, is outside time. 
connection with this world. 
1 
Thus the coming Kingdom of God has no 
Does this mean that Buber's relational ontology must be 
rejected, leaving no option but to return to Heidegger? Certainly not! 
Buber's work reveals a longing for communion which cannot be ignored. 
There can now be no calm acceptance of death as that which enables man to 
be free, nor can it be said that we simply share the world with others, 
but they have no share in our 'Being-there'. The I-Thou relation reveals 
the vulnerability and irreplaceable character of each person, who has 
been madeunique by the relation of love with another. In contrast to 
Heidegger's man for whom the death of the other does not touch hjs I 
Being-there, for the person-in-relation the death of the other means 
the death of himself, since he 'is' only in relation. 
In this is shown the tragedy-of our existence,, a tragedy 
which is not averted by Buber's understanding of presence. Is there 
any way beyond this point, or is man a being trapped in contradiction 
between love which gives him his identity, and death which destroys it? 
From the analysis of Buber, it seems that if there is hope 
for personal as opposed to individual identity in the face of death, the 
focus of personal presence must be eschatological, i. e. not a 'natural' 
1 
Jurgen Moltmann's criticism of 
appropriate with respect to Buber: the esc. ' 
into history, ... makes the eschaton into a 
transcendental meaning of all ages, equally 
history and equally far from all of them". 
Barth's eschatology is 
haton, "breaking transcendentally 
transcendental eternity, the 
near to all the ages of 
Theology of Hope, p. 39. 
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identity constructed with reference to the existing spatio-temporal 
world, yet neither divorced from it. No basis has been established for 
such an identity, but it would seem that it must be expressed as a 
resistance to the causal world with its progression towards decay and 
death. If it is possible to express personal presence, it must be in a 
way which retains the eschatological tension between 'now' and 'not-yet'. 
Moltmann comments on an eschatological identity that persons "have not 
yet attained to identity with themselves, but ... in hope and confidence 
... are living to that end and here defy the reality of death". 
' Perhaps 
a fruitful way of expressing that tension is with the concept of absence, 
understood not as the opposite of presence but as the way of Being- 
present which is peculiar to personhood. 
Clearly 'absence' in this context would not signify 'lack 
of physical presence' which would be resolved once the person was 
physically present. It has been established that personal presence 
cannot be reduced to a compelling physical presence. What is meant is 
that 'absence' perhaps can express the mode of Being present as a person 
here and now, for absence highlights the claim that 'presence' is not 
determined by spatial boundaries. 
This can be illustrated by Sartre's notion of presence and 
absence. By the fact that his friend is not in the cafe where they had 
arranged to meet at a particular time, this friend 'fills' the whole cafe. 
In a glance he sees that Pierre is not there, and this absence does not 
limit his friend in the way that his physical presence would. 
2 'Absence' 
1 
Theology of Hope, p. 68. 
2 
Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 9. Cf. p. 277 
where the Absence of the 'other, announces to Sartre that he is present 
everywhere. Sartre's example of the cafe is used by John Zizioulas in 
"Human Capacity and Human incapacity: A Theological Exploration of 
Personhood" in Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 28,1975" pp. 4ol- 
427. My argument here has been considerably influenced by this paper. 
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is a particular way of being present, but for Sartre it depends on the 
concrete existence somewhere of Pierre--on the concrete possibility of 
his being present. For Sartre "death is not an absence", 
1 
since that 
would imply the possibility of concrete presence in death itself. 
The argument of this thesis is that unless it can be said 
that death is an absence, then death determines the Being of man, and 
there is ultimately no way of Being-present other than physical presence, 
which is an a-personal mode of Being. The notion of 'absence' in the 
context of personal identity seems to involve a temporal dimension. Any 
possibility of Being-present as a person depends on a hope for the 
transformation of the space-time structures which are characterised by 
death. This implies that death cannot be accepted but must be resisted, 
for above all other phenomena it demonstrates personal absence. 
Paradoxically, this resistance, if it is to express personhood, 
must show itself in a willingness to die, since absence is the only way 
in which the person can be present here and now. 
2 
This willingness to 
die differs from that advocated by Heidegger in two crucial respects: 
a) it is only Personal if the person dies for someone and b) there is the 
hope that absence is not the ultimate expression of personal identity, 
but is grounded in a future presence. 
At this stage, no justification has been given for such a 
hope. What is needed is some view of identity in which "death is swallowed 
up in victory"; 
3 in which physical death does not annihilate the person 
1 
Being and Nothingness, p. 278. 
2 
Cf. Moltmann, Religion Revolution and the Future, p. 170: 
"Any hope against death which does not produce a love for life and a 
loving readiness to die surely always bears within it the seeds of 
resignation". 
3 1 Cor. 15: 54. 
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because his idenity is in a body not bound by space and time, but 
which is nevertheless real. Buber's 'community' was not sufficient, 
because there was no basis for hope in a 'real' transformation of space 
and time. 
In the next chapter the paradox of presence-in-absence will 
be taken further, but first the results of the analysis of Heidegger and 
Buber must be drawn together and the view of self emerging must be 
placed in the context of other views. 
CHAPTER IV 
PERSONS-IN-REIATION 
At the end of the last chapter the agenda for this chapter was 
set, with the problem of how a person could be present in a way which 
safeguarded his freedom. With the analysis of Buber, the task was to find 
an alternative to Heidegger's view of isolated selfhood. It had been shown 
in Chapter II that Heidegger's self, resolute in the face of death, was not 
strong enough to be free in the way that Heidegger intended. Heidegger had, 
in a sense, argued too well that death is involved in existence to the 
point that it somehow creates the authentic self. The point which he 
sought to make was that by embracing death now, authentic selfhood could 
be discovered in which the freedom of the self was maintained. It was 
argued however that death as the 'end' could not be subsumed under 
'Being-towards-the-end', and that the freedom to be oneself was denied by 
death rather than confirmed by it. 
In the last chapter an alternative to Heidegger's concept of 
selfhood was explored, an alternative in which the answer to the question 
of what it was to be oneself was given not by reference to one's future but 
to the 'Thou'. Although it was observed that Buber did take note of man's 
temporality, the emphasis lay decidedly with the immediate, spontaneous 
encounter of 'V and 'Thou'. The I-Thou relation offered the possibility 
of identifying oneself not by reference to one's own physical boundaries 
but in freedom from thEm. A person was himself only as he moved beyond 
himself in the act of saying 'Thoul. Thus it was not the biological nature 
or personality which ultimately identified each person and made him unique. 
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His uniqueness was created in the context of communion with other persons 
and with non-human nature. A person's 'real presence' was dependent not 
on his own location in space and time but on the capacity to say tThou'r 
and to have it said to him. 
If personal identity was constituted solely in this way so that each 
person could be identified only in the context of a relational network in 
which he loved and was loved, l then personal presence would be a matter of 
freedom, for a person would be present to an other only as he willed to be 
present. Furthermore a viable alternative would have been found to 
Heidegger's individualised identitY and to the problem of death. Biological 
death would not affect a personal identity given in this way, for the 
biological body would have nothing to do with the identity of the person. 
Clearly this is not a possibility for human personhood, for man is 
identified not only in communion but also by his particular physical body. 
if man can be free to go beyond his boundaries in the act of relating, it 
is also true that he is identified and limited by his physical body with its 
unique characteristics and personality, and its inevitable journey towards 
biological death. Thus the freedom which a person has to disclose himself 
to, or withold himself from, another is conditioned by the necessity of his 
physical presence as a body located in space and time. The paradox and 
tragedy of personhood is that even though man has the capacity for, or at 
least the awareness of the possibility of, an ec-static movement beyond 
his boundaries and therefore the capacity for an identity which is not based 
1 
Or hated? Buber notes that "the man who straightforwardly hates is 
nearer to relation than the man without hate and love", I and Thou, p. 16. 
The important point is that in both love and hate, one encounters not an 
individual as he could be described by a dis-interested observer but a person 
who is recognised by the unique relationship he has with oneself. 
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on the separation of bodies, this ec-static movement is dependent on the 
physical body, and when the body dies, he dies. Biological death, as 
death of the substance, does not in itself threaten personal identity 
constituted by communion. It is a threat because it brings separation 
from communion. 
It seems that, however much one may talk of transcending 
one's boundaries in the meeting of 'I' and 'Thou', one is nevertheless 
also identified by one's physical presence. If this dual understanding 
of presence is taken as a 'given' for ontology, rather than a tension 
which may be resolved, then it seems that the I-Thou relation must be 
abandoned at least as an ontological concept. The reasoning behind this 
statement must be made clear. It will be recalled that Buber seeks to 
show that persons are present to each other not as objects are present, 
2.. e. in proximity to each other. Persons are present as they enter into 
relation with each other. For Buber persons 'are' in relating. Thus he 
introduces an alternative ontology to that in which beings 'are' because 
- of qualities inhering in themselves. The criticism was raised in the 
analysis of Buber that this simple alternative of presence-in-relation 
and physical presence did not do justice to the complexity of existence, 
and in particular to the fact that in an encounter the I-Thou relation 
seems to be dependent on physical presence. Does it then follow from this 
dependence that personal presence is ultimately reducible to physical 
presence? This conclusion has certainly not been reached by the many 
philosophical traditions which understand the self as 'more than' the 
body, but there is an important difference between Buber's view and those 
in which the distinction of 'self' and body is made within the individual. 
For such views, the problem of the knowledge of other selves can be kept 
separate from the problem of how the 'self' is related to one's own physical 
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presence. The identification of 'self' with mind or consciousness is not 
necessarily affected by the fact that one may have no direct knowledge of 
others, direct that is in the sense that it is not mediated by observation 
of the physical presence of the other. With a relational concept of 
selfhood, on the other hand, it is claimed that the Being of the 'I' is 
formed through a 'direct' knowledge of the 'Thou', and that a person is 
present only as he stands in a relationship of love to the 'Thou'. It 
should be noted that 'knowledge' in this relational sense has been redefined 
so that it does not mean the awareness of the physical or mental characteristics 
of the other. As John Zizioulas notes, l if persons are 'present' only 
in an event of communion, the 'knowledge' of other persons can be 
equated with love. "Knowing emerges ... only out of loving: love and 
truth become identical. " In other words I can know only what I love. 
But as the critics of Buber point out, and as Zizioulas himself observes, 
in the actual encounter of persons, in order to love the other person one 
needs to know something about him, and love seems therefore to be 
dependant on physical presence. 2 In that caser to use Buber's own 
terminology, the I-Thou relation is dependant on I-It. If Buber's 
ontology is based solely on what actually takes place between persons 
then it seems that an ontology of relation fails, and the concept of 
'free' personal presence must be rejected. This is not, of course, to 
say that the freedom of selfhood may not be expressed in another way, but 
it would be another concept of self that was involved. Thus for example 
1 "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity"t SJT, vol. 28,1975, 
p. 428. 
2 
See above, P. 108, where the criticism hv Stephen Katz is 
considered. H. D. Lewis has made similar points in The Self and Immortality, _ 
(London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 127f. Also, The Elusive Mind (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 260-274. 
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equation of the self with the mind as distinct from the body may protect 
the freedom of the self to be more than observable behaviour, but at the 
expense of the isolation of the self in its Being, from others. Further- 
more, even if one allows that the self is 'more than' the body, it 
appears that any mental function is dependent on the maintenance of the 
physical functioning of the body. 
' 
Thus if the self is identified with 
the mind, the notion of the capacity of the self to survive the death 
of the body is as problematical as it is with Buber's relational concept. 
This is not to deny, of course, that the 'self' may refer to some aspect 
of existence which is independent of the functioning of the body and may 
survive without the body. Without entering at this stage into a discussion 
on the survival of the self, the point can simply be made that views of 
the self have been constructed in which the 'presence' of the self is not 
reduced to physical presence, nor is it threatened by the death of the body. 
Such views are not the subject of this thesis, which is concerned to 
explore a concept of selfhood in which the self is irreducible to the 
physically present individual. The point has been reached where the 
whole possibility of 'presence' in relational terms has been questioned, 
and the task in this chapter is to consider whether such an ontology is 
possible, or whether some other view of self might better express the 
tension between physical presence and the transcendence of the boundaries 
set by that physical presence. Before these questions are considered, 
1 
cf A. R. Peacocke, Science and the Christian Experiment (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 142f.; P. Laslett, ed., The Physical 
Basis of Mind (London: Oxford University Press, 1957). See also 
I. G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (London: SCM, 1966), 
pp. 347-364. Ian Ramsey, who talks of the self as 'more than' the body, and 
also talks of the survival of the self, fails to consider this problem of 
the dependence of the self on the body. See I. T. Ramsey, Freedom and 
Immortality (London: SCM, 1960), p. 65. 
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the threads of the investigation thus far will be gathered together, to 
state concisely the concept of selfhood which has emerged, and to place it 
briefly in context with other notions of the self. Only then will it be 
possi e to assess clearly what is at stake in accepting or rejecting a 
relational view of the self. 
The Meaning of the Self 
The first assumption made in this inquiry was that to look 
for the centre of personal identity other than in the individual himself 
was at least a conceivable enterprise, 
' 
and indeed it was because Heidegger 
and Buber share this assumption that they came to be considered together. 
Where then has this assumption led? Two problems concerning selfhood have 
been tackled; a) the meaning of the concept of self, b) how that self is 
realised and expressed. Applying the primary assumption to these problems 
has led to conclusions that differ radically from some common views of 
the self . 
Within the existentialist tradition, and particularly as it 
is represented here by Heidegger and Buber, the two problems of the meaning 
of self and its expression have not been viewed in isolation from each 
other. As was noted above, 
2 
Heidegger resists the Cartesian conception of 
the self, not because of its mind/body dualism, but because of the implied 
ontological assumption that a being can be defined without going beyond 
what we take it to be in itself. Although the being may stand in certain 
relations to other beings these are in no way 'essential' to the being 
1 
See above, p. 2. 
2 Pp. 13 ff.. 
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itself. In the terms used in Chapter It the ecstatic character of Being 
is not appreciated by Descartes, or indeed by much of Western philosophy 
since Descartes. Heidegger's, and Buber's task is to rediscover that 
ecstasis. For these philosophers the question of what it means to be a 
self cannot be answered prior to, or in abstraction from, the act of 
existing in a world. Of course this does not rule out reflection upon 
existence, but existing itself is the primary material for reflection. 
Earlier, Heidegger"s phrase,, "the essence of Dasein lies in existing", 
was examined, and it was shown that Heidegger does not mean by this that 
-man still has an 'essence' which can now be read off from the act of existing. 
Rather it was argued that man is, ontologically, nothing more than the 
capacity to exist. It will be recalled that existence here was used in a 
special sense to indicate the standing out from his 'actual' state. For 
Eleidegger and Buber in their different ways it was that capacity which 
identified each man and made him unique. To be a self was to relate to 
that which was beyond one's bodily boundaries. 
This view of selfhood differs radically from other views. 
10, 
To discover what it means to be a self, i. e. what it is that identifies 
one as unique, a departure is made from the equation of self with the 
psychological centre, personality, mind or consciousness on the one 
hand, and with the Boethian concept of rational nature on the other. 
The term "self " for Heidegger and Buber does not refer to any entity 
lying as a 'transcendental unity' behind appearance, nor to any entity 
integrating perceptions, feelings and thought into an integrated whole, 
nor with a psycho-somatic unity. This is not to say that the 'Self' 
does not refer to any entity at all for these philosophers. Their 
position is that man can be a self, but that both the meaning and the 
realisation of selfhood is found only in 'standing-out' from man in his 
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'actual' state. Both Heidegger and Buber in their very different ways 
understand the capacity to be tec-static', i. e. to transcend the empirical 
state as the ground of man's capacity to be particular, i. e. to be at all. 
With Heidegger this lec-stasis' is temporal, with Buber an lec-stasis' 
towards the other. Such relations for them are not merely revelatory of 
a selfhood, and Being, defined in some other way, but are constitutive 
of what it is to be a self, and to be at all. 
Some aspects of this view of self will be drawn from the 
previous analysis, but first, other views of the self will be outlined 
in order to provide a perspective. 
Concepts of the Self 
It will be appreciated that the purpose of this thesis is to 
explore one particular conception of selfhood. This is not the place to 
examine in depth other views which, for this purpose must simply be noted 
in order to make clearer the concept of selfhood under investigation. 
full comparison of notions of the self would require an inquiry on its own. 
Accepting the risk of over-simplification and hence of 
d: Lstortion, the many views of the self have been subsumed under four 
classifications, namely, 11 the absolute-universal self; 2) the 
transcendental-constituting self; 3) the de-ontological or no-self 
paradigm; l 4) the natural organic self-Briefly, these classifications may 
hie described as follows. 
1 
The classification used here is that 
ed: Lt: Lon of-The Monist on-Conceptions of the Self: F., 
article by David A. Dilworth and Hugo J. Silverman, 
Approach to the De-ontological Self Paradigm". The 
no.. 1.1978f pp. 82f. 
presented in a special 
ast and West in an 
"A Cross-cultural 
Monist, vol. 61, 
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1) The absolute-universal self. The primary characteristic of 
this view, according to Dilworth and Silverman, is that "either the self 
is identified with the one or Totality, or it 'participates' in the 
perfection of Being". ' In the former case no distinction is made between 
the self as 'relativet and the self as 'absolute'. In the latter a 
real distinction is held, but theistic accounts propose a re-integration 
with an ultimate source of Being. Both monistic and theistic variations 
view the particularity of the self as only a temporary and/or illusory 
dissociation from the ontologically prior unity of the Self. Although an 
ancient concept found in theological versions of Hindu and Buddhist 
thought and in certain strands of Christian neo-Platonism, it appears in 
modern guise in the Idealism of Hegel, and in Process thought with the 
idea that finite selves become part of the Divine memory. 
2 
2) The transcendental-constituting self. In modern Western 
philosophy this view, stemming from Descartes, has had a considerable 
influence on the ways in which we view ourselves and our interaction with 
the world. The identification of self with consciousness or mind is for 
some philosophers so axiomatic that they do not appear to be aware of it 
as a questionable assumption at all. Thus John Hick in his comprehensive 
survey of possible approaches to death and eternal life, begins by 
assuming that the self is "the name for that from which our thought 
The Monist, op. cit., p. 82. 
2 
Cf. G. F. -icIT. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (translated by 
J. B. -Maillie, New York: Macmillanr 1931), especially p. 86. There are, 
however, suggestions in Hegel of a relational concept of selfhood, in 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion CLondon: Kegan Paul, 1895), 
vol. III, pp. 10-24. In Process thought, cf. 
Charles Hartshorne"s essay, "Time, Death and Everlasting Life", in 
-ýThe Logic of Perfection CLaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962). 
153 
necessarily starts, namely the consciousness which is now composing these 
sentences, or which is now reading them, and which is a source of 
volitions and a subject of perceptions and emotions. "l H. D. Lewis, 
standing within the tradition of Descartes' cogito and Kant's transcendental 
unity of apperception can argue that "there really must be something at 
least which makes possible the unification of experience., -2 Significantly 
the development of this line of thought from the Cartesian cogito leads 
to something quite different from the transcendental ego, at least as 
pursued by Sartre, who argues for the emptying of the ego: Sartre denies 
Husserl's belief in a transcendental ego lying 'behind' consciousness, 
an I'll essentially involved, no less than objects, in the very possibility 
of any act of consciousness whatsoever. Sartre denies the reality of 
the transcendental ego and reinstates the object of consciousness as the 
source of the 'I'. His thesis is that there is no ego 'in' or 'behind' 
consciousness. There is only an ego 'for' consciousness. The ego is in 
the world of objects. The unity of the ego is given by the object, 
rather than by some inner principle of unity. Consciousness for Sartre 
seems to be a totality in itself; the ego can only be an expression of 
I 
consciousness, as opposed to a condition of it. 3 The interesting point 
is that a concept of the self in which the reality of a transcendental 
self is posited has led in Sartre to the opposite view, that there is 
no-self behind appearance. 
1 
Death and Eternal Life (London: Collins, 1976), P. 38. 
2 
The Self and Immortality (London: Macmillan, 1974), who 
asks how sense impressions are connected if not by the unifying idea of 
self. 
3 
J. P. Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (translated by 
Williams and Kirkpatrickr New York: Noonday Press, 1957) especially 
pp. 38ff. 
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31 The no-self-paradigm. in Western pbLilosophy this position is 
championed by Hume with his account of the self as a "Faundle of perceptions" 
and his questioning of a principle of unity synthesising the changing 
perceptions into a coherent whole. ' Hume does not as such deny the 
reality of the self, but rests with its non-apprehension. He himself 
admits to being uneasy with his conclusion2 for while being unable to 
discover a self unifying experience, he observes that an identity is 
3 preserved through these complex, changing experiences. 
If Hume does not take the step of denying the reality of the 
self, it is taken within some Buddhist traditions. Thus Hume's'bundle 
of perceptions" has been compared to the Buddhist analysis of the self 
into the five skhandas or constituents; form, feelings, perceptions, 
impulses and consciousness, and the denial that the self can be associated 
with any one of these skhandas or indeed with the aggregate. 
4 No less 
an authority than Suzuki declares, "there is no psychological substratum 
correspondi-ng to the word 'self " Catman) as when we say a table we have 
something substantial answering to the sound, Itable'. "5 This conception 
1 
David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge 
COxford University Press, 1965), Book I. Part IV, Section VI, pp. 251ff. 
2 
Ibid., p. 635. 
3 
Cf. the comment of Glyn Richards, that "Hume's misunder- 
standing arises from the assumption that the self is the name of something, 
an impression or entity. He seeks the entity which relates to the notion 
of consciousness or ego and when he fails to find it he is puzzled. " 
Glyn Richards, "Conceptions of the Self in Wittgenstein, Hume and Buddhism: 
an analysis and comparison". The Monist, vol. 61, no. 1,1978, p. 48. 
4 
Ibid., pp. 48f. Cf. Susan L. Anderson, "The Substantive Center 
Theory versus the Bundle Theory", pp. 96-107 in the same issue. 
5 
Suzuki Daisetz, "Self the Unattainable. " The Eastern Buddhist 
CE. B. F new series, vol. rII, no. 2.1970, p. 3. For a comparison of 
Western Existentialist and Buddhist views of the self, see also Keiji Nishitani, 
"On the I-Thou Relation in Zen Buddhism", E. B. new series, vol. II, no. 2, 
1969, pp. 71--87; D. ff. aishop, "Buddhist and Western Views of the Self", 
ibid., pp. 111-123; S. R. Hopper, "The 'Eclipse of God'ý and Existentialist 
Mistrust", E. B. new series, vol. III, no. 2,1970, pp. 46-70; Joan Stambaugh, 
"Time-Being; East and West, ' E. B. new series, vol. IX, no. 2,1976, 
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of the self shows some resemblance to the view of Heideggerr and the 
similarity will be discussed after the fourth view is described. 
The natural-organic self. In this view, the word 'self' 
refers to the individual as a psycho-physical unity, and a dualism of 
self and body is denied. The extreme view within this classification is 
the behaviourist position of B. F. Skinner for whom "mentalistic" concepts 
must be translated into statements about bodily behaviour and observable 
responses. In his view the self is used as a "hypothetical cause of 
action", an "originating agent within the organism" when we are unable 
to find elsewhere an explanation for a man's behaviour. 1 The self is a 
'repertoire of behaviour appropriate to a given set of contingencies". 2 
in Gilbert Ryle's modifications of this extreme view, mental concepts 
are acknowledged to be useful, for they are really statements of 
dispositions to behave in particular ways. 
3A 
position in which mental 
activity is accorded some autonomy, but still within the view of the 
self as a psycho-somatic unity, is that of Strawson who declares, 
What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of 
a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states 
of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal 
characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally 
4 applicable to a single individual of that single type. 
pp.. 107-114; John Steffney, "Non-being-Being versus the Non-being of Being: 
Heidegger's ontological Difference and Zen Buddhism", E. B. new series, 
vol. X, no. 2,1977, pp. 65-75; A. H. Lesser, "Eastern and Western 
Empiricism and the 'no-self' theory", Religious StudiLs, vol. 15, no. 1, 
March 1979, pp. 55-64. 
1 
B. F. Skinner, 
' 
Science and Human Behaviour, (New York, 
The Free Press, 1965), p. 283. 
2 
B. F. Skinnerr Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 199. 
3 
The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949). 
4 
P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen University 
Paperback, 1964), p. 101. Cf. A. R. Peacocke, who, approaching the same 
problem from the side of the biologist says of a man that 
he is "one person 
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This view need not imply that mental processes are nothing more than 
physical events. Instead of beginning with two states, physical and 
mental with the consequent problem of how they are related, the unity 
of the self is assumed. 
The question now is, into which category does an ecstatic 
view of selfhood fall? It might seem that, in emphasising the transcend- 
ing of bodily boundaries, there is ultimately a denial of the self, 
consonant with the no-self paradigm. As has been noted abovel both 
Heidegger and Buber reject the identification of the self with any 
aspect of the individual which may be thought to constitute the essence. 
This includes the identification of the self with consciousness, mind 
or body. Does this suggest a no-self, the emptiness at the centre of 
the carriage wheel referred to in the introduction to this thesis? It 
seems not, for neither philosopher denies the reality and particularity 
of the self. Their point is rather that the meaning of selfhood is 
to be found elsewhere than in the empirically observable individual. 
Apart from the first category above, in which the particularity of the 
finite self is ultimately denied, in the other three conceptions, the 
self is defined, whether as a bundle of perceptions, or as a network of 
behaviour,, or as a mind, over against others. In other words the 
particularity of Being is equated with the individuation or separateness 
of Being. What marks off the concept of self as both Heidegger and 
Buber present it is that the Being of the self 
is constituted in relation 
to what is other than the individual. being is 
'particular', uniquely 
possessing both physical and mental attributes, each explicated 
by 
appropriate sets of predicates". Science and 
the Christian Experiment, o. 142. 
1 
pp. 13ff., pp. 114ff. 
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itself only as it goes beyond its boundaries in the act of relating to 
what is other. Such a view raises several difficult questions. is there 
a denial here of the reality of the individual body? Even if it is 
allowed that in some sense selves become themselves with others, are 
not they also identified by their separateness? Does the concept of 
self have any meaning if we dissociate it from the concept of mind or 
consciousness? These questions will be considered shortlyr but first 
to complete the classification of self concepts, the notion of the self- 
in-relation will be described briefly, with an indication of the 
ontological ground that supports it. 
The self-in-relation: Persons and Individuals. The 
distinction between 'person' and Lindividual', used throughout the thesis, 
must now be sharpened, to make clear that with these two terms alternative 
ontologies are proposed. The word 'person' in particular has been used 
in many different senses, many of which refer to some aspect of the 
individual, such as his moral value, or his personality. In others, the 
word person is used for the individual who is 'growing' in creativity, 
love, and self-esteem. One may be more or less of a person, more or less 
of an individual as one is open to change in oneself. 1 
The word person as used in this thesis is not subject to degree 
in the above sense that one can be more or less of a person. It is not 
simply that two poles of selfhood are represented by the two words, 
person and individual, and that each 'self' is defined somewhere along the 
line between the two, although with some uses of the words this could well 
1 
For a summary of some approaches to the concept of person, 
cf. Ralph Ruddock, ed., Six Approaches to the Person (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1972) ; R. S- Downie and E- Telfer, Respect for Persons (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1969); John H. Walgrave, Person and Society (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1965). 
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be true. Used here, however, personhood is a term that can either be 
applied completely to a being, or not at all. The reason for this is that 
personhood has been linked here with ontologY, and the concept of a 
t'loartial' being seems contradictory. Either Being 'is' or it 'is' not 
at all. With the two -words 'person' and lindividuallf at least as 
presented by Buber, alternative ways of understanding Being are proposed. 
The 'individual' refers to the self which is defined with reference to 
its own boundaries, and is grounded in an ontology of 'substance'. 
"Person' refers to the self which is defined in relation to what is beyond 
its boundaries and is grounded in an ontology of Irelation'. 
The distinction between 'person' and 'individual' has 
been made by many philosophers, though even when not confused with 
"individual', the relational character of 'person' has not always been 
chosen as the defining characteristic. Thus Jacques Maritain uses the 
two terms 'personality' and 'individual' to distinguish a "material pole" 
which "'does not concern the true person but rather the shadow of a 
0 
personality"', and a "spiritual pole, which does concern true personality. 
Amongst those who have employed the distinction but with a relational 
emphasis are Nicolas Berdyaev, John Macmurray and Karl Heim, whose views 
on personhood will be sketched here. 
2 
1 
The Person and the Common Good (London: Godfrey Bles, 1948), 
p. 24. 
2 
Note should also be taken, amongst contemporary writers, 
of David Jenkins, The Glory of man (London: SCM, 1967)and The Contradiction 
of Christianity (London: SCM, 1976). Also Wolfhart Pannenberg, whose 
contribution, "Person" to RGG Ord. ed. 1 V, pp. 230-235, traces the 
development of a relational concept of the self. Cf. his Jesus, God and 
Man (London: SCM, 1968) pp. 179-183 where the same concept is explored in 
the context of Trinitarian doctrine. 
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Berdyaev, like Buberf sees two realmsf that of object- 
ification and that of existence and freedom, or as he also describes it, 
the realms of nature and spirit. 1 The person is the fulcrum between the 
two. There is in Berdyaev's philosophy a dualism, but he rejects a 
dualism of body and soul. 
Dualism exists, not between soul and body, but 
between spirit and nature, between freedom and 
necessity. Personality is the victory of the spirit 
over nature, of freedom over necessity. 
2 
Between the person and the objectifiable 'natural' world there is a 
discontinuity. "Man is a personality not by nature but by spirit. By 
nature he is only an individual.,, 3 Berdyaev argues that, when defined 
by reference to his own psycho-physical boundaries alone, man is 
unavoidably an individual, i. e. a part of the whole. But man as a 
person is a "microcosm, a complete universe ... a potential universe in 
4 an individual [i. e. a unique and repeatable] form". This view 
corresponds to Buberýs notion that in the I-Thou relation one encounters 
the Thou not as a part of the world, but as the totality. 
Berdyaev does not rest with a dualism between spirit and 
nature, for his philosophy is intrinsically eschatological. He rejects 
the restriction of eschatological language to the theologian, and argues 
that philosophy itself can be eschatological, oriented towards the End. 5 
1 
Slavery and Freedom, (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1943), pp. 10f. 
Spirit and Reality (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1939), pp. 4f. 
2 
Slavery and Freedom, p. 31. 




Cf. The Beginning and the End (London; Geoffrey Bles, 1952), 
51. 
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The objectifiable. world is not set permanently over against the freedom 
of the existing self but is to be transformed; the central thought Of 
Iteschatological philosophy', he declares is connected with the "Interpre- 
tation of the Fall as objectification, and of the end as the final and 
decisive victory over objectification". ' Persons are crucial to this 
victory, which is to demonstrate the power of freedom over necessity. 
Communion between persons is to be the focus of transformation. "All 
society and all history are transfigured and liberated through humanity, 
through the supremacy of personality.,, 2 That transformation, or 'End' 
must not be understood as a historically datable, objectifiable event 
for that would be the very reverse of the movement of freedom which 
Berdyaev perceives to be at the heart of the eschaton. Using arguments 
similar to Buber's, he contrasts "existential" with "objective"' or 
'historical" time and claims that the end is here when "objective" 
time is transformed into "existential" time. The 'end" is seen as the 
transformation of the 4objective" world by the creative freedom of 
3 
persons who resist causality . 
Against this belief similar questions to those posed to 
Buber can be asked; i. e. concerning the ontological status of the 'event' 
of transformation. 
4 it is interesting tonote that Berdyaev's defence 
parallels Buber's with his use of the Kantian categories of the phenomenon 
and noumenon. 
5 He talks of the "noumenal basis within the concrete life 
1 
The Beginning and the End, p. 51. 
2 
Ibid., p. 47. 
3 
Ibid., pp. 233ff. 
4 
Cf. above, P. 133. 
5 
For Berdyaev's acknowledgement of his allegiance to Kant see 
Slavery and Freedom, p. 11. 
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of the world". Man is "not merely one of the phenomena in a world of 
objects. His noume-nal essence remains in him. And in acts which take 
their rise from that noumenal essence he can change the world. "' Thus 
Berdyaev, like Buber, believes that man can bring about the transformation 
of the "objective' world because it is not self-sustaining but is subject 
to the 'existential' world. By changing the ways in which man relates 
to the world, so the world is changed. This for Berdyaev is not a claim 
for man per se but a recognition of his God-manhood. 2 By entering into 
communion with God, whose freedom is unbound by nature, man realises his 
true character and brings in the 'End'. 
Berdyaev describes his philosophy as "dualistically 
pluralist, creatively dynamic, personalist and eschatological". 4 It is 
a philosophy which reaches from its heart in the personal to the structures 
of space and time. His solution to the problem of freedom and necessity 
is that ultimately the realm of necessity is transformed. This, it could 
be said, is an ontological transformation, a transformation of reality. 
Karl Heim, who also writes of the relation between persons 
and reality, seems to argue rather for an epistemological transformation, 
a transformation in the way in which reality is seen. Heim's primary 
interest is in wrestling with the meaning, within a scientific cosmology, 
of a transcendent God. Either the theologian uses such words as 'above' 
or 'beyond' with reference to God, and so betrays his distance from a 
1 




Ibid., p. 235. 
4 
Ibid., p. 51. 
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scientific way of conceiving spacel or he must find a way of expressing 
transcendence in accordance with a modern scientific understanding of 
space. 
1 
Heim takes the latter course, and develops a doctrine of 
'spacest in which the I-It and the I-Thou relation form two dimensions 
of reality grounded in a third "space", the space of the presence of God. 
The objective world of I-It is only one space "into which everything is 
fitted. There exists simultaneously a second space .... This is the 
non-objective space in which the I and the Thou encounter one another. "2 
This second space is not an alternative to the first, but is coterminous. 
Heim uses the analogy of a two dimensional man who suddenly discovers a 
third dimension which has been'there'all the time. 3 The paradox of the 
I-Thou 'space' is that it exhibits a polarity. "I am I only by virtue 
of not being you or anyone else", yet I need you to be myself. 4 Heim's 
solution to the problem is to posit an "archetypal" "suprapolar" 'space' 
which embraces these other 'spaces' and resolves the polarities 
inherent in them. 5 This archetypal space bears the presence of God, 
whose presence is not identical with 'objective' space or the 'I-Thout 
space, but is nevertheless not divorced from them. There is the 
realisation that, "while we are encompassed on all sides by the temporal 
world, we stand at the same time even now in the midst of eternity and 
we are enclosed within the archetypal space of God". 
6 
1 
Christian Faith and Natural Science (London: SCM, 1953), p. 165. 
2 
Ibid., p. 108. 
3 
Ibid., p. 145. 
4 Ibid., p. 158. 
5 
Ibid. f pp. 161ff.? p. 168. 
6 
Ibid., p. '171. 
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For Heim there is indeed a transformation but it is of the 
understanding, not of reality. "'My eyes are opened to the all-presence 
of the eternal world. "' There is a disclosure of the eternal which forms 
the ultimate structure of reality. 
In criticism, apart from John MacQuarriels comment that it 
is "surely impossible to explicate the structure of personal existence in 
2 something so impersonal as space", it seems that Heim has taken over the 
strand of Buber's thought in which God has a natural relation to the 
world rather than one of freedom. The critical 'distance' between God 
and world necessary if transformation is to be an ontological matter, is 
not maintained. It seems that the 'space of God' is co-terminous with 
other 'spaces'. 
John Macmurray,, while also committed to a relational 
concept of selfhood is far less concerned than Berdyaev or Heim to 
investigate the structures of the universe, but carefully analyses the 
meaning of the self as agent as opposed to the reflecting mind. His 
task is the teasing out of the meaning of person (as opposed to individual) 
through the mother-child relation--the "original unit of personal 
existence-, --3through various possible societal relations with their 
effect on the self, to the idea of God as the "universal personal other', 4 
and to religion, defined tersely as "the celebration of communion--of 
the fellowship of all things in God". 5 Macmurray is at his best in 
1 
Christian Faith and Natural Science, p. 175. 
2 
Twentieth Century Religious Thought (London: SCM, 1963), p. 208. 
3 
Persons in Relation (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), p. 62. 
4 
Ibid., p. 164. 
5 
Ibid., p. 165. 
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the wealth of detail with which he decorates his argument, and in the 
thoroughness with which he explores the facets of the personal. Thus 
the implications of the self as agent--the 'I dor as opposed to the 
'I think'--are shown in discussions on the tension between involvement 
and withdrawal, on morality, on community as opposed to society. The 
painstaking character of his analysis is invaluable, and it is not so 
much a criticism as an observation to note that the cosmic and 
eschatological implications of personhood are lacking in Macmurray. 
For example, the threat posed by death to a selfhood constituted by 
relation, although mentioned by Macmurray is thought to be merely an 
example of the natural rhythm of withdrawal and return characteristic 
of any relationship. The fear of death, or the fear of isolation which 
in this scheme amounts to the same thing, is in his view under the impress 
of love, for fear, "as the negative,, presupposeslove and is subordinate 
to it". ' This confidence in the power of love is perhaps grounded in 
Macmurray's starting point of action. It is from the standpoint of action 
that the new logical form--the form of the personal--emerges. This 
form is a unity in which the positive includes its own negative as a 
2 
necessary dimension of itself. The negative contained within action 
in Macmurray's terms is process. This notion is applied to the world 
which, from the standpoint of action is postulated not as a process but 
as an action. 
3 
The conclusion is to "think Reality as constituted hy 
the inclusion of the unreal in its own being. Such a concept would then 
enable us to think the unity of the world without falling into dualism 
1 
Persons in Relation, p. 70, cf. pp. 62f, 
2 
Cf. The Self as Agent CLondon: Faber and Faber, 1957), p. 48. 
3 
Ibid-f. p. 219, 
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or antimony. "l And so, an "argument whicb. starts from the primacy of 
the practical moves steadily in the direction of a belief in God. ,2 
Although Macmurray himself does not state this explicitlY, 
it would seem that death for him is subordinate to love and constrained 
by it ultimately because of God. Death is absorbed as the negative by 
the positive of love. In Macmurray"s philosophy this is no eschatological 
hope but an existential reality of the freedom of persons in relation. 
The 'passivities' of existence, including death? are absorbed within 
action. It seems that the dialectic of love and death which provides 
the structure of this thesis is resolved in Macmurray's thought. 
To return to the main theme, the point has been reached 
where some criticisms of the concept of persons in relation must be met. 
The question has been raised above3 concerning the particular concreteness 
of the self constituted by relation. Is there not a danger of diffusing 
the centredness of the self to the point of extinction? 
Particularity in Communion: an Ontology of Presence 
The problem of particularity is highlighted by a quotation 
not from Buber's work but from John Macmurray. Thus-- 
Personality is mutual in its very being. The self is 
one term in a relation between two selves. It cannot 
be prior to that relation and equally, of course, the 
relation cannot be prior to it. 'V exist only as one 
member of the 'you and V. The self only exists in 
the communion of selves. 4 
1 
The Self as Agent, p. 218. 
2 
Ibid., p. 221. 
3 
See above, P-157. 
4 
Interpreting the Universe (London: Faber and Faber, 1933), p. 137. 
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Macmurray seems to strain logic here for in def i-ning the 1L self I as "one 
term in a relation between selves"f he uses the very term he is defining. 
For this to make sense, 'self' must be used in two ways; the "self' which 
relates and the 'self' constituted by the relation. What then, it seems 
reasonable to ask, is the meaning and nature of the 'self' prior to the 
relation? This is precisely the question which Macmurray (and Buber) seek 
to avoid with the claim that the relation and the self constituted by 
relation cannot be separated. Yet Macmurray himself does talk of a relation 
between two selves, suggesting that the poles of the relation do have a 
reality in themselves. Bradley's question as to the ontological status 
of a relation between two qualities A and B seems appropriate here, 
for he captures the dilemma. If, he asks, A is related to B by a 
relation C, what are we to understand here by the 'is'? If the relation 
C has an "independent" reality, as opposed to being an attribute of 
A or B, another relation, D, seems to be necessary to connect C to A 
and B. An infinite regression is the result. If on the other hand 
the relation does not have an independent reality, but is a property of 
A and B, what then is the connection between the two other than 
juxtaposition? l Bradley's conclusion is that "qualities must be, and 
must also be related .... Each has a double character, as both supporting 
and as being made by the relation. "2 Such a conclusion implies a 
contradiction within the meaning of Being, and since, to Bradley, "a 
relation without terms seems mere verbiage,, 
3 he affirms that "a relational 
1 
F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1897), pp. 17-29. 
2 
Ibid., p. 26. 
3 
Ibid., p. 27. 
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way of thought .. must give appearancer and not truth-. "l 
It must be admitted that if the particularity of A and 
B is defined by their separatenessp then a relation between them cannot 
constitute or affect the Being of A and B, and the ontological status of 
the relation is indeed a problem. But what happens to Bradley's 
argument if his assumption that "a relation without terms is mere 
verbiage", is challenged, if relation is affirmed as the primary 
ontological category, and the being of 'substance' as such is questioned? 
Bradley's problem seems to be that he sees the need to ascribe reality 
in some sense both to the particulars A and B, and to the relation between 
them. But what if the particularity of A and B. is given, not by their 
'substantial' nature but by the relation between them? 2 This is not, of 
course to deny particularity to A and B, for an ontology without 
particularity is no ontology at all, but it is to question the equation of 
particularity with the objective, space-time body. 3 
The thrust of this thesis is that an alternative ontology 
is at least conceivable, an ontology in which beings are particular- 
and therefore 'are' at all--not by reference to their physical presence 
but only in an ecstatic movement of communion. Thus, as John Zizioulas 
1 
Appearance and Reality, p. 28. 
2 
Bradley himself "recoils in horror" from the notion that the 
particularity of A is given solely by the relation to B. He is clear that 
whatever it means to say that A is in relation with B, "we do not mean 
that 'in relation with B' is A. " Ibid., p. 17. 
3 
Cf. Strawson, who while declaring that there can be no 
ontology without particularity, assumes as a principle that beings are 
spatio-temporal particulars. Individuals, p. 15, p. 126. This point is 
noted by John Zizioulas, "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", SJT 
vol. 28,197, f, p. 415. 
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concludes, In this ontologyf Iýcommunion does not threaten personal 
particularity, it is constitutive of it. ontological identity therefore is 
to be found ultimately not in every 'substance' as such, but only in a 
being which is free from the boundaries of the 'self"'. ' What makes a 
being particular, ie. uniquely itself and not to be confused with 
another self, is that it is in communion with others. 
But this concept threatens our almost instinctive ontological 
assumption that particularity is to be equated with individuality. Surely 
what an entity 'is' can be defined only in terms of itself. It may also 
relate to other entities but by their very character as observably 
separate beings how can they be involved in the definition of what it 
tis'? Furthermore, how can the uniqueness of the self be preserved if 
one is immersed in a network of relationships? If one 'is" no more than 
onets relationships, distinct uniqueness seems to be lost. 
There is an assumption here that may not be true. It seems 
that concreteness and uniqueness is destroyed because it is assumed that 
the uniqueness as well as the unity of the self stems from individuality, 
ýIrk 
or that which separates one from another. In the alternative ontology, the 
unity of the individual is not that which defines it as a self. Rather 
the self is defined by its uniqueness, and the uniqueness is not given 
by its own qualities or substance. Instead of the argument that one is 
unique because of one's separate individuality, here it is suggested that 
2 one is unique because one is in communion with others. The self is a 
1 
"Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", p. 409. 
2 
If one is identified as oneself by reference to uniqueness 
rather than unity, light is shed on ethical debates such as, for example, the 
question of whether a brain-damaged person is a person at all or a 
'vegetableý. If being a person depends on unitythen the answer surely is 
Inot. But if the person is himself because he is unique, he may still be so 
loved as to be unique, and there uniqueness does not depend on the degree of 
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particular being as it loves and is lovedf not because of its own nature. 
As was noted above, it is not that particularity is denied by this idea, 
for the particularity, the concrete uniqueness of the self, is 
indispensable for the event of communion, but neither can particularity 
be separated from that event. There is no denial that the self is 
present, but that presence is not compelling to the observer.. The person 
wills freely to be present as he stands in relation to the otherý This is 
an ontology of 'presencet. It is not that a being is present and may 
relate to other present beings, but that what it means to be present is 
to be in relation. 
At this point, perhaps the reader is left sympathising with 
Bradley and his comment that a relation without terms is 'mere verbiage', 
for it is difficult to conceive how the concept of self-in-relation can, 
as it were, get off the ground. Is it not circular to say that particularity 
is indispensable for the event of communion, but also that particularity is 
constituted by that event? This is the same problem to which attention 
was drawn at the beginning of the section, in which Macmurray appeared 
to use two senses of the self; the self which relates, and the self 
constituted by relation. Is there any way out of this dilemma? The 
difficulty is that, even if it is possible to conceive of a particularity 
constituted by communion, the standpoint from which this is conceived is 
of a being particularised also by a separate body. From this standpoint 
consciousness of the individual. Cr. John Knox, Jr., who in a philosophical 
rather than ethical context, suggests that it does indeed make sense to 
say that the self can survive the death of its mind, in contradiction to 
most philosophers; "Can the Self Survive the Death of its Mind. " Religious 
Studies, vol. 5; no. 1,1969, pp. 85-97. 
1 
Cf. Heidegger's fusing of the two terms, 'being', (ousia) 
and 'presence' (par-ousia). BT, p. 47/25. 
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talk of particularity in communion seems to deny the concrete reality Of 
the body which is undeniably separate, and exchange that reality for a 
particularity which, at best, is a nebulous meeting point of relationships. 
In other words materiality appears to be denied in an ontology of relation. 
This is, of course, not the case. Enough was said in the 
analysis of Buber to show that the 'I' met the 'Thou' in his "concrete 
otherness". But for Buber, the embodiedness of the 'Thou' did not bring 
about division or separation. With his doctrine of Urdistanz ae believed 
that space and time were neutral categories which could be either the 
bearers of an I-Thou relation, or be hardened into the separation of 
I-it. 1 As was shown, however, the difficulty is that the space-time body, 
though it may be the bearer of the ecstatic movement towards the 'Thou', 
is also, in that it dies, the bearer of separation. Thus it is not that 
as such relational selfhood is anti-material, burdened by a physical body. 
Rather it is that the body is the mode of expression of a particularity 
constituted in another way by communion. Herein lies the paradox and 
tragedy of personhood, that the body which bears man's capacity to identify 
himself in relation to what lies beyond him, is the same body which 
brings relationships to an end. 
2 
Persons as Bodies: The Paradox of Presence-in-absence 
What does it mean to acknowledge the embodiedness of identity, 
not grudgingly to avoid an unfashionable dualism, but wholeheartedly? 
It means to be aware strongly of the paradox that the thesis is exploring 
via Heidegger and Buber, the paradox of love and death, or presence and 
1 
Cf. above, pp. 121ff. 
2 
Cf. above, pp. 145ff. 
0 
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absence, This is a paradox whi-ch- both- philosophers have attempted to 
resolve by emphasis-ing one or other pole. Both have argued for the free 
presence of the self, a presence without absence, but in so doing have 
ignored some of the implications of being a body. Heidegger argues 1- for 
an ontology of presence in the face of absence, or death, but even within 
his own perspective it was shown in Chapter II that he avoids the death 
of the body. His argument for the free presence of the self depends 
on showing that the capacity to ex-sist is not negated by facticity. 
To do that, he equated death with dying and the fact of death as the end 
was made of little significance. So with the physical body. The 
embodiedness of the self is played down to the point of claiming explicitly 
that "Dasein is never at Thand in space". 1 If he conceded the physical 
body as a dimension of man"s Being, he would be unable to sustain an 
argument for the presence of the self other than physical presence, for 
all other dimensions such as the capacity to ex-sist would ultimately 
be reducible to their ground in physical presence. This follows from 
Heidegger's primary ontological assumption, that the Being of the 
self is defined in relation to the 'end'. If, at the end, there is no 
more than physical absence, so in life all other dimensions of the self 
can be reduced to physical presence. 
Going beyond Heidegger's own perspective, it can be 
observed that in failing to consider love as an ontological phenomenon, 
he ignores the capacity of the body to transcend its boundaries. Buber, 
on the other hand, who also argues for an ontology of presence without 
1 
BTr p. 419/368. 
172 
absencee concentrates on the. capacity to transcend the boundaries of 
the body, but at the cost of ignoring the body in its weakness. He 
ignores the fact that the body dies, and therefore also the person. 
He understands 'presence' in an immediate, spontaneous sense, as 
opposed to the 'absence' characterising the ! -It relation. For him, 
the only alternative to the immediate presence in the I-Thou encounter 
is I-It. but do these two poles truly simmarise existence? Are there 
not also moments in the meeting of two persons, where the separateness 
of their bodies expresses not the absence characterising the I-It relation, 
but the lack of presence characterising I-Thou? They may long to be 
present to each other, that is personally present in communion as opposed 
to being simply physically present, but for some reason there is a 
barrier to their freedom to relate. There is here a mutual isolation 
which however cannot be seen as an example of an I-It relation, for there 
is a longing for I-Thou. As was noted in Chapter III1 the error in much 
of Buber's writings is that he assumes free, personal presence as a 
fully realisable possibility now. A position which seems more true to 
the tension between presence and absence, love and death, is that-'presence' 
as the immediate love between persons is possible for us only in a mode 
of absence such as in the example of the cafe cited in Chapter 1112. 
As John Zizioulas comments on Sartre's example: 
When ... I have an appointment 
in a cafe with a 
friend whose existence matters to me, and on my 
arrival there I discover that this person is not 
there, the absent person, precisely by not being 
there occupies for me the entire space-time context 





Pp. 141f - 
3 "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity, p. 413. 
173 
He goes on to illustrate tbLe presence-in-absence concept from art and 
history arguing that through the creative shaping of space and materials 
in art, personal presence is expressed, for the person is unbound by 
these dimensions. Similarly man's capacity for history expresses 
personal presence in that he can transcend the boundaries of time. 
The already given in terms of events -- the rpast'-- 
does not produce an irresistible causality for man .... The 'events' created by man through history bear the 
seal of freedom that is inherent in personhood. 1 
However, the 'presence' of persons in art or history is still realised in 
'absence'. To use an example which Zizioulas himself does not, a stone 
age axe head made in flint portrays the presence of the sculptor in 
something material, even though the person is physically ahsent. This 
personal presence through the stone would not be enhanced if it were 
possible for the stone age man to be actually present. The artwork 
demonstrates a presence-in-absence. Similarly the capacity to mould 
the past by continually re-writing history cannot overcome the facticity 
of the past, nor the fact that we are divided from it in time. The 
writing of history shows the capacity to transcend the boundaries of 
time, but only in weakness, in the awareness of death. 2 
The presence-in-absence paradox has been introduced as 
1 
"Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", p. 418. 
2 
Cf. John Zizioulas, op. cit., pp. 413-418 for the development 
of these themes. Cf. Erich Fromm, who sees art as one of the ways in which 
man seeks to overcome his separateness and isolation, by uniting himself 
with the material he is working on. For Fromm, this unity is false because 
it is not interpersonal. He finds the answer to the problem of separation 
in the achievement of interpersonal union, in love; The_A-, t of Loving 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975), pp. 21f. But, lacking an 
eschatological perspective, Fromm has to maintain that the love of persons 
solves the problem of separateness. The argument of this then is that 
human love, threatened by death, cannot in itself overcome the problem. 
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a way of expressing the freedom of the self in the face of death, which 
indeed has been a guiding problem f or the thesis as a whole. It has been 
suggested that both Heidegger and Buber argue for an ontology of presence, 
but at the cost of denying some aspects of being a body. Suber's 
ignoring of physical death as a limit to personhood is a denial of the 
body in its weakness. Heidegger's ignoring of love as constitutive of 
the self is also a denial of the body in its capacity to transcend its 
boundaries. By saying that persons are bodies (not, have bodies, or 
exist 'in' bodies), the paradox of presence and absence is affirmed. 
It is not that man is both a person and a body. Rather, as body, he 
is particularised, made unique, made present in commimion with other 
persons. For human persons, love, which makes us ourselves, is an 
embodied love. It is not that the body forms a part of man, but that 
as a psycho-physical whole, the body is the mode of expression of a 
self constituted by communion. 1 This explains why death poses such a 
threat to personhood, for the presence of the person is inseperable from 
its mode of expression, the mortal body. 
one final point must be made to classify further the 
understanding of persons as bodies. It is not being claimed that the 
only way personhood can be expressed is as a body, but only that human 
1 
In this way two positions regarding the self are avoided. 
On the one hand, the reduction of the self to the psycho-physical body 
is avoided, for this view ignores man's ecstatic character. On the other, 
a dualistic approach in which the self as mind, spirit or soul, is 
separated from the organic body is avoided. It has been noted above that 
the relational view of the self tends towards the latter position, with 
the apparent dissolution of the self into a non-material, nebulous complex 
of relations. This, it has been suggested is a misunderstanding of the 
concept of person under discussion. 
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personhood is so expressed, ' ThroughOut the last two chapters the claim 
has been that the particularity of persons is given in relation to other 
persons, and that personal presence is therefore-not bound by the 
physical presence of the spatio-temporal body. In saying now that for 
human personhood the mode of expression is the body, this claim is not 
being denied, but simply that human personhood exhibits a paradox of 
presence-in-absence. Both communion and separation are expressed by the 
embodiedness of human persons. 
In introducing the qualifier 'human' to personhood, the 
purpose is to leave open the possibility of understanding God in terms of 
personhood. Clearly, if the particularity of Being requires a body this 
leads to a theological dilemma. As John Zizioulas notes, in that case, 
"Either God's particularity is also one determined by space and time 
(by a 'body'), or it is impossible to attribute particularity to God 
at all,, in which case it is also impossible to attribute ontology to him; 
we are simply forced to say that he is not. " His conclusion is that the 
only way out of such a dilemma is "to admit the possibility of a 
particularity which is not determined by space and time, i. e. by 
circumscribability or, in other words by individuality. " Thus, "even 
when it is determined by a body (as in the case of man) the person is 
particular only when its presence is constituted in freedom from its 
boundaries as a being which is particular because it is unique and 
indispensable in the context of commAinion., '2 
1 
Cf. Strawson, who does insist that the only way that 
Being can be particularised is as a spatio-temporal body. Individuals, 
pp. 59ff., p. 15, p. 126. Cf. above, p. 167. 
2 "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", p. 415, note 1. 
Perhaps Zizioulas could have qualified his conclusion a little. Given the 
understanding of the self as relational, the conclusion follows, but in 
an alternative ontology in which a dichotomy between an 'essential' self and 
the body was posited, the body would be as inessential for man to be man as 
it is for God. 
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CONCLUSION; 
IS THE CONCEPT OF GOD IMPLICIT IN PERSONHOOD? 
The tension between love and death has been explored in this 
thesis, and the close connection between that tension and the concept of 
selfhood has been indicated. The theme of presence-in-absence has been 
used to express two aspects of existence, both of which seem constitutive 
of the self, if the original premise is accepted, namely that the self can 
be defined in relation to what lies beyond its psycho-physical boundaries. 
The purpose of the presence-in-absence concept was to show that personal 
presence differs from physical presence in that the presence of persons 
is ultimately a matter of love and freedom. Again in the words of 
John Zizioulas: 
... the presence of personal beings ... is not 
established on the basis of a aiven 'nature' of 
the being but of love and freedom: persons can 
neither be particular-and thus be at all-by 
way of a nature compelling them to 'be' so, nor 
be present, i. e. recognised as being there, by 
compelling us to recognise them. 1 
Clearly we have not reached a resting place with this paradox. As was 
argued in the criticism of Heidegger in Chapter II, an ontology of presence 
cannot be based on an ultimate absence. 
2 'Presence' indicates that the 
destiny of the self is towards life, rather than death. But, of course, 
there is no question, given the framework of this thesis, of denying the 
reality of death and its power to influence the meaning of the self. 
If the embodiedness of persons is accepted, then death threatens the self. 
It seems that, for the relational concept of the self to be coherent, it 
1 
"Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", p. 414. 
2 See above, pp. 87ff. 
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must include a hope for '-pure" presencer presence-without-absence. 
From what has been said above it should be understood that this does 
not mean an escape from the body. Rather it would be a hope that the 
structures of space and time themselves would be transformed so that 
the body supported the free presence of persons. The body then, far 
from serving to separate and divide persons, would signify their 
difference from each other. This difference would still be maintained 
for there can be no denying of unique particularity and the particularity 
of human persons is expressed in the body. 1 
It seems then, that an eschatological perspective is 
implicit in the concept of personhood, for it appears that the 'ecstatic' 
character of man is not satisfactorily explained if death is the boundary 
of existence. In his ecstatic capacity he seeks to transcend every 
boundary. Howeverr if it is true that the body is the mode of existence 
of human persons and not simply a 'part' of man separable from an 
tessential" personhood, then the self has no natural capacity to 
transcend the death of the body. Therefore, if presence-without-absence 
is the destiny of persons, and without which presence-in-absence is 
meaningless, the concept of God appears to be involved in the definition 
of the self as person. The freedom which characterises the presence of 
persons is possible only because its source is ultimately not the human 
'Thou' but God. John Zizioulas argues that if there is ultimately no 
personal presence-without-absence, then there is no personal presence at 
all, and that the very use of the word 'presence' becomes "arbitrary 
and in the end meaningless. " Where, he asks, have we got the category 
1 
Cf. abover pp. 141f., and p. 122 for the contrast between 
division and difference. 
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of presence from when we apply it to personhood? 
Is it an extrapolation or an analogy from the 
experience of the presence of objects as they are 
observed and recognised through our senses or 
minds? But the presence of which we are talking in 
the case of personhood is the very opposite of this 
experience .... It is, therefore, impossible to regard 
the experience of the actual world as the source of 
the category of presence in the paradox presence- 
in-absence. And if that is the case, then there are 
only two alternatives before us. Either what we call 
presence is an arbitrary use of a category which in 
this case bears no ontological significance 
whatsoever and which will prove the empiricist right 
in calling this kind of presence sheer fantasy. Or 
if we wish to disagree with the empiricist and attack 
an ontological significance to the presence of the 
presence-in-absence paradox, we shall have to admit 
that presence in this case points to an ontology which 
does not ulitmately depend on the experience of this 
world. Those who accept this paradox as pointing 
authentically and ontologically to personal existence 
are not as far as they may think from an implicit 
assumption of God. ' 
We must be careful not to claim too much with this 
argument. It is not that the concept of God is implicit in anthropology 
but that this anthropology demands a concept of God as personal presence 
without absence, unless it is fantasy. Others however have made the 
inclusive claim. Wolfhart Pannenberg for instance argues that certain 
phenomena, particularly man's Popenness to the world*, and his 
"infinite dependence" lead us to presuppose"something outside himself 
1 
Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", p. 421. Clearly, 
some conceptions of God are incompatible with the freedom of personal 
presence. For example it was noted in Chapter III that, to the extent 
that Buber identifies the world with God, he removes all hope of a 
transformation of the space-time structures, in which presence-without- 
absence would be a reality. (Above pp. 127f.; cf. p. 139). God, if he 
is the source of 'pure' presence, cannot also be understood as the ultimate 
basis for the world 'as it is', i. e. a world characterised by separation, 
division and the final 'absence' of death. 
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that i-s beyond every experLence of the world". 1 Pannenberg's Lntention 
is to show that for an anthropology to be coherentf the concept of God 
has to be included in the definition of man, so that one is not really 
2 considering man if one ignores this dimension. Apart from the 
vulnerability of this position to Feuerbach's critique of religious 
projection, and its emphasis on 'openness' to the neglect of the 
paradoxical 'closeness' of man, it does not allow that other 
anthropologies are coherent. John Zizioulas, on the other hand, as 
indicated in the passage quoted above3 does concede that an alternative 
ontology is possible, viz one in which 'presence' is ultimately 
reducible to physical presence. A similar view is advocated in this 
thesis. The claim here is that, if the concept of self as person-in- 
relation is accepted, and if the presence-in-absence paradox is accepted 
as the way in which the freedom of personal presence is expressed in 
the human situation, then the concept of God is implied by this 
anthropology. 
This does not exclude other ways of understanding the 
meaning of the self, but if the relational view of the self is rejected, 
other attempts must grapple at least as seriously with the inter- 
relation of love and death. other concepts of the self have already 
been outlined in this chapter. The question of what enables-. -a choice to 
be made between them must finally be faced. The connection between 
selfhood and ontology has been shown throughout this thesis. It is 
1 
What is Man? (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 
pp. 3ff.; p. 9. Cf. "Anthropology and the Question of God", and "Speaking 
about God in the face of Atheistic Criticism"', Basic Questions in Theology 
CLondon: SCM, 1973), Vol. III, especially, pp. 91f., p. lo4, W6. 
2 
Cf. Basic Questions, vol. III, p. 89. 
See above, p. 178. 
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there-fore not simply a choice between views of the self, but a 
fundamental question of what ': is" at all. It seems that the answer to 
the question of what it means to be oneself depends finally on whether 
the 'givenness' of the past and the present is accepted as the only 
basis for ontology in which case death must be taken as a dimension of 
man, and of the self; or the tension between presence and absence, love 
and death, is taken as an indication that the existence of man cannot 
be explained fully from within existence, but only ultimately by 
reference to an extra-human reality. 
Put briefly the options available on the question of 
love and death vis 'a vis the self are; 
1) the acceptance of both love and death as dimensions of 
existence, and of the self, but with no expectation of a resolution of 
the tension. This position would accord with a -view of the self as a 
psycho-somatic unity. The self relates to others, but in the end the 
self is made nothing by death. This view also accords with the idea 
that the self is 'more than' the body, i. e. an immaterial self, but is 
dependent on the body. 
the denial of the power of death to limit the self. Buber's 
'immediate' presence of the self in relation comes into this category, for 
the self is outside time and untouched by death. Also, any view which 
proposes the survival of the self, as mind or consciousness or soul, 
without the body ultimately denies the reality of death. 
the denial of love as a dimension of the being of the self. 
On this view, represented in this thesis by Heidegger, the reality of 
death is so overbearing that it stifles all other dimensions of existence, 
and leads at best to the self made an individual by the relation to his death. 
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4) death is seen as a negation of a selfhood constituted 
by love. Death therefore is not viewed as a dimension of existence 
which can free one to be oneself. Its power to confine the self is 
to be resisted. The existence of both love and death is seen as a 
paradox which points to a final resolution with the defeat of death. 
Implicit in this view of the self is an eschatological hope for the 
transformation of the structures of existence producing death. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that a choice between 
these views rests in the end on whether it is accepted that death 
forms part of the definition of man. If death is unacceptable for 
man it seems that, given that death appears inescapable for all of 
us, the only appropriate stance is that of Dylan Thomas who does not 
go quietly to the grave, but 'rages against the dying of the light'. 
The only appropriate stance, that is, in the lack of any evidence 
to show that death will not go on for ever. For 'evidence' of the 
possibility that death may be defeated, the philosopher is at a loss. 
Could it not be that death does go on for ever? The above analysis 
cannot answer that question. Instead of answers, the analysis has 
produced questions. Are the paradoxes of love and death, presence 
and absence, irreconcilable? If the philosopher sets himself the 
task of producing a descriptive ontology, these questions seem 
unanswerable, although there have been suggestions in the thesis 
that the philosopher, as philosopher, need not restrict himself to 
a descriptive ontology. If he ponders on the ontological ground 
for the meaning of 'presence' in the presence-in-absence paradox, 
he may find an analysis of existence itself which commends an 'ecstatic' 
ontology taking him beyond the 'actual'. 
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At this point the enquiry could end, with the 
conclusion that at least one way of being oneself is to exist in 
the tension of love and death, neither denying the reality of one 
nor the other. However, the suggestion has been made in the closing 
pages that the paradoxes of love and death, presence and absence, 
point towards an extra-human reality, the source of pure presence 
and love, an ultimate resource of personal Being. In the final 
chapter the remit of the theologian to bring an extra-human reality 
to bear on questions of existence will be considered. The intention 
is not to present theological speculations as though they might 
provide simple answers to the philosophical problems encountered 
above. Rather, it is to indicate that some theology is concerned 
with these same problems and that it has a valid contribution to 
make to them, admittedly from a different starting point than the 
philosopher analysing existence phenomenologically. 
CHAPTER V 
THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PERSONHOOD 
It was suggested at the end of the last chapter that the 
concept of God as presence-without-absence is implicit in this presentation 
at least of the relational concept of personhood. The task of this final 
chapter is to ask briefly what theological concepts would be compatible 
with personhood, and how, if at all, they could resolve the paradox of 
presence-in-absence. 
The theological remarks that follow should not be seen as a 
diversion from the primary task of the thesis, to investigate the meaning 
of a relational concept of the self. The theological concepts to be 
outlined, far from being separate from anthropology, are the ground of it, 
in the sense that the concept of man as developed here cannot be under- 
stood in separation from the concept of God. Put simply, it will be 
suggested that man is man not simply in relation to his fellow man but 
ultimately in relation to God. The suggestion that man is defined in 
relation to God should not come as a surprise to readers with a Christian 
theological perspective, and yet within Western traditions as opposed to 
the Eastern Orthodox ýith its doctrine of theosis, a considerable division 
is posited between God and man. If man is defined by reference to himself, 
any relationships he enters into are extrinsic to his Being. The argument 
of this thesis points in a very different direction. The final extension 
of the notion that the self is truly itself in relation to what is other 





I-ý--Tn<Du relationships with other mortal persons cannot be 
the ultimate ground of the freedom from being identified by one's location 
as a spatio-temporal body; for the I-Thou relation is expressed by bodies 
which die. What is needed, it was suggested, is some view of identity 
in which 'death is swallowed up in victory', in which physical death does 
not annihilate the person because his identity is in a body not bound by 
space and time but which is nevertheless real. 
2 
A Reconciliation of Love and Death? 
Before considering the contribution which theology might make 
to this problem of embodiedness, and of presence-in-absence, one objection 
must be met. Could it not be argued, on theological grounds themselves, 
as well as others, that being oneself means finding some reconciliation 
between love and death? Could it not be that we are persons who in I-Thou 
relationships are given freedom to be ourselves, but that this freedom is 
bounded by death? Indeed, to put the case more strongly I could 
it not be 
that love is only love in the company of death? Such an argument would 
certainly accord with the position of some existential psychologists. For 
example, Rollo May suggests that love is defined by its ending: 
Death is always in the shadow of the delight of love 
The most excruciating joy is accompanied by the consciousness 
of the imminence of death, and with the same intensity. And 
it seems that one is not possible without the other .... 
Abraham Maslow is profoundly right when he wonders whether we 
could love passionately if we knew we'd never die .... 
Love is not only enriched by our sense of morlZality but 




above p 143. cf W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology 
(London, SCM 1973) vol III p 114. "Since in the end my fellow man is 
ultimately as dependent as I am upon the gift of freedom, the 'thou' 
of my fellow man cannot be the ultimate basis of freedom. " 
3 
Rollo May, Love and Will (London: Collins Fontana Library, 1972), 
pp. lolf., my italics. 
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The anthropological assumption behind this position, explored 
by Norman 0. Brown in Life Against Death, 
' 
is that-the way of wholeness 
for man lies in some reconciliation of love and death, and that the 
attempt to deny the power of either is a denial of a dimension 
of man, without which he would not be fully himself. Brown's argument 
will be considered here in some detail for it enables the theological 
implications of accepting death to be taken further. 
In his analysis of Freud and the post-Freudians, Brown shows 
that Freud postulated an irreconcilable conflict between love and death, 
"grounded in the very nature of life itself. ,2 Brown's view is that to 
accept this duality is to concede that man is in a state of sickness, in 
which either the instinct for love or for death is repressed. For Brown, 
man cannot be whole unless he can be freed from repression, and he cannot 
be free until he ceases to repress the awareness of death. According 
to Brown, man has attempted to fight death by his creation of "immortal 
cultures" and by "making history. 113 Religion, too, has been used to deny 
the power of death: 
The ultimate defect of all heavens with immortality beyond 
the grave is that in them there is no death; by this token 4 
such visions betray their connection with repression of 
Again; 
... the Christian heaven exists to solve problems not soluble 
on earth; and since it postulates immortality in heaven, its 
psychological premise is the 
' 
impossibilýty of reconciling life 
and death either on earth or in heaven. 
1 
(Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1959). 
2 
op. cit., p. 79. 
3 
Ibid., p. 101. 
4 
Ibid., p. 108. 
5 
Ibid., p. 95. 
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In contrast to the idea of immortality after death, Brown 
argues that the resurrection of the body expresses the Christian hope 
for the abolitiou of repression, a "resurrected body which the Christian 
creed promises would want to die because it was perfect. " 
1 
Thus the 
perfect body, according to Brown, is a body reconciled with death. -This 
body would be transfigured, for; 
... the abolition of repression would abolish the unnatural 
concentrations of libido in certain particular bodily organs, 
concentrations engineered by the negativity of the morbid death 
instinct .... The human body would become polymorphously 
perverse, delighting in that full life of all the body which 
it now fears. 2 
The repressive power of death would no longer have sway over the body, 
for there would be no attempt to deny death as a part of life. His 
conclusion is that, "In the last analysis Christian theology must either 
accept death as part of life or abandon the body. " 
It would seem that within the Judeo-Christian tradition 
there is a resistance to the former alternative, that death is a 'given' 
for man. In the Genesis story of the Fall, one of the themes is that 
death is a result of man's turning from God. It seems that, for the 
compiler of the story, physical death for the whole creation was a con- 
sequence of the severing of the relationship between man and God. Yet 
even at the level of the meaning of the story, without considering any 
connection between it and cosmology, this interpretation has been 
questioned. Thus Eichrodt in his Theology of the Old Testament argues, 
in a very Heideggerian way, that in the story of the Fall, it is not the 
1 
Ibid., P. 108. 
2 
Ibid., p. 308. 
3 
Ibid., p. 309. 
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I'simple fact of dying which is here proclaimed as the punishment of sin 
but the enslavement of all life to the hostile powers of death - suffering, 
pain, toil, struggle - by which it is worn out before its time. "l 
Eichrodt suggests that for the compiler of the text, Adam would have died 
even if he had not sinned, but that by his disobedience he became 
enslaved to death. Freedom would then mean the capacity to face one's 
death as a dimension of the Being of man. How similar this is to 
Heidegger's theme that man is 'thrown' as Being-towards-death, but that 
freedom consists in not being alienated from oneself by death. Put 
another way, this position would appear to suggest that death is a 
result not of sin but of createdness. 
Karl Rahner adopts a similar position concerning the involve- 
ment of death in the definition of man when he declares that death is a 
"natural event", and that Adam, even had he not sinned, would not have 
"lived on endlessly in the bodily life of this world" but would have 
"brought his personal life to its perfect consummation .... through a 
"death" which would have been a pure, active self-affirmationfl. 
2 
Criticism of the notion that death is an activity, or a 
final decision, has already been made. Is not death as the end completely 
beyond the power of the existing self? It was noted in the discussion 
1 
Walter Eichrodt, Theology of the old Testament (London SCM 1967) 
vol. II p. 406. 
2 
On the Theology of Death, (New York, Herder and Herder 1972) 
p. 34. To be fair to Rahner, it should be noted that he recognises a 
dual character in death, i. e. "that there is in every human being a real 
ontological feature which contradicts death", and so this "Catholic 
doctrine concerning the natural element in death does not mean that the 
actual death which each of us will die may be looked upon as a natural 
process, as though death could be neutralized". Ibid. p. 37. For the 
range of attitudes to death within theology cf. John Hick, Death and 
Eternal Life; for a brief summary cf. N. D. o'Donoghue,, "Sister Death", 
The Furrow vol. 29 no. 5, '1'378 pp 274-293. 
3 
cf. above p. 89. 
188 
of Heidegger that even if death is accepted as one of the 'passivities' 
of existence, an aspect of Ithrownness' without which man would not be 
man, serious theological implications follow. In particular an acceptance 
of death as an aspect of the definition of man seems to imply that death 
is part of God's intention for man, and for the rest of his creation, 
and that for this feature God should be praised. 
1 
The ontological 
assUMPtion in this position is that for an understanding of the Being of 
man, the empirical world, in which death is clearly present, is the only 
'given' from which an ontology can be constructed. This assumption might 
well be acceptable to some theologians, and could accord with other notions 
of the self, but from the perspective of the particular relational concept 
under discussion it seems unacceptable for two reasons at least. 
The first problem has already been raised in Chapter IV, 
concerning the ground of personal presence. If, as has been argued, the 
freedom of persons requires the capacity to be present to one another 
without coercion rather than through compelling necessity, how can the 
body whose horizon is death supply this ground? If death determines man's 
Being, then it seems that he has no alternative than to be present as a 
compelling physical presence. Yet it has been suggested that personal 
(i. e. free) presence is a possibility, albeit in the strangemode of 
'absence', when the person though physically present withholds himself, or 
when though physically absent, is personally present. 
2 
How then has the 
concept of 'i)resencel arisen? It will be recalled from Chapter IV that 
this question is raised by John Zizioulas, who argues that to be applicable 
to human personhood, the category of presence cannot have come by analogy 
from the experience of objects as they are observed and recognised by 
I 
cf. above p. 95. 
2pp. 141f f- 
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our sense and minds. Such a presence is the very opposite of personal 
presence. lie concludes that it is impossible to regard the experience 
of the actual world as the source of the category of presence in the 
presence-in-absence paradox. In the face of this he sees two alternatives. 
Either I presence' must be abandoned as an ontological category, which 
would mean that man could only be objectively present; or it must be 
admitted that the reality of personal presence ". Lpoints to an ontology 
which does not depend on the experience of this world. " 
1 
The fact that 
personal presence and love are possibilities, although in a mode of 
absence, is an indication that there is for man a horizon of presence- 
without-absence. 
The second observation which suggests that a reconciliation 
of love and death cannot be a theological terminus, given the relational 
concept of personhood, is made by Herbert Marcuse. Like Brown, Marcuse's 
search, in Eros and Civilization, is for an unrepressed existence. He 
declares that if the significance of death lies not in its character as 
the end of life, but as the end of pain, then "the conflict between life 
and death is the more reduced, the closer life approximates the state of 
gratification. 12 Yet even if it is possible to exist oneself without 
repression, accepting death, and to hope for a future in which the 
repressive power of death will diminish, there remains the problem of 
those who in the pasthave died in pain: 
Not those who die, but those who die before they must and 
want to die, those who die in agony and pain, are 
the great 
1 
John Zizioulas, "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity', ' SJT vol. 28 
1975, p. 421. 
2 
H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation (London: Sphere Books, 1969), 
p. 187. For a good comparison of Brown and Marcuse see Theodore Roszak, 
The Making of a Counter Culture (London: Faber & Faber, 1970), pp. 84ff. 
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indictment against civilisation. They also testify to the 
unredeemable guilt of mankind. Their death arouses the 
painful awazeness that it was unnecessary, that it could have 
been otherwise .... Even the ultimate advent of freedom 
cannot redeem those who died in pain. It is the remembrance 
of them, and the accumulated guilt of mankind against its 
victims, thjt darken the prospect of civilisation without 
repression. 
Marcuse concludes that a philosophy which is not to work as the 
7handmaiden of repression" must respond to the fact of death with the 
"Great Refusallf. 
2 
Although unable to articulate an explicit theology himself, 
Marcuse has surely introduced an alternative theological option to 
those which Brown offered. According to Brown, the only alternative to 
the acceptance of death as a dimension of man is a flight from death 
into heaven in the 'next' world which, he comments, is to "abandon the 
body". Yet Marcuse's refusal to forget those who have died in the past 
in pain, is both an expression of unrest with the world 'as it is', and 
at the same time a refusal to justify the pain of the past by reference 
to a glorious future. It is the 'fixity' of the past which criticises 
all hope of free and unrepressed existence in the present and future. 
The absence of those in the past menaces our identity in the present. 
Marcuse is unable to go further than to express his refusal to consent 
to death, for to him the past is unredeemable. It would seem that if 
a theological statement is to meet Marcuse's point, it would have to 
show that the past is in some way not fixed, but open to transformation. 
3 
It now can be made clearer why Buber's account of personal 
identity is inadequate. Buber can offer no hope for the past, for 
there is no particular time or place in history at which God has touched 




cf. Elizabeth Templeton, "On Undoing the Past", (unpublished paper 
delivered to the Society for the Study of Theology, York, 1979) where the 
hptween the Irenean doctrine of 'Recapitulation' and the 
ed. 
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the world. huber challenges Christian theologians to show why suffering 
still takes place in a world which is supposed to have been redeemed; 
and yet if Buber's hope is only in a God who is still to come, there 
can be no compensation for the suffering of the past, and indeed for 
this present which becomes past. 
1 
Two problems have been raised, both connected with the freedom 
of personhood, which seem to require a rejection, on theological grounds, 
of an ontology in which death is accepted as a condition of man being 
himself. In the first, the freedom to be personally present seems to 
require some way of being a body which does not force the recognition of 
oneself by another. In the second, the question is raised whether, on 
grounds of theodicy, the presence of persons implies being free from the 
limitations of a particular space and time. The argument up to this point 
has been that a relational concept of personhood implies both that personal 
presence is not defined by a particular space-time context and that for 
man personal presence is embodied. These implications are in conflict 
given the present spatio-temporal structures leading to death, for death 
allows only one of these implications, viz. the mortal embodiedness of 
persons. The acceptance of death as a condition of man being himself 
would resolve that conflict, but it has been maintained throughout this 
thesis that personal existence is faithfully portrayed only when the 
conflict between freedom and necessity is acknowledged. 
The problem set for this final chapter is whether any 
theological themes offer the hope of an ultimate resolution without 
denying the present dilemma. All that can be done at the end of an 
inquiry concerned with a philosophical issue is to provide the simplest 
1 
Cf. above, p. 132, note 1. 
192 
agenda for further research. The concern, as stated at the beginning 
of the chapter, is to suggest theological concepts which might be 
compatible with a relational personhood and how, if at all, they could 
resolve the paradox of presence-in-absence. Two questions can be isolated, 
crucial for the coherence of a relational personhood. These are drawn 
from the issues raised in Chapter IV, on personhood and the body. 
1). Can persons be particularised, i. e. uniquely themselves 
without being particularised in any way by individual 'natures'? What 
can counter Strawson's insistence that the only way Being can be 
particularised is as a spatio-temporal body, for throughout the analysis 
of existence, even if the identity of the person is constituted in 
communion, he is also identified as an individual by the spatio-temporal 
body? 
1 
Is embodiedness inseparable from the concept of person? If so, 
then not only is the paradox of presence-in-absence irreconcilable, but 
the application of personhood to God is not possible. To avoid the 
conclusion that only bodies are persons, it would have to be shown that 
it makes sense to talk of persons being particularised by communion, 
without in any way being identified by an individual'nature'in distinction 
to other individual 'natures'. 
2). Even if it can be shown that the concept of personhood 
without a body makes sense, it has been argued above that in man personhood 
is embodied. Is there any way of being embodied which does not enable the 
person to be individualised by his body? 
Though perhaps not immediately recognisable as the classical 
concerns of theology, these questions do indeed bear on theological 
problems and to go further, are they not among the questions to which 
1 
see above pp. 170ff. 
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theologians have continually sought answers? In particular, the 
Trinitarian and Christological debates in the Church can be viewed in 
part as attempts to wrestle with precisely such questions. The struggle 
by the Church Fathers, and by theologians ever since, to find a formula 
reconciling the personhood of Father, Son and Holy Spirit without 
lapsing into the Tri-theism of three individuals reflects the struggle 
in this thesis to articulate the particularity of the person without 
basing that particularity on his individual 'nature'. The second 
question, concerning the embodiedness of personhood in man and how 
persons can avoid being circumscribed by the spatio-temporal body, is 
one which bears on the Christological debates. How could a particular, 
bodily man whose birth and death could be determined with some accuracy 
be, from all eternity, the second person of the Trinity? And, to put 
the same question in a soteriological setting, if the presence of that 
man was limited by his spatio-temporal body, what ontological effect 
could his life and death have on those who lived at different times 
and places? 
In the following pages no attempt will be made to examine 
in any depth the history of these complex debates nor to compare the 
many and varied interpretations of the Trinity and Christology. It 
is not intended to try to solve one set of problems connected with 
personhood by means of another complex debate fraught with its own 
network of problems. The purpose of what follows is simply to indicate 
that some lines of Trinitarian and Christological thought suggest fruitful 
approaches to the problems left by the existential analysis, whereas 
others do not. In this selection of some theological viewpoints, no 
judgement of relative values is intended. They are chosen simply for 
the fact of their correlation with the philosophical concept of person 
under examination. It should not be imagined from that selection that 
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the relational view of the self is here proposed as the final arbiter 
of the validity of the T-rinitarian and Christological concepts. The 
question of what validates theological concepts is itself open to 
debate, but by whatever canons, whether it be scripture, the authority 
of the Church Fathers, Tradition etc., the relational concept of 
1 
personhood would also require testing against such authorities 
what contribution, then, can theology make in the Trinitarian 
and Christological debates to the two questions isolated i. e. 
, 
particularity without individuality, and embodiedness without 
individuality? 
Particularity without Individuality; the Doctrine of the Trinity 
r . Lhe 
difficulty recurring throughout the thesis has been that 
even if a person is particularised, made uniquely himself, in communion 
with other persons, he is also particularised by his individual 'nature'. 
This problem was shared by the Father. s who attempted to defend the distinct 
4 
particularity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit without ind. "Vidualising 
them as three 'natures' or essences. In the language of the third and 
fourth centuries, there were three persons but only one essence or 
substance, three hypostases and one ousia. one of their difficulties, 
as it is here, was that as far as sense observations are concerned three 
1 
Though beyond the scope of this thesis it would be interesting, 
for example, to compare the relational view of selfhood with Biblical 
views of the self such as the notion of corporate personality as 
interpreted by-H.. viheeler Robinson et al. In the area of patristics, 
the influence Q-n the Fathers of presupposed concepts of the self could 
be examined. How much, for instance, has the 'psychological' model of 
the Trinity affected concepts of the person in Trinitarian discussion? 
And how justifiable is the claim, made by C. C. J. Webb in his remarkable 
book, God and Personality, that the philosophical use of 'person' is 
founded in its theological use, rather than the reverse? God and 
Personality, (London, ý3eorge Allen and Unwin, 1918), ,. 46. 
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persons do signify three individualised 'natures'. As Augustine put the 
problem, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are three men, not one man. Why then 
in God should there not be three essences rather than one? 
1 
Such unity 
as may be perceived between three men or women is contrary to the 
conceived unity of the members of the Trinity. 
Clearly the meaning of the concept of unity is crucial to the 
question of whether the Trinity can be the ultimate resource for 
particularity without individuality, as indeed it was a crucial question 
for the Church Fathers. Committed, from the Hebrew tradition, to a 
belief in the oneness of God, the church had to adapt its theology to 
accommodate the claims that the Father is God, the Son is God and the 
Spirit also is God. This required an interpretation of 'unity' appropriate 
to God, a unity in which oneness and threeness were not mutually exclusive. 
2 
Karl Rahner, in his recent book on the Trinity, claims that 
"Christians" have never taken seriously the tripersonal character of God 
and are "almost mere 'monotheists'". 
3 
By "Christians" he means those 
adopting an " r4. ugustinian-Western conception of the Trinity .... It begins 
with the one God, the one divine essence as a whole and only afterwards 
does it see God as three in persons". This approach he contrasts with 
"The Bible and the Greeks (who) would have us start from the one 
unoriginate God, who is already Father even when nothing is known as yet 
about generation and spiration". 
4 
This is not the place to discuss the 
1 
Augustine of Hippo, The Trinity, translated by Stephen McKenna, 
(Washington, The Catholic University of America Press 1963). Bk. 7.4 p. 232. 
2 
For a discussion of the problem of unity in the Trinitarian debate, 
and the influence on it of Aristotle's analysis of unity, see H. A. Wolfson, 
The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970), 
vol. 1 pp 305-363. 
3 
The Trinity translated by J. Donceel, (New York, Herder and Herder, 
1970), p. 10. 
4 
Ibid. ,- 17. 
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accuracy of that generalisationr in every case, but simply to note two 
approaches to the unity of the Trinity; the one beginning with the Unity 
and attempting to understand the distinction of the Persons; the other 
beginning with the distinction of Persons and attempting to understand the 
Unity. 
Rahner's own approach will be considered shortly. First it 
should be noted that this divergence in approach is not confined to the 
Greeks and Latins, but continues to the present day. Donald Baillie, 
commenting on Trinitarian thought in the first half of this century, notes 
two trends, one tending in its extreme form towards modalism, the other 
tending towards tritheism "because of its use of the 'social' analogy 
associated with the Cappadocian Fathers of the fourth century". 
1 
Trie 
outstanding example of the first trend cited by Baillie is Barth with 
his preference for 'modes of -Deing'in the Godhead rather than 'persons', 
but it is the other trend which is of interest here, and in particular 
Baillie's criticism of the 'social' view of Trinity. This position was 
exemplified for Baillie by Leonard Hodgson, whose Croall lectures on the 
Trinity had been delivered only five years previously. Hodgson suggested 
that the notion of 'arithmetical, simple unity' was inappropriate for the 
unity of God and considered instead the unity of the thinking, feeling, 
willing human self. 
2 
Arguing that the "seat" of organic unity is not to 
be found in any one of its constituent elements, or in some further entity 
of the same order of being" 
3, 
but in the "unifying activity which unifies 
1 
Donald Baillie, God was in Christ, (London, Faber and Faber 1955), 
p. 134. 
2 
Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity (London, Nisbet 1943), 
85 
3 
Ibid., P. 92. 
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the component elements" 
1, 
he proceeded to apply this model to the unity 
of God, "a dynamic unity actively unifying in one Divine Life the lives of 
the three Divine persons" . 
2 
Baillie's criticism of the concept of 'social' 
unity represented by Hodgson is that: 
If we regard the three personae of the Trinity as quite distinct 
persons or personalities in the full modern sense, we seem to 
imply that they are parts of God, and it is difficult to remedy 
this by going on to speak of their being united in the highest 
conceivable kind of unity. If they are three distinct Persons, 
are they limited by each other so that they are finite Persons? 
or if that is rejected as intolerable, and it is maintained 
that each has the attribute of infinity, is it not very difficult 
to think of three infinite Beings of the same essence, co-existing 
with each other as distinct entities? Yet I do not sei how the 
interpretation in question can avoid that difficulty". 
Baillie's criticism is powerful. Given the initial assumption that the 
three persons of the Trinity are to be interpreted by analogy with 
'personalities', there seems no way of avoiding tritheism. For the 
purposes of this discussion the 'social' concept of Trinity would provide 
no answer to the problem of particularity without individuality. The 
precise question faced here is how three persons in relation can avoid 
also being three individuals. From the perspective afforded by the 
foregoing analysis, it can be seen that Hodgson's analogy could not 
provide the answer, for he seeks in the unity of the individual self an 
4 
analogy for the unity of a society of persons. On the other hand, as 
I 
Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity (London, Nisbet 1943) 
p. 94. 
2 
Ibid., p. 95. 
D. Baillie op. cit. p. 141. 
4 
A. C. . ýelch makes this point in his critique of Hodgson's thought: 
"The idea of an internally constitutive unity is not unreasonable when 
the constituents are thinking, willing and feeling. Its usefulness to 
Hodgson's case depends upon some further demonstration that personalities 
are of such a nature as to be capable of being comprehended into, or of 
comprising a unity of intensity". The Trinity in Contemporary Theology 
(London, sCM 1953). p. 255. 
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has been shown above, in a society of human persons the separateness of 
the persons is not overcome by their relatedness to each other. A 
conception of the Trinity based on the model of a human society of 
persons would not escape Baillie's criticism of tritheism. 
Karl Rahner, though by no means adopting a 'social' analogy 
for the Trinity, is concerned to recognise the real distinctions between 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and believes that his method offers a new 
approach to the problem of the connection between the oneness and 
threeness of God. 
1 
He takes the way of the Greek Fathers in starting 
from "the self revelation of God (the Father) as given in salvation 
history, as mediated by the Word in the Spirit". Iiis basic thesis is 
that "these distinctions of 'God for us' are also those of 'God in 
Himself I. 
2 
In the technical language of the Trinitarian debate this 
thesis is expressed as follows: "The 'economic' Trinity is the 'immanent' 
Trinity and the 'immanent' Trinity is the 'economic' Trinity". 
3 
If our 
conception of the one God is derived from his self-communication rather 
than from some notion of unity conceived elsewhere, then we have to 
speak of the "unity of three divine persons, of the unity of the Father, 
the Son and the Spirit, and not merely of the unicity of the divinity". 
He declares that he is considering the problem of the One God rather 
than the One Divinity, and therefore ", V. -e are from the start with the 
4 
Father, the unoriginate origin of the Son and the Spirit". The meaning 
of the unity of God for Rahner is to be given only by an investigation 
of the relationships between Father, Son and Spirit as they are 
1 
The Trinity p. 45. 
Ibid. p. 44. 
3 
Ibid. p. 22. 
4 
Ibid. p. 46. 
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communicated in creation and redemption. 
If, however, we look for a fresh interpretation of the 
concept of unity in the light of the interpersonal relationships 
characterising the 'economic' Trinity, we are disappointed. Joseph 
Bracken, in a stimulating article on contemporary Catholic views on the 
Trinity, notes that "even though his understanding of the economic 
Trinity clearly reflects a heightened awareness of the strictly inter- 
personal relationships between God and man, Rahner hesistates to use the 
same interpersonal categories in his doctrine of the immanent Trinity". 
1 
Instead, he continually questions the use of the term 'person' to refer 
2 to Father,, Son and Holy Spirit, preferring "distinct manner of subsisting". 
His main difficulty with the term 'person' is that: 
.... when today we speak of person in the plural, we think 
almost necessarily, because of the modern meaning of the 
word, of several spiritual centres of activity, of several 
subjectivities and liberties. But there are not three of 
these in God - not only because in God there is only one 
essence, hence one absolute self-presence, but also because 
there is only one self-utterance of the Father, the Logos. 
The Logos is not the one who utters but the one who is 
uttered. And there is properly no mutual love betw 7 en 
Father and Son, for this would presuppose two acts. 
Thus for Rahner there can be no I-Thou relation within the Trinity. 
4 
But why precisely does he reject the notion of a plurality of persons in 
the Trinity? It is because in God there is only one essence, hence one 
1 
Joseph A. Bracken, "Ehe Holy 
- 
Trinity as a Community of Divine Persons: 
Part II, Person and Nature in the Doctrine of God'11-eyth-rop Journal vol. 
XV 1974, p. 257. 
2 
The Trinity p. 109. 
3 
Ibid. p. 106. 
4 
cf., Ibid. p. 76, n. 30 "Hence within the Trinity there is no 
reciprocal 'Thou'. The Son is the Father's self utterance which should 
not in its turn be conceived as 'uttering' and the Spirit is the 'gift' 
-,, hich does not give in its turn". 
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absolute self-.,. ýresence". Three 'persons' for Rahner would mean three 
separate subjectivities, three consciousnesses, with the attendant danger 
of "massive tritheism". 
1 
It appears that Rahner hesitates to revise the concept of 
unity to allow for a community of persons, and instead recasts the concept 
of 'person' us 'distinct manner of subsisting'. Rahner himself admits 
that the "concepts of essence or substance are not simply irreplaceable". 
Their replacement by "better concepts" is "hardly conceivable", yet "it 
is possible that, in another conceptual framework .... a few aspects may 
come out more clearly than hitherto". Such concepts, he suggests, would 
be "less static, more ontological, referring more to a spiritual than 
to a thing - like reality". 
2 
Bracken comments on this point that Rahner 
is "understandably cautious about tampering with such a fundamental 
philosophical concept, unless an entirely new metaphysical frame of 
reference could be put forward which would justify such a dramatic shift 
in perspective 11 .3 Yet it seems, declares Bracken, that by holding to 
an older concept of 'essence' or 'substance', and by assuming that 
'person' means 'separate self-consciousness' Rahner may well be "at 
cross purposes with himself": 
For, on the one hand he is anxious to ground belief in the 
Trinity in the actual experience of Father, Son and Spirit 
within Christian Life and worship; and, on the other hand, 
he is openly distrustful of the 'tritheistic' overtones of 
that same day-to-day experience of the Trinity and seeks to 
remedy this defect by coining a new technical phrase, 
'CListinct manner of subsisting', to substitute for the 
1 
Ibid. p. 42. cf., p. 75f. 
2 
The Trinity p. 56. 
3 
op. cit. Part II p. 269. 
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traditional word, 'person'. By this switch in 
terminology, however, Rahner seems implicitly to 
reaffirm. what he ostensibly wished to change in 
virtue of his book; namely, the presumably too 
strong emphasis on God as one rather than as 
genuinely tripersonal in Christian life and worship. 
This is not to take away from the strength of Rahner's work. Rather it 
is to suggest that if he had been able to follow through the implications 
of his own method even when the practically unchangeable concepts of 
essence or substance were challenged, he would have sought a revision 
of the concept of unity in terms of the interpersonal character of 
Father, Son and Spirit as they are experienced in the life and worship 
of the Church. 
Bracken himself tentatively suggests a "new conceptual 
framework". ý,, hich accords closely with the concept of persons-in-relation 
presented above. He notes the attempt by Hodgson to find a new 
perspective on unity-in-Trinity, but that the analogy of the internal 
unity of an individual self was not a -suitable model for a society of 
persons. 
2 
He further notes a recent attempt by William Hasker to 
consider again the appropriateness of the social analogy for the doctrine 
of the Trinity. Hasker's basic thesis is that "there is in God a Father, 
a Son and a Spirit, who mutually love and QQmmune - that is who enjoy 
personal relationships - with each other. Each Person is to each other 
Person as an 'I' to a 'Thou'". 
3 
As to the ground of unity, Hasker 
analyses the distinction between 'person' and 'nature' and concludes, 
"che nature is that in virtue of which the self is able to have experiences 
of various kinds; it is the real capacity or the real potentiality for 
op. cit. p. 260. 
2 
Ibid. Part I p. 166. 
3 
William Hasker, "Tri-Unity" Journal of Religion vol. 50 1970, p. 5. 
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having such experiences,,. 
' 
'Person' is 
"the self existing as the possessor of its nature and by 
it as the subject of its experiences, experiences which 
are not the self but which are experiences of the self and 
which by their character serve to characterise the 2therwise 
unknowable nature by which they are made possible". 
Using this model for the Trinity, he declares that 
"the one individual and indirisi-ble 7-, Iature of God is 
possessed by three Subjects, each of whom is really 
distinct from the other two and is the Subject of his 
own distinct expe 5 iences in the unity of the one divine 
nature and life". 
Bracken quotes these passages and comments that Hasker's 
analysis of 'nature' was exclusively in terms of its function as the source 
of unity for an individual human being, not for a society of persons. 
How can three persons share one nature? 
4 
Bracken's own approach to the 
unity of Persons in the Trinity is not based, as Hodgson's and Hasker's, 
on the unity of the individual. Rather, he redefines the concept of 
unity so that a community of three persons does not contradict it but 
constitutes it. The question of the unity of God and the question of 
the distinctness of the Persons are brought together by understanding 
unity precisely in terms of the mutual love of the three Persons. The 
"essence" or "ontological unity" of Father, Son and Holy Spirit as one 
God "would be grounded in the single act of infinite being whereby they 
5 
are a community of three persons". 
1 
Ibid. p. 24. 
2 
Ibid. p. 26. 
3 
Ibid. p. 27. 
4 
Bracken, "The Tmj-'inity", Part I, p. 168. 
5 
Ibid. Part II, p. 259. 
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Belief in the Trinity demands that the three divine 
persons, Father,. Son and Holy Spirit, exist as one God, 
not three Gods. Yet one is not thereby committed to an 
understanding of their ontological tri-unity as 
reductively the unity of physical substance. Their 
unity as one God might also be the unity of a community. 
In this case, the name 'God' would be strictly speaking 
a common or, better, a communitarian term which is 
applied first of all to the individual persons as 
members of that same community. 
Is there an answer here to the guiding problem for this 
section, namely, the possibility of personal particularity, or distinctness, 
without being individualised? Bracken himself asks the question, "If 
the divine persons are God only in virtue of their unity as a community, 
then what are they as individual persons, apart from their reality as a 
community? " The answer to this query-. 
... would seem to lie in the further proposition that 
to be a divine person is to be ipso facto a member of 
the divine community. 'Person' and 'community', at 
least within the divine being, are thus strictly 
correlative terms to express different aspects of the 
same unique reality: the persons together are the 
community and the community has no reality apart 
from the persons. Without these divine persons the 
community would not exist. But likewise without their 
life together in community the persons would not exist 
in relation to one another and thus be distinguished 
as individual persons. It is therefore a false 
question to ask what the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
are in the T selves, apart from their reality as a 
community. 
That Bracken can declare the question of the individuality 
of the divine persons a false question leads us to inquire into the 
assumptions supporting his position. He himself does not present 
the concept of unity-in-community as an undefended doctrine, but declares 
that it depends for its coherence on an "antecedent philosophical 
hypothesis that the unity of a community is a genuine ontological unity 
1 
Ibid. Part II, p. 129. 
2 
"The Trinity", Part I, p. 179. 
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on a higher level of being than that of an individual substance"-1 From 
a prior review of the attempts of various twentieth-century philosophers 
and sociologists to define the reality of human community, he makes 
clear his own understanding of the "social nature of man". 
2 
He develops 
a Onew social ontology" in which "the first category of being should 
not be substance but ... persons-in-community", which he defines as: 
the free union of self-sufficient individuals within 
a collectivity which exists in and through themselves 
as a group but also ver and above themselves as 
individual persons. 
Having established his ontological model he then uses it to "offer a 
preliminary reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Trinilt". y". His 
declared purpose is to establish his hypothesis as 
"at least plausible, 
i. e. free from internal contradiction'_'. 
4 
He then finds that it has 
"unexpected strength and flexibility for the analogical understanding 
of the distinction of persons within the Godhead". 
5 
Bracken's arguments have been considered at some length, 
because his position is close to the one presented here. But there is 
a crucial difference in method. Bracken analyses the social character 
of man and develops a model of persons-in-community. The Trinity is 
then used as an example of the theory. In this thesis the existential 
analysis has shown if man is considered without reference to an extra- 




Ibid. L-). 171. 
3 
Ibid. p. 179. 
4 
Ibid. ý?. 169. 
5 
Ibid. Part II, p. 270. 
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by the contradictory fact of separate individuality. The paradox of 
presence-in-absence suggests that lr=an' jersons, considered on their 
own, cannot be free from their individual 'natures' and hence their 
separateness. If this is true, then the community relations of 'human' 
persons cannot be used as an analogy for a community of divine persons 
who are free from individual separateness. The doctrine of the Trinity 
is not under consideration in this chapter as an example of persons-in- 
community but as the possible ultimate resource for personhood, the 
resource in which there is pure presence without absence, where persons 
are themselves without in any way being individuals. The relevance of 
the Trinity for man will be considered in the final section of the 
chapter, but as a preliminary comment it would seem that 'human' 
personhood considered in itself is ultimately a contradiction; and that 
a personhood in which there is hope for 'ý? ure' presence is a divine- 
human personhood. 
This discussion has indicated that in at least one 
contemporary treatment of the Trinity, the concept of personhood 
without individuality is defended as being free from internal contra- 
diction. The further vital question of whether this concept, in 
addition to being internally coherent, also refers in reality to a 
Trinity of Persons in Unity cannot be considered here. An extensive 
analysis of both the patristic and Biblical material would be required 
to determine whether this position reflected any of the strands in the 
Christian tradition. Sufficient has been said here to indicate a 
compatibility between the philosophical concept of persons-in-relation 
and some interpretations of the problem of unity in the Trinity. 
What relevance does a discussion on the Trinity have for 
the question of being oneself? The answer is given in an impassioned 
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cry from Rahner; 
The isolation of the treatise of the Trinity has to be 
wrong. There must be a connection between Trinity and 
man. The Trinity is a mystery of ýalvation otherwise 
it would never have been revealed. L 
With this thought in mind, attention is turned to Christology and to 
the second question isolated above, can persons be embodied without 
necessarily being individualised by the body? 
Embodiedness without Individuality; the Doctrine of the Incarnation 
Contrary to Bracken's argument it seems that the doctrine 
of the Trinity cannot be understood by analogy with human persons-in- 
community. The existential analysis using Heidegger and Buber has 
indicated that personhood in man is expressed paradoxically as presence- 
in-absence, and such presence seems inappropriate as a model for 
personhood in God. 
Yet this position leaves the problem of the relevance of 
the Trinity for man. If the Trinity cannot be understood by analogy with 
human personhood, then neither, it seems, can human personhood be under- 
stood by analogy with the Trinity. It is one matter to show the 
coherence of the concept of three divine Persons who are themselves 
purely in relation to each other, but how can this be relevant to man, 
who, it appears, is inevitably individualised by his body? As was noted 
in Chapter IV, the relation of persons and the body presents a dilemma: 
are only bodiless beings persons, or are only bodies persons? If the 
former, personhood carmot be attributed to man; if the latter, personhood 
cannot be attributed to God. 
2 
Now this dilemma, in which man and God are 
divided, is generated by the assumption that beings are individualised by 
their bodies, or Inaturesf. John Zizioulas' solution to this dilemma should 
1 
The IEIEI, ýZ, p. 2 1. 
2 
cf. above, p. 175. 
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be recalled from the last chapter. His conclusion was that the only way 
out of the dilemma was to admit the possibility of a particularity 
which was not determined by the body, and that even when it is determined 
by a body (as in the case of man), the person is particularly itself only 
because it is unique and indispensable in the context of communion. 
In other words, the presence of persons would not be established on the 
basis of a given 'nature' compelling them to be 'there', but on the 
basis of love and freedom. 
There is here a radical implication for the distinction 
between God and man. If both 'human' and 'divine' persons could be 
identified only in communion, and not on the basis of a given 'nature', 
what is it that would distinguish God and man? The answer given by 
Zizioulas himself is that the only difference is that man is created 
whereas God is not, and that man would be himself in communion with God. 
2 
This would be so only if the self was not also identified and isolated 
as an individual body. How embodied persons could be free is of course 
the pressing problem of this section, and indeed of much of the thesis. 
The conclusion of the preceding chapters has been that from within his 
own resources man has no way of overcoming the individualisation of the 
body. The suggestion was made at the end of Chapter IV that the concept 
of God was implicit in the idea of personhood, for God as 'pure' presence 
was an ultimate hope for persons trapped in the presence-in-absence 
paradox. The difficulties with this suggestion concerns the possibility 
of any connection between Persons-in-Trinity and embodied persons. What 
possible connection can there be between God and man, that could enable 
1 
"Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", p. 415, note 1. 
2 
Ibid. p. 434. cf. Gregory of Nyssa. On the Formation of Man, 
Chapter 16: 
vvherein,, then, lies the distinction between the Divine 
and that which resembles it? In this: that the one is 
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embodied persons to be free? John Zizioulas' own answer, at the end of 
his paper on personhood, is to understand Christ as the person in whom 
"the division of natures (divine and human or created) becomes difference". 
Rather than thinking of the 'divine' and 'human' natures of Christ "as 
though they were something ultimate or self-existent", he begins with the 
person of Christ who is himself in "the filial relationship between the 
Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit in the Trinity". Thus, the 
particular uniqueness of Christ as the second person of the Trinity, and 
as Jesus of Nazareth is established by the same relationship. 
2 
With this 
schema, Zizioulas hopes "to avoid the dilemma 'divine or human person' as 
well as the curious composition 'divine and human person'". For: 
*** 'human person' and 'divine person' cannot in this case 
be placed in apposition as though they were two parallel 
'entities' of some kind: the dilemma 'divine or human person' 
as well as the composite 'divine and human person' disappear 
in Christ by virtue of the fact that the one and the same 
'schesis' [i. e. relation] is constitutive of Christ's being, 
both with 5egard to his humanity and with regard to his 
divinity". 
Zizioulas' Trinitarian interpretation of Christ as man would seem to imply 
that he was not himself as an individual at all, but that his identity 
as the embodied person %j; -esus of Nazareth was given solely by his relation 
to the Father. His concrete particularity as the embodied Jesus is not 
denied by this scheme; without being embodied he is not man at all. It 
uncreated and the other exists through creation". 
Quoted by V. Lossky. Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church. CLondon, 
James Clarke, 1957), 
_p. 
119. 
1"Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", p. 415, n. 1. 
2 
Ibid. p. 436. cf. W. Pannenberg's claim that Jesus identified 
himself only as he pointed away from himself to the Father, and that 
"the deity of Jesus himself, as that of the 'son', is based precisely 
on Jesus' holding fast to the difference between God the Father and 
himself". Theology and the Kingdom of God. (Philadelphia, Westminster 
Press, 1969) p. 134. 
Ibid. 
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is rather that Christ is not individualised by his human 'nature'; 
instead: 
... human nature in Christ recovers its ekstatic 
movement towards God and thus it overcomes its 
individualisation. In this sense creiturehood 
becomes a 'new creation' in Christ... 
The idea here seems to be that Christ the person whose identity was given 
solely in relation to the Father, was free to "recapitulate" and "refer 
back" scattered 'nature' to its Creator in a way which restored the 
wholeness of man's 'nature'. "Had Christ been another 'individual' among 
us, this catholicity of nature would not have been realised". 
The major difficulty with this notion, that the identity of 
Christ is established solely by the relation of sonship to the Father, is 
that the concrete individuality of*Jesus is denied, in favour of a 
particularity-in-relation. Is this not a denial of the full 'manness' 
of Jesus? If his identity as a person was established in the Trinitarian 
relationship, was he not also identifiable as an individual with a 
particular personality, set within a particular socio-political context? 
How can the person of Christ be embodied without necessarily,,, being 
individualised, i. e. confined by the boundaries of the body, boundaries 
which culminate in death? 
John Zizioulas is himself fully aware of these criticisms 
and argues that the embodiedness of Christ as man and the embodiedness 
of men, must be interpreted ecclesiologically, and pneumatologically. 
1 
Ibid. p. 435. For the relation of the person of Christ to the 
body as one of freedom rather than necessity cf. Athanasius De Incarnatione 
translated R. W. Thomson (oxford University Press 1971), p. 137. 
2 
Ibid. cf. J. Zizioulas I'Ve"rite' et Communion",, Irenikon 1977 no. 4, 
pp. 492ff. where these ideas are expanded somewhat. 
3 "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity". p. 437. cf. "Verite et 
Communion", p. 493. 
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This is not the place to consider at length what would, in effect, 
amount to a full dogmatic theologyr nor indeed can alternative 
Christologies be considered. The purpose of this section, and indeed 
of the chapter, is simply to respond to the claim, at the end of 
Chapter IV, that the concept of God is implicit in the concept of 
persons-in-relation as developed above. From that analysis, questions 
have arisen, not the least of which is the relation of person to body. 
All that can be achieved here is to outline some requirements which a 
Christology would have to meet if it were to be consistent with the view 
of personhood, explored. Zizioulas' Christology at least in the brief 
fragments quoted here, only highlights one of the problems to be faced 
by theology, as indeed it is one of the outstanding problems facing any 
attempt to concretise the idea of persons-in-relation. 
Outstanding Questions relating to a Christological Anthropology 
The preceding sections of this chapter have been concerned 
with two questions identified above as crucial for the coherence of a 
relational selfhood, viz. Can persons be particularised without being 
individualised? ; and, Can persons be embodied without being 
individualised? 
1 
It has been argued that particularity without 
individuality is internally coherent with regard to the Trinity, and 
that embodiedness without individuality is a Christological possibility. 
If a Christological anthropology is to be constructed on the basis of 
these conclusions, then the following are some of the problems to be 
faced, concerning the ontological relevance of Christ for man. 
1). The relation of person to 'nature' 
In this thesis, the embodiedness of persons has been 
presented as a paradox. The stance has been that the body is an 
I 
see above, p. 192. 
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inseparable aspect of the human person, the concrete 'mode of existence' 
of each unique person, made unique by communion with other persons. The 
paradox arises because each body, as an isolated unit of 'human nature', 
is also the basis of a unique identity formed by separation from others. 
If this paradox is to be resolved Christologically, it would seem that 
a revision of the concept of 'nature' is required, so that the 
fragmentation of man's 'nature' is overcome in the person of Christ. 
Ide-individualising' of the body of Christ is necessary, so that his 
embodiedness is affirmed without thereby identifying him as an individual 
'nature'. 
' 
In the preceding section it was noted that Bracken attempts to 
qualify the concept of 'nature' in God by the concept of communion-of- 
persons. The 'nature' of God in this understanding is not divided into 
three separate 'natures', neither is it a fourth entity over against the 
Being of the three persons. For a Christological anthropology to be 
the ontological ground of the view of self outlined in this thesis, the 
attempt must be made to conceive of the 'nature' of man along the lines 
Bracken uses with reference to the Trinity; so that man's 'nature' does 
not individualise him but is the embodied 'mode of existence' of persons 
who are themselves in relation. 
2). Christ as Representative Man 
If Christology is relevant to anthropology, some view of 
Christ as Representative man is necessary. If Christ as an individual 
overcame death, that event has no significance for others, apart from a 
legalistic functional one. His resurrection would be a private 
resurrection in the midst of a decaying world and a dying humanity. 
1 
cf. J. Zizioulas who coins the phrase "de-individualising of 
Christ", "Vdrite'et Co=union', ' p. 495. cf. V. Lossky, The Mystical 
Theology_of the Eastern Church, pp. 118ff; In the Image and Likeness 
of God, (oxford, Mowbray, 1975), pp. 106ff. 
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In talking of representation, care must be taken here to 
avoid the pitfalls of some Western attempts to interpret Christ as 
Representative man. ii-itonement theory in Western thought views Christ 
as Representative man but in so doing either ignores the freedom of 
persons or the power of death. The substitutionary model in which 
Christ dies in our place makes the existence of each person redundant; 
and an 'imitative' model, whereby following Christ's example leads to 
salvation, in no way affects and reverses our passage towards death. 
The task of an adequate Christology is therefore to find a model of 
Christ as Representative man in which the embodied uniqueness of each 
person is preserved. In other words, an attempt must be made to conceive 
of an inclusive Christology, i. e. one which affects man rather than 
some men, without usurping the freedom of persons. 
The particularity of Jesus Christ in the Church 
Some way of bridging the gap in space and time between the 
particularity of the embodied Christ and the particularity of other 
persons must be found. It is possible that the Pauline doctrine of the 
Church as the body of Christ can be understood ontologically rather 
than analogically, so that the identity of persons in the Church, and the 
identity of the person of Christ are established in an identical way. 
Clearly, if Jesus is identified as himself by his individual separateness, 
then he, as one individual, could not be identical with other individuals, 
i. e. if Jesus was identified by his spatio-temporal presence, then it 
makes no sense to say that others could 'be' him. 
one possibility is to bridge the distance betweeen Christ and 
ourselves pneumatologically. however, as John Zizioulas comments, 
introducing the Holy Spirit as a Deus ex machina in order to connect an 
individual who lived in Palestine for thirty years with us here and now, 
213 
does not convince either existentially or ontologically. 
1 
On this model 
the Spirit is an agent of communication, assisting in overcoming the 
distance between Christ and ourselves. Zizioulas identifies another 
Christological model, in which the Spirit has an ontological function, 
with respect to the person of Christ and of ourselves: 
Ici le Saint-Esprit n'est pas quelqulun qui nous assiste 
A en comblant la distance entre le Christ et nous-memes, 
mais il est la personne de la Trinitel qui re"alise 
actuellement dans 1'histoire ce que nous appelons le 
Christ, cette entite' absolument personnelle et relationelle 
de notre Saveur. En ce cas notre Christologie est 
conditionnee essentiellement - et non seulement 
secondairement 2 comme dans le premier cas - par la 
pneumatologie. 
In this interpretation, the division between the 'one' and the 'many' 
in the body of Christ disappears, for Christ is 'one' as the unique body 
Jesus of Nazareth, as he relates to the Father, but he is also 'many' 
in that the same relation 
... becomes now the constitutive element - the hypostases - 
of all those whose particularity and uniqueness and therefore 
ultimate being are constituted through the same filial 
relationship which constitutes Christ's being. The biblical 
notion of the 'body of Christ' acquires [in] this way its 
ontological significance in all the variations in which this 
notion appears in the Bible: the anthropological (Adam - 
firsý and last), eschatological, ecclesiological, eucharistic 
etc. 
This concept has much to commend it, and is a useful starting point in 
tackling the problem of how persons can be freed from bondage to their 
spatio-temporal boundaries. If Christ, pneumatologically, is himself 
both as 'one' and as 'many', then the resurrection cannot be interpreted 
111V of 
erite et Communion , p. 495, note 3. 
2 
Ibid., p. 497. For commentaries on the pneumatological approach 
to Christology characteristic of Eastern Orthodox theology, cf. V. Lossky, 
The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, pp. 156ff; In the Image 
and Likeness of God, pp. 104ff. 
3 
J. Zizioulas, "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity". p. 438. 
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primarily as an event involving the historical Jesus Christ and relevant 
to the Church only as a secondary matter. Rather, the resurrection, which 
expresses the embodied transcendence of the person beyond the boundaries 
of space and time, must refer both to the one body, Jesus Christ, and 
the body of persons-in-commilnion, the Church. 
At least one difficulty remains with this concept as presented; 
viz. the temporal dimension is ignored. Indeed, Zizioulas declares: 
.0 Le Saint-Esprit en actualisant 1'evenement Christ dans 
Of 11histoire, realise en meme temps Son existence personelle 
. 7-- comme corps ou communaute. Le Christ nlexiste pas d'abord 
.0. e- comme Verite et ensuite comme communion; Il est les deux 
simultaneement. Toute distance entre la yhristologie et 
llecclesiologie disparalt dans 1'Esprit. 
In the light of what has been said above concerning the bondage of persons 
to a particular 'time 12 , the concept of the simultaneity of the existence 
of the embodied Jesus and the body of the Church, as suggested by 
Zizioulas, is problematical. And yet this problem of the 'fixity' of 
persons in the past must be faced as a problem for Christology, and some 
way must be found to express the transcendence of the person of Jesus 
beyond first century Palestine, and so from there to express the 
transcendence of all persons beyond their 'own' time and space. From 
the analysis of Buber, it has been made clear that such a freedom of 
persons is not found by 'abolishing' time in the timeless 'moment' of 
encounter. The difference between one person's 'time' and another's 
must not be denied - for it is a particular and unique space and time 
which enables persons to be embodied at all. But 'time', instead of being 
a barrier to communion between persons, must be shown to allow free 
communion to take place. For a Christology to offer such freedom to 
111V / I/ erite et Communion", p. 497. 
2 
cf. above, p. p. 189f If. 
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persons from the limitations of space and time, an eschatological 
perspective is required, for clearly persons are not yet free from their 
boundaries. 
4). Freedom anticipated in the sacraments 
One final question must be asked which is of central 
significance for a Christology compatible with the view of personhood 
explored. If Christology is to be concerned not simply with the 
relationship of God and man in one 'individual', but with every person, 
how can the freedom of person vis a vis his 'nature' be actualised 
existentially? The incapacity of man to overcome the spatio-temporal 
limitations of his body has been emphasised; there can therefore be no 
suggestion of transcendence of the self by will-power, or by following an 
ethical code. One approach to the question of the actualising of freedom 
from space and time is to find ontological significance in the sacraments 
rather than simply a symbolic value, i. e. in these acts of the Church, 
space and time are transformed in anticipation of the eschaton_, so that 
these dimensions are bearers of personal communion instead of dividing 
persons. Whether or not the Pauline understanding of the sacraments, or 
the thoughts of the Church Fathers, can bear such an ontological 
interpretation cannot be investigated here. Certainly, some contemporary 
Protestant theologians appear to view them in such a way. Thus 
T. F. Torrance in Space, Time and Resurrection, understands baptism 
and eucharist as spanning the 'old' and 'new ages'. On the one hand, 
"visible, tangible and corruptible elements" of this creation,, water, 
bread and wine are used. But on the other, these become the bearers of 
1 
the new creation in Jesus Christ. 
1 
Space, Time and Resurrection. (Edinburgh, the Handsel Press, 
1976), ID. 148. 
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The two Sacraments of the Gospel enshrine together the 
essential 'moments' of our-participation in the new 
creation, while we are still implicated in the space 
and time of this passing world. Baptism is the 
Sacrament of our once and for all participýLtion in 
Christ, ... The Eucharist is the Sacrament of our 
continuous participation in Christ ... which is 
regularly to be repeated, until Christ comes again. 
They thus express in their togetherness the core of 
the ontological and eschatological relation which 
we ha Ye within the crucified, risen and ascended 
Lord. 
Such a sacramental view is an attempt to avoid a divorce between this 
spatio-temporal world, characterised by decay and death, and another 
world of the 'new creation I, a world in which the freedom of persons is 
not contradicted by the body but enabled by it. Whether or not the 
sacraments can meet the requirement cannot be settled here. Nevertheless, 
the point remains that if Christology is to be the ground of anthropology, 
then some way must be found of concretising the freedom of Christ, as 
Representative man, within our paradoxical existence. From the above 
remarks it may appear that, by focusing on the sacraments, this 
Christological model reduces personal Being in Christ to the 'moments' 
of baptism and eucharist, in a way reminiscent of Buber's 'moment' of 
encounter. This problem, however, need not be insuperable. There 
remains the possibility that the reflection of the transformation of 
space and time, expressed by the sacraments, is also to be found in the 
existence of persons. In the concluding pages of the thesis, it will be 
suggested that in the tension between the 'now' and the 'not yet' 
portrayed by the sacraments, there is a vision of Christian existence. 
Before that point, a final comment must be made on the 
1 
Ibid. p. 150. cf. Jurgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the 
_ý2irit. 
(London, SCM, 1977, pp. 236ff; pp. 252ff. 
Theology of the New Testament, CLondon, SCM, 1952), 
Rudolf Bultmann, 
vol. 1, pp. 310ff. 
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purpose of this section. it has not been the intention to provide 
answers to the paradoxes explored earlier, but rather to raise more 
problems, which have to be faced by Christology if it is to be relevant 
to these paradoxes. As with the preceding section on the Trinity it 
should not be thought that Christology is here subjected to the 
philosophical concept of persons-in-relation as if it were the ultimate 
criterion of truth. Rather, the reverse holds. If Christology is to be 
relevant to the paradoxes of existence, it is our concepts of 'self' and 
'man' which need revision in the light of Christ as Representative man. 
The clear conclusion of the comparison of Heidegger and Buber has been 
that the 'self', defined without any relation to an extra-human reality, 
is left either to a relation with itself, or with creation. The result 
of either is death. Christology, if it is to provide the ontological 
ground for another view of man, must surely show that man is not himself 
towards death, but towards life. In summary, if Christ is to be that 
life, a Christology is needed which is inclusive for man without 
usurping the freedom of each person to be himself. Secondly, if the 
person of Christ is to be interpreted ecclesiologically as communion, 
then a view of the Church is needed which, again without denying freedom 
of persons, offers an inclusive hope to all persons, indeed a hope that 
the whole creation of space and time itself "will be set free from its 
bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of 
God". (Rom. 8: 21). 
CONCLUSION 
ESCHATOLOGICAL EXISTENCE 
In the last five chapters there has been an exploration of 
the polarities of love and death. Heidegger's stoical isolation in the 
face of decaying time, and Buber's timeless moment of eternity in the 
face of the other, which began as alternatives, have both emerged as 
dimensions of manwithout which one is not faithful to the paradox of 
existence. The problem throughout this study has been how to hold 
together love and death without denying the reality of either. It has 
been argued that the attempt to reconcile the two leads ultimately to 
the incorporation of death in the definition of man, so that man- 
without-death would not be truly man at all, but some sort of super- 
man. Such an acceptance of death means that, even if a distinction is 
made between empirical man, man 'as he appears ', and 'true' man, both 
would be defined by death. If, on the other hand, it was argued that 
'true' man is man without death, what are we to make of empirical man 
who is a part of a dying world. Is man 'as he appears' not man at all? 
Buber's vision was that empirical man is not wholly defined 
as a being who dies, for a dimension of man 'as he appears' is his 
capacity to love, and love cannot be acco=odated with death. For 
Buber,, in the midst of the world of necessity and death is another 
world of freedom disclosed in the momentary meeting of 'V and 'Thou'. 
The criticism of Buber was that he could not come to terms with 
facticity, with death, for the glimpses of eternity in the moment of 
encounter were presented as though they were inherent in creation here 
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and now, if only we had eyes to see and ears to hear. 
It was suggested that an eschatological perspective might 
overcome this deficiency in Buber's thought. But have the Christological 
a. ssues sketched in the last chapter taken us any further, for has not the 
new identity in Christ been confined to the 'moments' of baptism and 
eucharist? Both Heidegger and Buber in different ways were searching 
for authentic existence, for a way of identifying oneself which 
corresponded to and reflected the world as they believed it to be. 
Is there no way in which an eschatological identity can be expressed 
other than in the sacramental life of the Church? If there is, it 
should not be imagined that somehow in the midst of a creation gripped 
by facticity some persons, by following a programme for authentic 
existence, can achieve freedom from the strictures of space and time. 
The reality of death surely puts an end to any suggestion that freedom 
could be achieved by following a code of bAhaviour. According to the 
Christological points raised, in the last chapterr freedom must come only 
I in adopting a new identity in Christ, in whom space and time have been 
transformed in anticipation of the coming glory of God. 
How then could eschatological existence be actualised? 
Perhaps by bringing a hope in the transforming creativity of God to 
bear on the present and the past, of which we too will soon be part. 
This hope is that in the power of God, for whom the past is as much a 
reality as present and future, persons and events in the past need 
not be trapped by their own space and time but can be related to an 
eschatological future. Such a hope for the transformation of the past 
is expressed well by the Scottish poet, Edwin Muir: 
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But he will come again, it's said, though not 
Unwanted and unsi=moned; for all things, 
Beasts of the field, and woods, and rocks, and seas, 
And all mankind from end to end of the earth 
Will call him with one voice. In our own time, 
Some say, or at a time when time is ripe. 
Then he will come, Christ the uncrucified, 
Christ the discrucified, his death undone, 
His agony unmade, his cross dismantled-- 
Glad to be so--and the tormented wood 
Will cure its hurt and grow into a tree 
in a green springing corner of young Eden, 
And Judas damned take his long journey backward 
From darkness into light and be a child 
Beside his mother's knee, and the betrayal 
Be quite undone, and never more be done. 1 
There is here a hope for a re-creation of the past, so that even Judas, 
that archetypal figure of damnation, would become as a child, not only 
forgiven but made innocent. And so we can wait with longing not only 
for persons in the past, but with them for the whole material creation 
to be released from bondage to necessity, and confinement to a particular 
space and time span. 
Does this mean that eschatological existence can be no more 
than an attitude of hope and longing? Is there only a vision of glory 
wit ut any concrete anticipation of it? Is there any real sense in 
which persons could anticipate the transformation of the past? Clearly 
any suggestion that the past could be altered by the will of man would 
be to presume for man the creative power of God, and would be a denial 
of our weakness and bondage to our own space and time. And yet to 
accept that 'what is done is done' seems to be an acknowledgement that 
we are ultimately defined by our own space and time. In Chapter V it 
was suggested that this paradox of existence could be actualised as a 
1 
Edwin Muir, "The Transfiguration" in Collected Poems 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 200. 
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Resistance to facticity, a Refusal to be defined by it while 
acknowledging its reality. 
With respect to the past such a resistance surely takes 
place when someone refuses to let the past be forgotten, whenever 
Bloody Sunday, or the death of Martin Luther King, the 1968 invasion 
of Czechoslovakia or the crucifixion of Christ, are remembered and 
recalled to the present, as a suffering testimony against complacency 
in the present. To be faithful to the Eschaton, such a recalling could 
not be a mental recollection of past events which does nothing to 
alter the events themselves, but in the fashion of the Lord's Supper is 
an anamnesis ,a re-calling of the past event which is complete only 
in relation to the eschatological future, in a way which affects the 
present. In recalling these events to the present, there is a refusal 
to accept the world as it is portrayed by the oppressorst a refusal 
to rest while these events are forgotten by oppressors for whom they 
are an embarrassment. 
Perhaps here the Christian doctrine of the forgiveness of 
sins is relevant, if it is viewed from an eschatological perspective. 
In contrast to some views of forgiveness which, tacitly conceding that 
the past is unchangeable understand forgiveness as a forgetting of what 
has happened, or a pretence that it does not matter for the present, 
could not forgiveness be seen as a refusal to forget, for forgetting, 
in Marcuse's words is also "to forgive what should not be forgiven if 
justice and freedom are to prevail .... To forget past suffering is to 
forgive the forces that caused it--without defeating these forces'l. 
1 
1 
H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 185. 
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Such a refusal to forget should not be taken as a mental process, a 
function of the individual, but a personal stance of remembrance in 
which one recognises past wrong-doing and suffering, and presents it 
to the righteousness of God. Forgiveness would then be a mediating of 
the hope that past and present are not always to be bound by facticity. 
Not that this activity could be the means by which the past is transformed, 
but that in its forgiving the Church enacts in imperfect and partial 
ways the complete transfiguration of creation by God for whom no one and 
no part of creation at any time is absent. 
As far as the present is concerned, once again the key to 
eschatological existence seems to be to maintain a critical stance over 
against the world 'as it is', to refuse to resolve the tension between 
the 'now' and the 'not-yet'. As to how that tension is demonstrated in 
concrete situations, it appears that almost any action could be faithful 
to the eschatological vision, and almost any action could be a denial 
of it. One could exist ascetically, anticipating the eschatological 
transformation,, Ipy renouncing the limitations of the body with its 
natural needs. In that way one resists the world 'as it is', yet such 
an existence could easily be a denial of the tension if it were forgotten 
that such ascetism is only an anticipation of the kingdom and in no way 
a final realisation of it; or if the renunciation of bodily needs 
became corrupted to the view that the body is evil. 
On the other hand one's actions could portray the frailty 
of the human condition and yet be faithful to the vision of the Kingdom 
of God if one accepted the frailty not in complacency but in longing 
for the time when creation is transformed. It seems that an absolute 
position on any moral dilemmais excluded and that it is not so much one's 
actions'but one's whole orientation which determines whether one is 
existing in faithfulness to the eschatological hope. 
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To illustrate the range of existential possibilities an 
example will be considered from the world of drama rather from 'real' 
life. In T. S. Eliot's "The Cocktail Party" two ways of expressing love 
are explored. Celia, who has a vision of a love taking her beyond 
herself, believed she had found in Edward someone to whom she could give 
such love. With him, time stood still. "I abandoned the future before 
we began, and after that I lived in a present where time was meaningless, 
a private world of ours, where the word 'happiness' had a different 
meaning, or so it seemed. "i Yet when, after his wife has left him, 
Edward refuses to take the opportunity to gain his freedom with Celia, 
she feels she has betrayed her inward vision of love by supposing it 
could have been made real in Edward. In her distress she turns to 
Reilly, a psychiatrist, to ask if she can be cured of her longing for 
a visionary love. He assures her, 
If that is what you wish, I can reconcile you to 
human condition, the condition to which some who 
have gone as far as you have succeeded in returning. 
They may remember the yision they have had but they 
cease to regret it ... 
He depicts existence in which two people become tolerent of themselves 
and others, and the other life will be only like a book they have once 
read,, and lost, a dream that has faded leaving only a sad, wistfulness; 
0- two people who know they do not understand each 
other, breeding children whom they do not understand 
and who will never understand them. 
3 
This is one kind of love, which Celia feels could not match her vision, 
1 
T. S. Eliot, The Cocktail Party (London: Faber and Faber, 
1974), p. 65. 
Ibid., p. 136. 
3 
Ibid., p. 137. 
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but which might have been her lot with Edward. Reilly responds, 
There is another way, if you have the courage. 
The first I could describe in familiar terms because 
you have seen it, as we all have seen it illustrated, 
more or less, in lives of those about Us. The second 
is unknown, and so requires faith--the kind of faith 
that issues from despair. The destination cannot be 
described; you will know very little until you get 
there; you will journey blind. But the way leads 
towards possession of what you have sought for in the 
wrong place. 1 
The interesting point is that Eliot, far from denigrating 
the commonplace life in comparison with the self-sacrificing love he 
wishes to portray through Celia, refuses to judge them as alternatives. 
Thus Celia asks, 
... what is my duty? 
Reilly: Whichever way you choose will prescribe its own duty. 
Celia: Which way is better? 
Reilly: Neither way is better. 
Both ways are necessary. It is also necessary 
to make a choice between them. 2 
Eliot here presents two ways of loving, the way which leads to self- 
sacrifice, and with Celia to a withdrawal from 'normal' secular life 
to a religious calling. The second way is expressed in the bustle 
of everyday life. Both ways are necessary for tog*ether they remind us 
that the kingdom of God is not here, and yet may be anticipated. 
This tension between realisation and longing is evident not 
only in one to one relationships but in all areas of social and political 
life. To be faithful to the coming Kingdom of God, it appears that a 
resistance to two assumptions is called for; both that the ultimate 
1 Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 138. 
Ibid. 
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realisation of freedom can be engineered by man; and the view of the 
ethical libertine who supposes that there is nothing we can do to bring 
in the Kingdom of God, so we might as well do what we like. 
Perhaps it is the agony of choosing itself which is 
faithful or unfaithful to the eschatological vision rather than what is 
finally decided. The weakness of the person who is unable to take the 
sacrificial path may witness as much to the absence of the Kingdom of God, 
I 
as much as does the person who denies his own self and lives for others. 
Is not the Church also to reflect this range of existential possibilities, 
embracing and standing in solidarity with the weakness of man, as well 
as being an anticipation of the glory of the coming Christr keeping 
before the world the vision of the Kingdom: 
It's a long way off but inside it 
There are quite different things going on: 
Festivals at which the poor man 
Is king and the consumptive is 
Healed; mirrors in which the blind look 
At themselves and love looks at them 
Back; and industry is for mending 
The bent bones and the minds fractured 
By life. It's a long way off, but to get 
There takes no time and admission 
Is free, if you will purge yourself 
Of desire, and present yourself with 
Your need only and the simple offering 
Of your faith, green as a leaf. 
R. S. Thomas, "The Kingdom" 
H'm (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 34. 
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